

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

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THE TAPROOT OF RELIGION AND ITS FRUITAGE

BY
CHARLES F. SANDERS
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
GETTYSBURG COLLEGE

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1931

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SET UP BY BROWN BROTHERS LINOTYPERS
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TO

My Wife

WHOSE SYMPATHY AND ENCOURAGEMENT
MADE IT POSSIBLE

PREFACE

THE problem of religion is complicated with all the cross currents of civilization. Statecraft has undergone profound modification in recent years. Science and invention have completely revolutionized the modes of thought and of life throughout the whole of our Western civilization. Man's mental horizons have expanded so rapidly that he has become bewildered. So many of the old landmarks are gone. Man has become so engrossed with the subsidiary interest in things, that he has almost forgotten that his major interest is realizing manhood. Absorbed in the question of "What shall I do or what shall I get?" he has lost sight of the more important question, "What shall I become?" Even our educational system has been caught in the maelstrom. The vast extent of knowledge has imposed the necessity of selection, with the result that our students go out into life specialized. Their very education has destroyed their perspective. Having accepted the idea that man cannot master everything, it follows that he must choose what shall claim his attention and what shall be ignored. As a

result of this splitting up of interests the universal interest of faith and religion has slipped into the rank of a special interest, which may be ignored just as a man may ignore astronomy or politics. If civilization is to get its bearings, and if man is to move with steadiness toward his high destiny, religion and the faith of religion must be restored to its rightful place of universal interpreter of life and master of civilization. We live by faith, not by knowledge. We must needs awaken to the recognition of the fact that the *things of faith* must receive the attention which their importance warrants. The writer sends forth this book with the fond hope that it will contribute something to this end.

I wish to make special acknowledgment of the helpful suggestions made by Professor S. G. Hefelbower, Ph.D., who was kind enough to read my manuscript before it was submitted to the publisher.

C. F. S.

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,
January 1, 1931.

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THE TAPROOT OF RELIGION AND ITS FRUITAGE

THE TAPROOT OF RELIGION AND ITS FRUITAGE

CHAPTER I

ITS PLACE IN EXPERIENCE

Our age is intoxicated with respect for material progress of every sort. No one seems to question this. But why should they? The past half century has witnessed more advance in man's mastery over physical nature than the whole course of civilized history which preceded it. It is eminently proper to recognize this splendid achievement and admit it to the crown of glory which is its due. But it is a most grievous error to fail to observe the fatality of its distracting power. The fascination of these great achievements has so charmed us that we have well-nigh lost interest in the abiding values of life. In a general way this is the psychology of the complaints being heard concerning the decadence of religion. It is the very simple process of absorption in *things* to the utter neglect of *values*.

To the writer of this book the complaint

about the efficacy of religion has been greatly overdone, and the lamentation that religion has lost its grip is an utterly mistaken judgment. Man has a destiny to realize, and he knows it. He may not always be clear as to its nature but he is never entirely unconcerned about it. In the moments of his serious reflection he acknowledges that mastery over things is his sideline; that his real business is self-realization. And religion is the vital stream of spiritual dynamics which both guides and inspires man in this his most intimate concern.

Concerning things it may be sufficient to have knowledge; but concerning values it is essential that wisdom be added to knowledge. The admonition, "with all thy getting, get wisdom," is compelling. To miss it, is to miss destiny, the most fatal prospect imaginable. The fact that he has been victimized by error and superstition makes him critical. For he simply cannot afford to be deceived on an issue which involves the self. Man wants peace of mind which is bound up with the realization of his essential nature. His method consists of a comprehensive survey of the sum total of experience to read out of it the meaning of life. At the heart of experience, under a variety of forms, there is a directive spirit which forever bids him rise above the actual and temporary to achieve the real and the abiding.

Our first concern, therefore, is with *the fact of religion.* We are not setting out on a course of apologetics. We are dealing with a fact which is given in experience, the supreme fact in the understanding of the universe and of human life. Our aim is to interpret this fact. At the very outset we would have it understood that, so far as method is concerned, we shall proceed in accordance with approved scientific principles. We begin with fact, and we shall insist on fair and accurate interpretation. So far as this procedure makes us critical it is for the sake of establishing a more correct statement of the truth. The great apostle of Christianity enjoined his disciples to "prove all things, and to hold fast that which is true." It is only in this way that the promise of the Founder can be realized, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." That freedom is the philosopher's peace, the religionist's triumph.

What, then, do we mean positively when we propose to discuss *the fact of religion.* Just this; that religion is not an invention, nor a fiction produced by craft to seduce the ignorant, or as an instrument with which to tyrannize over the timid. It is rather the most profound expression of the nature of man. It is a mode of human reaction that is as fundamental and characteristic as affinity in the field of chem-

istry. Chemical elements attract and repel each other in accordance with a definite law of proportion. They simply do. And the science of chemistry is a matter of tracing out those laws. In the field of human relationships there is a steady urge to socialize in accordance with a divine program. Historians and ethnologists from Herodotus to Wundt agree that there is no city or community of human beings without its temples and its gods. This universal expression of man's nature is fundamental and characteristic. The problem here differs from the problems of physical science. Physical elements and forces remain the same. Man, on the other hand, finds himself unfinished and his central concern is the achievement of the full fruition of his potential powers. Religion is the main factor in bringing this to pass, and the philosophy of religion is simply the matter of tracing out the law of this development. An age that boasts of its scientific spirit must seek to explain this sublime phenomenon rather than explain it away. It is utterly useless to undertake to understand man without an adequate interpretation of this profound expression of his nature in which he functions at his highest.

The great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, once remarked, "Give me matter, and I will build a world." The point of this observa-

tion is that *matter must be given,* and moreover, its modes of relationship must be determined by its original endowment, but once thus given it holds within itself the principles of world-building. That is to say, matter, as we know it, *i.e.* as it appears in nature, is intrinsically endowed with the principles of world-building which science discovers. The source of this endowment, so far as science is concerned, is a mystery, but the fact of the endowment is attested by the constancy of its reactions. In similar spirit, we may claim, "give me persons and I will build a moral order." The point again is that the persons are given, and moreover they are clothed with the unique endowment which makes the moral order inevitable. But the moral order involves discipline, inspiration, endeavor toward achievement. We may for the moment regard the source of this endowment as inscrutable mystery, but there can be no question as to the endowment. It is our object here to describe, and, perhaps, interpret this fact of human nature.

In the physical order it is a fact that matter gravitates; in the personal order, it is a fact that persons aspire. And, let us be reminded, they achieve. Gravitation and aspiration are modes of functioning that are irreducible and each is scientifically attested. Religion moves and has its being in the realm of aspiration. A

fair interpretation of experience requires us to give full recognition to the fact of aspiration as well as to the fact of gravitation.

The bed rock from which we start is this aspirational character of our personal nature. As Wundt observed and reiterated, "In the realm of the psychical, the most fundamental law is the law of increase, as over against the law of constancy in the realm of the physical." Professor James, in a brilliant passage, observes:

> The pivot round which the religious life revolves, is the interest of the individual in his private, personal destiny. Religion, in short, is a monumental chapter in human egotism . . . Religious thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental fact. Science, on the other hand, has ended by utterly repudiating the personal point of view.

We challenge this repudiation. This is not to discredit science. We are simply insisting that science respect its limits.

There are many scientific conclusions toward which a man may take an attitude of indifference with perfect equanimity. But such is not the case on conclusions which involve man's own nature and all of his prospect. The philosopher's search for wisdom is not imposed by a

morbid brooding over things that are not. It is inspired by the very nature of personality. Where the prospect depends on one's own choice—and this is just the essence of personality—the wisdom of the choice is paramount. Moreover, the distinction between the wise and the foolish is not an arbitrary one. Wisdom does make a difference. Wealth and poverty represent distinctions of possession and they make a difference. But possessions frequently are beyond our control. Wisdom and folly, however, are more fully within our control and the differences they make are vastly more consequential than the differences of possession. It is this preëminent importance of wisdom to personal achievement that tends to be ignored in an age so absorbed in things as is the present.

We cannot here enter upon the interesting problem of the freedom of the will except to say that, no matter what physiological psychology may have to say, the fundamental fact about persons is that they grow in wisdom and in self-direction. That is to say, man begins his earthly career with utter lack of self-direction or self-control. But he takes himself in hand and disciplines himself to the increase of his self-mastery. And this self-mastery defines the ends for which the discipline is undertaken. Any procedure that ignores or slights this fundamental fact can have no just claim to scientific stand-

ing. We cannot explain man in impersonal terms.

The moment we seriously direct our attention to the positive characteristics of the human self we find that *the most fundamental thing about it is aspiration and achievement.* This fundamental characteristic is a fact and deserves to be treated as such. The effort to rule it out to save a mechanical theory is a vicious bit of dogmatism that has long since been out of date. You may set its beginning where you like and account for its origin as you will, but you cannot, without violence to the facts, escape the fact that the most characteristic thing about civilization is the achievement of higher levels. Professor Ayres, in his brilliant book, *Science, the False Messiah,* has effectively noted this by saying: "Man does climb above himself . . . Civilization is like Jehovah; it is that it is." [1]

Bishop Berkeley observed long ago that we have a tendency to stir up a lot of dust and then complain that we cannot see. Recent psychology has made liberal contributions to this confusing dust. It is important that we get clear of the range of this behavioristic dust and take an accurate survey of some of the most palpable forces of history, in order that we may be in position to give them a fair reckoning. In man's

[1] Ayres, p. 281.

steady climb through the long and tedious course of human achievement, he has been under the inspiring guidance of the idealistic philosopher and the religious seer. We must note not only the fact of the seer's vision, but likewise the no less important fact that the rank and file has responded to his inspiration. "Everyone knows that none of Plato's millennial suggestions has ever been put into force without crippling reservations; but no one has ever ventured to conclude that this means that the *Republic* might as well never have been written . . . No such state having been founded, our confidence in its possibility remains unshaken." [2] The Sermon on the Mount implies a social order that could never by any stretch of imagination be regarded as the scientific description of a fact; but no one would be so rash as to deny the vital force of its challenge. The same holds true of every piece of classic art and literature. It is just this soul-revealing and inspiring aspect that constitutes their classic character. The classics are the profound expressions of the human soul on the great themes of its potential aspiration. They are not only significant in themselves, but the fact that the rank and file of the human spirit discovers and responds to them contributes to an understanding of their essential nature. Their undying

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

appeal confirms their revelations as a true expression of the reality of spirit. As the flowing stream betrays the character of its source, so the whelming flood of classic art and literature is the most revealing thing we have of the nature of the soul from which it issues.

What do we mean by classic anyhow? If it does not mean the expression of some profound universal principle of spiritual appeal, it does not mean anything. If it does mean this principle of appeal, and the writer thinks it does, then it represents the unmistakable evidence that aspiration is the characteristic principle of human nature. This spells personality in letters that will not rub out.

The scientific spirit of our age has magnified induction with good reason. Its insistent query is: What are the facts? When we come to speak of ideals a difficulty lies near. Ideals are not facts in the ordinary sense of the term. But they are not less than facts; rather more. The soul from which they issue is a fact and by the ideal it lifts itself and others beyond itself. It simply does. And in this sense it is more than fact. Touching questions of destiny science writes "Unknown" with an air of finality which frequently smacks of hierarchical infallibility. What we need to understand is that there may be possibilities of error in this generalization, both as to the data as well as in the process of

induction. There may be attitudes and sources of direction outside the factors to which science has been trained to apply its method of rigorous induction. It is scarcely scientific to relegate ideals to the junk heap, because they fail to conform to the requirements of measurement which science has learned to apply so strictly. Common sense would seem to dictate a wiser course. Our first inquiry is not whether we can set its mathematical limits, but rather whether they constitute a real factor in human experience. The fact is they do elude measurement, but they do not vanish into nothingness thereby. On the contrary they are the all-pervasive, creative principles of civilization. What, then, is to be done about it? Surely we dare not be so rash as to treat this aspect of our nature with contempt. The other alternative is to acknowledge that there are realities for which we are obliged to make room, which lie beyond the pale of scientific determination.

> But beyond the bright searchlights of science,
> Out of sight of the windows of sense,
> Old riddles still bid us defiance,
> Old questions of Why and of Whence.
> There fail all sure means of trial,
> There end all the pathways we've trod,
> Where man, by belief or denial,
> Is weaving the purpose of God.
>
> —WHETHAM.

I am claiming a fair hearing for the grandest phenomenon of all human experience, the experience of conceiving ideals and responding to their appeal and inspiration. The unmistakable distinction of personality is its capacity for formulating and projecting ideals and moving toward their realization. The whole story of man's life on the earth is told in terms of these projections. I am rather doubtful whether science is always fair with the facts when it writes "Unknown." I sometimes wonder whether some other term, such as unmeasured, might not be more correct.

The other day I happened to be participant in a conversation in which a class discussion on the topic of animal intelligence came up. One member of the party, but recently returned from university studies, observed, "Professor Blank says, 'if animals had language such as we have you would find them quite as intelligent as we are.'" Now in common honesty is it fair to say that the reason why animals do not have such language is unknown? Perhaps even more to the point, is it fair to suggest that language is the cause of man's superior intelligence? The fact is that human language is one form in which the flowering of man's personal nature finds expression. When the astronomer finds irregularities among the planets he knows there is a disturbing body in the neighborhood and

he sets out to find it. Somewhere at the dawn of human history man discovered a "disturbing" factor in his own nature which distinguished him from other animals. Civilization has been advanced by a deeper penetration into this discovery and a more effective application of its meaning. But now the amazing thing has happened among psychologists that the age-old recognition of a distinguishing personal character, which lifts man above the animal kingdom, is on the point of being denied. The reason for this denial seems to be the determined purpose to force man into the mechanistic or naturalistic scheme of things. But the denial of what is distinctive in man is too high a price to pay for a theory. It is surely much more scientific to undertake a more thorough construction of the system of spiritual values in which this idealizing character lives and moves and has its being. The poet's phrase, "how like a god," may not look very scientific, but it is not absurd. And it seems a good description of the aspiring nature of personality. At the bottom of all that is distinctive in human experience there is this disposition toward ideal motivation. The personal is there and we know it is there. Naturalism discredits itself when it denies what is distinctive in man in order to save a theory.

As soon as we give full recognition to the fun-

damental fact of personality we are launched on the way toward a system of values which admits of consistent construction quite as readily and quite as coherently as the system of mechanism in the physical order. Moreover, in doing so, we arrive at a point of view which enables us not only to interpret experience, but likewise to give an adequate interpretation of the subject of human experience. The fact is, that so far as human beings are concerned, experience is always surcharged with an element of destiny. The late Professor Liebmann, of Jena, in a brilliant essay under the title, *From Plato to Darwin,* directs emphatic attention to this idealizing, directing factor which is everlastingly headed toward a moral goal. The only legitimate outcome in this interpretation is to give full place to the moral categories as well as to the physical categories. The experience of *glory* is as unmistakable as that of *color,* but their respective meanings as they affect our adjustments belong to different realms.

Having thus shown that the distinctive thing about personality is aspiration and achievement, the next step for our consideration in interpreting human nature is the fact that *religion represents the field of man's highest achievements, specifically as respects himself.* Man has achieved much in the realm of science and mechanics and his masteries here have done

much to convince him of his powers. But after he has done his best in these fields the supreme thirst of his soul still remains unquenched. He craves to become something more than a mere master of mechanical forces. His personal will is struggling to effect a mode of self-expression worthy of the dignity of his rational and moral nature. This insistent struggle may drive him to the laboratory, to the jungle, or to the martyr's stake. No matter whether it is Bruno or St. Paul, the witness of the will insisting that there is something better than mere earthly life is inescapably there. The man Bruno, the man Paul, the man Socrates lives for something beyond the confines of time and space. His specific achievement of personal dignity is worth more than life to him. When a stupid world would destroy this precious self of his, he rises above the world and lays down the temporary in order that the eternal may abide. It is not only the individual martyr who does this, but the deed inspires a response that clothes the act in a halo of glory which lifts the whole of humanity to a higher plane. There is no fact in all our human history that is better attested than this. The martyr's stake becomes a shrine. If we attempt to analyze this hard resistance of the will we find it sustained by sentiment that will not relent, and by logic that refuses to be ignored. The man seems to say: *"My self-*

respect would cease should I stoop to purchase life at the price of the denial of these principles and their logical implications." When he is thrown back on himself to account for his stubborn persistence, he is forced into the field of metaphysics. His course gets its justification as it reflects the viewpoint of the everlasting. The testimony of the ages approves the martyr and condemns the court that sat in judgment. The heart of humanity says we must find our criteria of personal worth in the things for which the martyrs stood. Man ultimately insists that his world view must be big enough to comprehend the glory and majesty of the martyr's ideal. In doing so, he is simply and plainly following the very best principles of science. But let us not forget that the thing he is seeking to interpret is the dignity and the transcendent meaning of personality.

In the last analysis, it is the system that ultimately justifies every scientific conclusion. Our problem, therefore, takes the form of whether or not religion can be interpreted consistently in the whole of things. As a matter of course the scientist, who is wedded to the mechanist theory to the extent of ruling the personal out of the universe, denies that there is any such problem. A very singular situation obtains at the present time. Among the psychologists, who are studying the mind, behaviorism derives

mental phenomena from matter. For them, matter is the base from which all else is explained. Among the physicists, who are studying the physical phenomena of matter, Einstein and his followers are deriving physical processes from spirit. For them spirit is the base from which all else is explained. Under these circumstances this is scarcely a time for mechanistic dogmatism. On the other hand, it would seem a most propitious time to construct anew a world view big enough to comprehend and explain personality, which is at once the most fundamental and the most characteristic fact about the human self.

In short, man's ultimate striving is after a personal character, a character that can abide. No matter whether as an individual or as a group, the supreme fact is always that in his most deliberate efforts of self-expression there is found at the same time the effort of a self-realization that will abide. Man insists that there is something intrinsically worth while about him, and he lives for the realization of this ultimate worth. His striving after his ultimate worth constitutes his religion. The chemist makes much of specific gravity in the determination of chemical character. He does this because of its definite revelation of the nature of the elements. It is but fair that we should give similar confidence to man's specific aspir-

ation as evidenced in religion in describing man's fundamental nature. Specific gravity interprets chemical character; specific aspiration interprets personal character; and these are not interchangeable.

I scarcely know whether there will be much profit in attempting a definition of religion. Definitions have spoiled so many things that I am fearful here. Professor Tyler defines religion as "the belief in spiritual beings," which certainly leaves much out. Durkheim calls religion "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single community called a church all those who adhere to them." This is almost a puerile confusion of a formal, institutional principle with a dynamic principle of personal life. And, moreover, Durkheim overstresses the negative aspect. The essence of religion is positive, the inspiration to aspire. Edward Caird is certainly much closer to the facts when he says: "A man's religion, if it is sincere [if it is not sincere, it is a misnomer to call it religion], is that consciousness in which he takes up a definite attitude to the world, and gathers to a focus all the meaning of his life." I have a good deal of sympathy with C. J. Webb when he says, "I do not myself believe that religion can be defined." But we must at least try

to make clear what we are talking about. Lactantius calls it "the link which unites man to God." Personally I have tried to say nearly the same thing by defining it as "life motivated, inspired and dominated by the consciousness of God." The important thing to be kept in mind is that religion is a thing of life and accordingly partakes of the same difficulties in definition as life itself. I have seen no definition of life other than a description of its functions. Religion is personal life functioning toward God.

There are three great fundamentals in human experience which form the basis of large classifications of facts in our environment. The first is the fact that matter gravitates. We know only that it does. We do not know why except that it is somehow in its nature to do so. The second is that plant life germinates and grows toward the light of the sun. We know only that it does. We do not know why except that it is somehow in its nature to do so. The third is that personal life grows toward spiritual light. And here we have brilliant intimations of "why" as we do not have in the case of the lower orders. This growth toward spiritual light promises self-realization, ultimate satisfaction, peace. It is thus the revelation of man's nature in its profoundest aspect. Here we plumb man's deepest depths. "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so thirsteth my soul for Thee, the living

God," is the most brilliant epitome of the religious nature of man.

It is highly important that we differentiate this subjective, tremendously vital thing, this fundamental character of personality from its objective forms which so easily appear as dead husk. It is at this point that Durkheim's definition, previously noted, is in error. Rites and ceremonies are social instruments more or less effective in the social functioning of religion; they are modes of carrying on. In themselves they are dead. They function only as they issue from living personalities and inspire responses in other personalities. Apart from persons they are worse than empty. The bane of ceremony is the ease with which it lends itself to superstition. This is what Jesus found in the Temple at Jerusalem, and Paul found in Athens. A famous teacher of psychology in one of our great universities was asked why he did not publish a textbook. His reply was, "I want to continue teaching psychology." The point of which was that the moment he would reduce his teaching to cold print much of its vitality would be gone. The personal stimulus would be absent. In the field of religion the importance of the personal is vastly greater just because religion is so completely a personal matter. Temples, creeds, and ceremonies are indispensable as instruments for carrying forward the religious

program. In studying the fact of religion these indispensable instruments of religion require the same recognition as laboratories in the field of science. The laboratory, no matter how well equipped, is ineffective without the scientist. The laboratory always remains subordinate to the man. In like fashion the personal force of the man must vitalize the rites and ceremonies. A laboratory is just as much a superstition as a ceremony so long as the personal element is left out. Charged for its normal function by personality both of them take an effective place in the onward march of human progress.

When man thinks through the real aspiration of his own nature to its culmination in a character that can abide he calls it by various names, such as happiness, *summum bonum,* rationality, balanced character, or godlikeness. No matter by what name he describes it, the fact that he does so shows definitely that man is conscious of imperfection together with an inner urge to overcome it. He forecasts his destiny in the same fashion as he develops his knowledge in other fields, namely, by constructing a consistent conception of personality. It is this thinking-life-through to destiny that impels man to religion. When he does think it through, devotion to that ultimate meaning becomes religion. There is no escape. Functionally the experience of religion takes the form of complete self-dedication to

the perfection of one's personal powers. Having conceived the possibilities wrapped up in his potential self, the aspiration to realize springs forth as the plant from the seed. The full-blown flower of that aspiration is religion. Hence the observation that man is "incurably religious."

Our analysis of the fact of religion thus far has shown that it is of the nature of personal beings to aspire and to achieve; that their highest achievements in the sphere of self-realization constitute religion; it now remains for us to consider the third factor which this analysis reveals; namely, that *in the grand program of realizing his destiny man seeks help from above.* He draws upon his objective world for help and he receives it. Figuratively speaking—and I am not so sure that it is merely a figure—his own personality in its feeble incompleteness reaches out to the mighty complete and he calls Him God. And this is no more fiction than the sun is fiction to the growing plant. In each case it is response to light. There is mystery about each of them, but the fact is, they grow under the light. From God man draws inspiration; before Him he is at once filled with awe and inspired with hope; all his powers of imitation and of emulation are called into action. "We shall be like Him for we shall see Him as He is."

We are dealing with the fact of religion. We are keeping close to the facts of personal re-

action. Science has made much of the superstitions which have clung to man's religious programs and the confusion with magic in the early stages. This is all true. But the deduction so frequently drawn from it is not true, namely, that religion is wholly a matter of superstition. It is more than strange that scientific men should insist that religion should have been born full grown and free from error from the start, and in the same breath go into ecstasies over the marvelous growth in other fields of human knowledge. The superstitions in the field of medicine are of the rankest sort. And what was astrology but superstition in the field of astronomy; mesmerism in the field of psychology; and now Einstein comes with the startling revelation that matter is an ancient superstition of the physicist. But why enlarge on a point so patent? The fact is that primitive man did have very crude notions about Deity and the mode of communing with Him; but directing attention to the crudeness is missing the point. The main thing is that he did have the notion. His notion about physical nature and of modes of reaction to it were quite as crude. And it may be well for us in this connection to be reminded that even before Einstein the reality of matter had been denied with even greater cogency than the reality of God. But man does react in very definite ways to both.

We are now confronted with the problem of Deity. Thus far we have been analyzing experience and keeping close to common sense. Man does aspire and he does achieve. It is not quite so simple to make clear the fact that he gets divine help.

There is no question about man's building temples and elaborating forms of worship. The problem consists of determining what objective warrant there is for his worship. Some months since I met with a very agreeable traveling companion in the person of a professor of biology in the University of Peking. He was Chinese with a Western education. Our conversation naturally turned to the fundamentals underlying our respective civilizations. His contention was that the idea of Deity is not necessary, claiming in evidence the Confucianism of China. But when he tried to explain the Temple of Heaven and the worship that took place there it was evident that heaven was treated as if possessed of all the personal attributes ordinarily ascribed to Deity. Thanksgiving and supplications are not addressed to impersonal being.

A few years ago a delegate to the conference of The Religious Education Association, announcing himself as a teacher of religious education in a mid-Western college, surprised the conference by saying they had ceased to use the

name of God, finding such concept unnecessary. When asked whether he prays and worships, his reply was in the affirmative. So far he was clear. He had ceased to use the name of God; he had continued to pray; he had continued to worship. When asked how and to what he addresses his prayer his fumbling was most revealing. The principle of gravitation is nonsense without a physical entity at the center; and worshipful aspiration without a person on the throne is absurd. Until we somehow rise to the conception of the personal as the inspiring center of worship we have failed to explain it.

The supreme object of religion is God and if we are serious in thinking of religion as a fact we must somehow bring God within the range of fact. Our difficulties here in large part grow out of the infamies that have been perpetrated in the name of God. France and Russia, to mention only these glaring examples, prostituted this sacred name and all it stands for to the most corrupt purposes. Voltaire, though never avowing atheism as he was charged, protested that the infamies practiced in the name of Deity were sacrilege; and Lenin, outraged by the cruel tyrannies supported in the name of religion, repudiated the whole religious scheme and professed atheism outright. But these protests, arising as they do against spurious forms of religion, can no more be taken seriously as

evidence for atheism than a protest based on counterfeit coinage should be taken to mean that there is no genuine coin. Frankly, I do not believe in the God of Rasputin, nor in the God of the French Jesuits under the Bourbon régime. But I am not an atheist. In the case of the counterfeit coin we reject the counterfeit by the standard of the genuine, not the other way around. Atheism and irreligion proceed in the opposite direction and reject the genuine by the standard of the spurious. We must make it our business to distinguish the specific character of the genuine and eliminate the counterfeit from the market. We must do the same thing in religion.

We are treating religion as a fact given in experience. Subjectively this experience appears as an answer to an inspiration to rise to higher levels of spiritual achievement. In its full functioning it somehow involves a fellowship with God. We have found that counterfeiting such fellowship has wrought much harm, and that it has been assumed that the claim of such fellowship is never more than either pretense or ignorance. What reply shall we make?

In the first place, why should we stumble so greatly over man's ignorance with regard to God when in every other field of his blunders we take them as a challenge to a more persistent endeavor to correct the error and rise above it?

There is no doubt about it, there have been many foolish things done in the name of religion. Robert Ingersoll once grew rich teasing the people about the mistakes of Moses. Didn't Columbus make a foolish mistake, fooling around for three months on the Atlantic in a sail boat? He should have taken an airship and come over in thirty-six hours. Yes, by our better standards, there have been many foolish prayers, perhaps even blasphemous ones. There is no doubt that there have been most absurd things done in various acts of worship. But why concentrate on the absurdities? We do not act that way in the field of medicine. If we concentrate on the truths of Moses, he still towers like a spiritual giant beside whom the mighty Rameses shrivels to the stature of a pigmy. And the difference is due to Moses' response to the great I AM who challenged him from the burning bush.

The trouble with mankind is that he has read into his conception of Deity many of the corrupt attributes of his temporal rulers and regarded Him as being capable of being cajoled and used for selfish ends. But why blame religion for the false conceptions which politics has imposed upon it? Augustine's God is a good deal of a Roman emperor. But now that emperors are out of fashion, Augustine, if he were here, would scarcely repeat this mistake.

Let us admit, then, that man has blundered in his conception and in his use of the sacred name of Deity. But let us not on that account surrender the sacred name. Let us seek to do here what under similar circumstances we are accustomed to do in the case of other blunders. Let us try to correct them.

There is a very common error which treats knowledge and belief as separate and distinct processes, whereas the fact is just the opposite. The separation has been responsible for a most unfortunate attitude toward belief. It has brought belief into a sort of quasi contempt as if it were shifty and insecure. Religion, which is faith in action, under this false separation becomes utterly illusory, perhaps downright fanaticism. Now the fact is that knowledge and belief represent stages of solidification, so to speak, in our understanding of experience. The belief is more plastic than knowledge but no less real on that account. Belief invariably begins as the implication of knowledge, and it is constantly under the necessity of revision as enlarging experience increases the amount of knowledge as well as its accuracy. We know, for example, that as a result of something happening in space, we experience light. We discover also that whatever it is that furnishes this experience travels at frightful speed. Not so long since we believed it traveled by means of active corpuscles. Later we believed that it traveled

as a form of energy by an undulatory motion within a hypothetical substance called ether. Now they tell us that neither of these old beliefs by itself is adequate, but that both seem to be required. We do not know that there are any light corpuscles or that there is any such substance as ether. But we believe in something of the kind from the necessity of having a medium for the conveyance of light as we experience it. Divorced from the belief the knowledge goes to pieces; combined with belief it furnishes explanations which in turn furnish us with modes of control that verify our inferences. Now the point of all this is that *knowledge partakes of the infirmity of belief and belief partakes of the strength of knowledge.* They are not independent processes. What we need to learn is the method of constant checking on our knowledge and belief so as to keep them in accord with the data of experience. Columbus sailed an untried sea by a faith which was implied in knowledge which he possessed. His faith shared the inaccuracy of his knowledge and held much that was erroneous, *e.g.* as to the size of the earth. But it was correct enough to enable him to accomplish his object. If his faith had proved false, if the older faith that the earth is a flat disk had been found true, the discovery of the error would have required the revision of what he called knowledge.

All knowledge, whether of science or religion,

involves certain principles which are and must be accepted by faith. Such for example is the principle of the rationality of the order of nature. We cannot demonstrate it, but we cannot get on scientifically without it. So also with the principle of uniformity. We believe our scientific discoveries of to-day will hold to-morrow and we stake our whole scientific procedure on this faith. If we were to refuse adherence to these beliefs concerning nature, our knowledge of nature would dissolve.

Thus far we have been speaking of the general relationship between knowledge and belief with the object of showing that they share each other's strength and weakness. Applying this general interpretation to the facts of religion we find that religion has the same kind of security as other types of experience. Personally I am disposed to think that in some respects there is an advantage in the matter of security in favor of religion, for the simple reason that we know it from the inside. We always know less about physical objects because our information rests on the most superficial sensory qualities. Now I wish to submit this proposition as eminently consistent with all that we know about man's personal nature; namely, mankind has received the best guidance toward the realization of his potential self from the prophets and the philosophers who have had the clearest consciousness

of God. Professor James is simply recording fact when he says, "Our lives seem good in proportion as we bring them into conformity with the best that we can think of God."

Our age has developed a sort of halo around natural science which tends to obscure the verities by which men live. It is not at all difficult to understand why the idea of the supernatural should be at a discount in a period of great achievement within the sphere which is bounded by the limitations which we ascribe to the natural. But when the age, which is so shy of the supernatural, is called on for a lamp to guide the aspiring soul of man, offers him the Unknown, we feel that we have been offered darkness when asking for light. And we simply prefer the supernatural because our whole being responds to the conception that personality is somehow super and it does rise by subduing the natural. The supernatural, instead of being outside the range of knowledge, actually constitutes the living core of all we know. The fact is we neither know nor do we believe in Unknowns; they do not inspire. Our personal natures, however, are constantly under the spell of the super—"who shall deliver me from the body of this death"; [8] "Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and

[8] Paul.

the inward man be at one." [4] In these phrases taken from classic prayers we have a thoroughly scientific observation of the fact that within our deepest self there is a struggle of something super against the natural plane on which we drift along. And, moreover, it is this super that calls forth man's noblest and most heroic undertakings. In the presence of such facts as these it is only fair that we should make our inferences from these personal reactions with the same confidence that we show in the case of physical reactions. No one has seen an atom, much less an electron, but we accept the postulation of these entities and energies because they are consistent with the facts of observation and make these facts comprehensible. By a similar logic man has accounted for his spiritual struggle as inspired and sustained by the super-spirit which he calls God. In the presence of the supreme fact that achievement of the personal order is inspired that way man postulates God and accepts Him, because He is consistent with the facts and makes them comprehensible. It is sheer nonsense to deny this. Isaiah and Plato, Socrates and Paul, each responded to this super and it is they and their kind who lead the van of civilization.

At the foundation of our total attitude toward our world there are three mighty convictions

[4] Plato.

which simply will not down. First, we regard the universe as rational, the alternative is chaos which makes knowledge impossible; secondly, we regard the relation between cause and effect uniform, the alternative is an everlasting succession of miracle in place of natural law; thirdly, we regard the character of moral values as changeless, the alternative is utter illusion at the heart of the universal order. Deny the first two and all physical science is at an end. Deny the third and you have struck the heart out of personality. Our total attitude toward the physical order of our world includes, we may say is based on, the two former convictions. Our total attitude toward the spiritual order of our world, and this is the order of our most intimate interest and deepest apprehension, is based on the third. Philosophically the God-conception is required as the only adequate foundation for this third conviction. We know God much the same way that we know the electron. The varied phenomena of everyday experience find their explanation thereby. Just as color qualities presuppose a physical object through which they come to manifestation, so the changeless moral values implied in our moral aspiration presuppose a changeless personality in whom they inhere.

Dr. Bernstein, writing in *Harper's Magazine* [5]

[5] May, 1930.

about the status of religion in Russia, concludes strikingly:

> To this writer, himself a teacher of organized religion, there is something darkly fascinating about a nation's attempt to abolish God. Will they succeed? Will they really prove that we believe in God only because we have been taught to believe in God, that man is not fundamentally religious? Or, once their immediate wants are satisfied, will they find deeper needs which bread cannot satisfy, or scientific materialism explain; will they learn, as this writer anticipates, that man cannot live without God?

The point I am making is this, up to the present time the fact is that civilization has been given its direction by religion. The God-idea has been part and parcel of the attested fact of personal aspiration. On the other side of experience, *i.e.* in the mechanical order, science is marvelously efficient. In the aspiring order of personality science stands mute. Science says God is not a scientific concept. Suppose we admit this and ask science by what name it will call the concept which it would substitute as the author of being and the finisher of values. When we hear the answer, "the Unknown," we simply demur, and reply in classic phrase:

"Him, therefore, whom ye ignorantly worship, declare I unto you." Frankly, civilization does not carry on under the inspiration of the Unknown. That is why fairness to the facts forces us to conclude that man, and by the same token civilization, is "incurably religious." His knowledge about his own personal striving impels him to believe in God and this faith in turn validates his knowledge.

The effect of accepting the tragic darkness of the Unknown has been put very strikingly by Eva Warner in the following lines:

> I've joined the ranks of the moderns
> Who spread futility . . . achieved
> the attitude pessimistic . . .
> penned books that feed despair . . . believed
> that life is a blunder. Proudly
> I've scattered the cynics leaven
> and gained my pittance of culture.
> . . . I've lost the kingdom of heaven.

The kingdom of heaven may not be acceptable as a scientific concept, but it is sheer nonsense to say that the loss suggested in the above lines is nil. I should dislike to propose that there are two kinds of knowledge, the one scientific and the other religious. The fact is, I do not believe it. But there are two modes of apprehension and the data represented by the respective modes are of different kinds. I know my avoirdupois through a series of data obtained from

sense perception; I know my "sacred honor" through a series of data obtained from the mystic power of apprehending moral and spiritual values. Both series are facts of experience. Behind the one series lies matter—the reality of which was denied by Berkeley—behind the other series lies the realm of spirit, the kingdom of God, and taking this series at its face value God becomes fact as inevitably and incontrovertably as matter. That is to say, the fact that man aspires to the realization of a kingdom of perfected moral values implies that God is the fact in whom these moral values inhere and through whom they everlastingly inspire.

The great apostle of the Gentiles seems to express this when he says, "I know whom I have believed." The adventure of Columbus or of Marconi required them to say, "I know what I have believed," but in life's great adventure knowledge and belief in the impersonal does not meet the case. Men live under the inspiration of "whom," rather than of a "what." This one in "whom the apostle believed" had uncovered the way of life in the phrase, "I lay down my life that I may take it again." The laboratory scientist may smile at this because it lacks the precision to which he is accustomed. I should like to rub off that cynical smile by courteously challenging him to answer whether or not I am describing a fact. I am not concerned with any

historical event which has transpired at a given date in human history, but rather with the fact that self-denial in the interest of universal moral value does inspire, and this inspiration does lift civilization toward a fuller realization of our personal powers.

I fear we have been guilty of another fatal error in our divorcement of faith and knowledge. Ordinarily knowledge is of objects which exist apart. Their existence is not dependent on our knowing them. We may write the record of our knowledge into a book, and in any case we may remain indifferent to it. So we have written our faith into a creed and treated it as if it were mere knowledge such as the scientist records in his ponderous tomes. The fact is we cannot treat faith that way. Knowledge is of the intellect; faith moves the will. An intellectual acceptance of the creed is not the equivalent of the faith expressed by the creed. I greatly suspect this is the secret of much indifference toward matters of faith. Mere knowledge leaves us cold. Faith transforms life. I am talking about facts.

I am exceedingly anxious to set forth the unity of faith and knowledge together with the difference in the way they function. In order to do this let me translate our venerable Christian Creed out of its cold intellectual form into the impulses of life. And let it be understood

that we accept the creed but we fear it has lost its moving force by its intellectual form. Our translation is to turn it back into the spiritual force in which it was born.

> I believe in love the almighty maker of heaven on earth.
>
> I believe in sacrifice, love's first-begotten and only child, born of the conflict between selfish motives and a diviner inspiration, suffered under the cruelties of a social system governed by unsanctified instinct, prostituted to the promotion of private interests, risen again from its pettiness and ruin, ascended on high and seated once more in the heart of humanity, whence it shall issue forth ever and anon to judge all manner of selfishness.
>
> I believe in the spirit of holiness, the universal brotherhood of mankind, the harmony of human interests, the resurrection of righteousness and its everlasting reign.

Thus translated back into life I submit this as fact verifiable in experience. Love, sacrifice, holiness translated by faith into life do accomplish the results described. But mere knowledge will not do it. One may have the knowledge and remain unmoved, not so with faith. Faith is personality in action, the formula to which the intellect reduces it strips it of its dynamic power. It is as futile to attempt to understand

this living reality from the literal expression as it would be for a biologist to attempt to understand vital functions by studying skeletons. We shall have more to say of this vital character of faith in a later chapter. We have done the causes which are dear to us much harm by treating faith as if it were a rite or a ceremony. We have substituted *services* for *service*. The fact is that *services* tend to beget hypocrisy, but *service* inspires. "Lo, I am among you as one who serves," is the formula of the most inspiring teacher this world has had.

Writing for the *New Republic*,[6] Mr. H. G. Wells relates the following incident:

> The other day I was talking with an eminent Anglican among various other people, and someone with an eye to him propounded this remarkable view, "There are four stages between belief and utter unbelief," he said. "There are those who believe in God, those who doubt him, like Huxley, the agnostic, those who deny him like the atheists but do at least keep the site vacant, and lastly those who have set up a Church in His place. This is the last outrage of unbelief."

The interpretation of which is that we have judged of religion by looking at its outrages and its skeletons and in these we have found dis-

[6] December 30, 1916.

creditable things. But as we penetrate behind the counterfeit we find that the *fact of religion* stands omnipotent still.

Return to the definitions of religion given on a previous page and note that when we undertake to study *religion as a fact* we are in the presence of a living thing. It is life consciously growing toward God. A profound pathos fills one's soul as he travels through the pathways of ancient civilizations. The relics that abide are of temples. The best those primitive people knew found expression in these monuments. Perhaps even then it was not bad. It was at tremendous sacrifice that they thus inscribed the record of their faith in a god to whom the highest glory should rightfully be ascribed. But the pathos of it all consists in their failure to understand the spirit of service. But of the fact there can be no question. It was in the discipline of profound sacrifice and devotion to their god that they achieved whatever abides. In all that remains of these disciplines there is eloquent evidence of the incessant stirring of the conflict between what is temporary and what is abiding. In the last analysis it is upon this that the *fact of religion* rests. Man's personal nature possesses the power to discern values that are intrinsically abiding and it is by these that man lives.

In conclusion, I wish to summarize my claim. It is a fact that religion, which is an

interpretation of life from the viewpoint of a personal God, explains both the leadership of civilization and the response which makes the leadership effective. It explains Moses; it explains Isaiah; it explains Buddha; it explains Zoroaster; it explains Paul; it explains Dante; it explains Gandhi; it explains Sun Yat Sen; and it is from such as these that civilization gets its direction and its courage to carry on. The offer of the Unknown, made by naturalism, utterly fails.

CHAPTER II

ITS RESEARCH AGENT

We have found that religion is a fact given in experience without which the personal aspect of human nature is left unexplained. The distinctive thing about man is his response to inspiration whereby he effects his most characteristic achievements. Things gravitate, but persons aspire. Human aspiration begins by mastery over things, but it is not satisfied until it has mastered self in the interest of the universal. In the effort to bring the self to the fullness of its powers man finds his awakening under the stimulus of an objective spirit to which he has given the name of God. His sense of fellowship with this eternal spirit leads him to cultivate the presence of the God who has inspired him. This is done in the most matter-of-fact way and it is only by an utterly false sophistication that the God of this fellowship has been questioned. Out of this fellowship, which is the original of all religion, he develops institutions for the effective cultivation of the divine presence and for the promotion of his own spiritual mastery.

These institutions suffer from the infirmities which characterize all things human. They arise from spontaneous expression. As soon as they assume the objective form the spiritual spontaneity tends to recede, and the formal letter is made the substitute for the living reality. Criticism then denies the place and function of religion on the basis of the deadness of its spatial form. But just as soon as we return to the functioning of personality we discover the error and find the foundation of religion in the basal fact of creative personality.

We have also found that personality is not limited to sense perception for its acquaintance with the objective world. Even in sense perception the objectivity of the stimulus is verified by subjective processes of intuition and inference. But in the matter of apprehending values the senses fail utterly. The experience of value comes through mystical apprehension which bears similar witness to the objectivity of its inspirations. Hence human experience has two sources of contact with the objective world, the sensory and the mystical. Both of these sources present aspects of reality. The source material of religion comes through the mystical. It now becomes necessary for us to analyze and interpret mystical experience, which constitutes the field of religious research.

The first thing we need to understand is the

fact that the experiences which have the most bearing on life come from something which the senses do not give. We act on the basis of something more than sense, and it is this further meaning which transcends the sensory object which is the most revealing thing in our experience. It is our reaction to this "something more than sense" that reveals both the reality of our personal nature and of our spiritual universe.

In the lines of Browning:

> Earth's crammed with heaven,
> And every common bush afire with God;
> But only they who see take off their shoes.

"those who take off their shoes" *see* something which impels them to take them off. In other words, we see the colors of the rainbow with our retinæ, but we see the glory of it by our mystical sense of apprehension. When experience is taken whole it must reckon with both of these aspects. And we must likewise note that it is the mystical contribution rather than the merely sensory that has the profoundest bearing on our personal natures. It is difficult to describe this to the man who has allowed his obsession with the merely sensory to strangle his capacity for mystical apprehension. He can still report accurately what he sees, but certainly it is gross error to accept his report as complete and final. Immanuel Kant indicates

the overwhelming awe with which he is impressed by the glory of the starry heavens and the mysterious impulsion of the moral law in the oft-quoted sentence, "Two things completely overwhelming me with awe, the starry heavens above me, and the moral law within." In similar vein it has been observed that "the undevout astronomer is mad." He may be an effective astronomer in his undevout madness, but his astronomy must not be taken as a complete record of man's experience in the presence of the starry heavens. If he leaves the glory out of his scientific description, it must not be assumed that it is not there. His astronomy is an abstraction and correct so far as it goes. But reality is whole, and when the whole of the experience of the starry heavens is adequately written the experience of the glory will be included. That is to say, the devout experience requires adequate interpretation as well as the factual experience of sheer, gross sense. Browning's reverence and Kant's awe represent a plus to the ordinary reactions of sense-perception which reveal at once the reality of the mystic process and the need to give it adequate interpretation.

Let us be frank enough to admit that we are here dealing with an interpretation of an aspect of experience which is not in the best standing in an age that has taken to jazz for its entertain-

ment and is otherwise absorbed in the scientific management of physical energies. There seems to be a positive aversion toward the type of contemplation which stirs the deep places of the soul with motives of personal self-improvement. Science has accomplished so much in the way of mastery of things that we have almost forgotten souls, and the mystic thrill has lost caste. Creative art everywhere is the expression of mysticism. It issues from the effort to set forth those vital feeling experiences with which the soul finds itself stirred whenever it penetrates beneath the surface of things. Moses at the burning bush in Midian and on Sinai experienced soul agitations which led to the overthrow of a cruel tyranny and the promulgation of the Decalogue which has become the foundation of civil law.

For a generation or more psychology has been fighting itself free from philosophy. The fight has well-nigh destroyed psychology itself. Much that appears under the title of psychology is nothing more than a branch of biology or physiology. We have no objection to the biologist advancing his science by searching out the bearing of psychical processes on the processes of life. That is his business. But when the master, mind, is subordinated to the servant, the organism, and reduced to the rank of a glandular secretion, we have left the level of science and

descended to the level of the advocate. Yet this was to be expected from the definite aim to reduce mental activity to processes that could be measured in terms of physical reactions without a remainder. In doing this psychology has almost lost the soul just because the distinctly personal element cannot be treated either by the principles of physiology or of biology. A few years ago the writer heard the late Edward Slosson trying to illustrate the chemical correlate of the emotions by saying: "I can change the chemical constitution of your blood by making faces at you." This is perfectly true. Joy and anger do reflect themselves in the chemistry of the blood. But the fatal fallacy of such a remark consists in forgetting that his proposition began with the personal pronoun. The "I" held the power to change the chemistry of the blood; it was not the chemistry of the blood initiating the change in the "I". This personal "I" may be more a term of philosophy than of psychology, but if it is, then certainly psychology has no right to any claim against personality. The fact is, the personal element is fundamental in human experience and if psychology must ignore the personal it can no longer claim to be the interpreter of human experience. As soon as we get back to the facts in the case and recognize that human experience is personal, the difficulties with mysticism are re-

moved. As Bertrand Russell aptly says: "If, as we must do if we have the mystic vision, we find the whole world worthy of love and worship, if we see

> The earth, and every common sight . . .
> Apparell'd in celestial light,

we shall say that there is a higher good than that of action, and that this higher good belongs to the whole world as it is in reality." [1] We must rid ourselves of the psychologist's fallacy of reducing mind to physiology.

If taken by itself, apart from the function it performs in the universal order, the mind is a profound mystery. So is gravitation. But in a world of material objects it serves to explain the sweep of the planets in their orbits, as well as the mystery of weight on the surface of the earth. So knowledge issues from the activity of mind and partakes of the same mystery. But when it is construed consistently with its normal function, it explains man's relation to universal spirit and the onward sweep of civilization through the ages toward higher things. But when we speak of knowledge in this its actual place in the scheme of things we have left physiological processes far behind.

In translating the Creed in the previous chapter we spoke of Love, Sacrifice, and Holiness,

[1] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 27.

ideas that are rich in meaning, but not one of them discernible through the senses. And the richness of their respective meanings lies outside the bounds of physiology. Each of them represents a profound relation of the experiencing person to his universe. Our world, therefore, is presented to us in two orders of being, the one is the world of sense, presenting physical objects, the other is the world of personal relationships experienced in terms of feeling. What we need to observe is that these two supplement each other and must never be permitted to deny each other. Once this is clear, we have advanced a long way toward the reconciliation of many controversies.

Experience of every kind is a veritable chaos as it is presented to us. Take for example the experience of a rose. It is presented to us in a variety of separate items of color, form, odor, and pleasantness. Out of the latter we get its beauty. If it doesn't please it is not beautiful. When it does, its beauty is compelling. We do not argue about it, we simply enjoy it. In the same way there is a compulsion about our rational concepts which rests on an intuitional feeling. We reject the notion of a circular square because we feel that the two concepts do not harmonize. And our resentment of injustice is vastly more than a matter of tradition. Tradition may account for the degree of the fineness of our

judgment of what is just, but the resentment is antecedent. In the background of Moses' experience on Sinai was a long tradition of reflection on cruel tyranny and a marvelous breakdown of the system so that he was prepared to see God. The wreck made by human passion, and the personal resentment against the injustice he had seen, prepared him to bow before the revelation of Him who would not permit the continuance of such things. Before presenting himself to Pharaoh he had experienced a presence which enabled him to say "I am that I am sent me." This sentiment of the ultimate, the inevitable, is compelling. This is mysticism. The reality of the experiences it presents, when squarely faced, is more convincing than sense, simply because it involves the self. That is to say, it requires justice on our own part to see justice. Hence it is that the mystic makes so much of rising into identity with pure spirit. "We shall be like Him for we shall see Him as He is." We will not be able to see Him as He is until we are like Him.

The disposition to see with the mind is antecedent to experience and fundamental in human nature. This sense of seeing things whole in a definite way partakes of the nature of the mystical. Out of the myriad variety of experiences we conceive a universe rather than a multiverse. We feel that it must be one. The infinite

variety of things given, in spite of the apparent conflicts, is forced into a single system. We take our attitude under a sense of compulsion; it must be so, otherwise knowledge goes to pieces. Why shouldn't we let it go to pieces? Simply because mystical feeling will not permit it.

In the deeper apprehension of our own personality a similar compulsion makes us relate our own individuality, with all its revolts and conflicts, with a universal moral whole, a moral universe. Without this whole the meaning of our deepest strivings dissolves. Why not let it dissolve? Simply because mystical feeling will not permit it. A clear consciousness of this sense of belonging to this moral whole, and the accompanying sense of coresponsibility for it, deepens insight and inspires courage. It is just this that makes such heroes as Isaiah, as Dante, as John Milton.

It is scarcely in good taste for the man who fails to apprehend the holiness of the ground on which he stands to cast aspersions on the more penetrating man who does. It has always been a sort of mystery to me that mathematicians, or interpreters of the Einstein theory, should invariably assume a patronizing attitude toward the lay public, implying the foregone conclusion that the rank and file as a matter of course should not be expected to understand these subtilties; and then to flatly reverse their attitude

when it comes to the seer whose vision penetrates the profound depths of things sacred. I respect Einstein and am happy to hear him expound his conclusions and the methods by which he arrives at them. Most of what he says is beyond my comprehension; and I confess that it is quite as difficult of belief as much that the seer proclaims on his ecstatic thrill. But I find that the way of civilization has held steadily forward under the inspiring guidance of the seer. Moses and Jesus remain the preeminent pilots and no one seems to be clamoring for a substitute taken from the schools of the mathematical sciences. It is because of their vision that they inspire reverence. If this vision is hallucination, then it is the clear witness of civilization that high-powered hallucination is superior to normalcy.

At the beginning of the century Professor Paulsen, of the University of Berlin, speaking of the trends within the German Empire observed:

> It is of the genius of the German people to build toward the skies where there are no limits. At the beginning of last century our great universities were fostering this type of genius and we produced a Kant, a Goethe, a Fichte, and a Schleiermacher. But at the end of the century we descended

> to the horizontal where we are hemmed in on every side. We have fostered technical schools to the neglect of the classics. What shall the harvest be?

The harvest came in 1914 and we are glad for the peace of mind of the great scholar that he was saved the anguish of seeing the catastrophe of his people; having died in 1912. Professor Paulsen was pleading for a just respect for the mystical.

It has always been difficult to get a fair hearing for ideals. Plato failed and Jesus was crucified. This would seem to be sufficient emphasis of the importance that we should take note of the fact that mystic apprehension is quite as real as sensory apprehension. The senses furnish us with data about things. It is on these that science builds. Mystic experience furnishes data in the realm of personal values. It is on personal values that religion builds. The philosopher wants a world view which will be big enough to comprehend both of these realities without compromising either.

"The great mystics have not been spiritual drones; they have been hundred-horse-power persons pouring into the world of time their unwonted additions of spiritual energy." [2] And it is by these things that men live and aspire.

[2] Jones, *Fundamental Ends of Life*, p. 86.

It is only by discovering more in the realities of the universe than science has been able to read there that we can find hope of deliverance from the barrenness of our present world. We must come to see that there are many realities which elude the scientific method, and that science always reduces its world to mechanical terms for purposes of description, and that we do not need so much to break with science as to supplement it. There are many great moments when what the poet calls "the heart" stands up and answers, "I have felt."

Walt Whitman says in his inimitably vivid way:

When I heard the learned astronomer,
When the proofs, the figures, were ranged in the columns before me,
When I was shown the charts and diagrams, to add, divide and measure them,
When I sitting heard the astronomer where he lectured with much applause in the lecture room,
How soon unaccountable I became tired and sick myself
Till rising and gliding out I wandered off by myself
In the mystical moist night air, and from time to time
Looked up in perfect silence at the stars.[3]

Let us take a little testimony. Dr. Pratt quotes from the "confession" of a French agnostic as follows:

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

I seem to feel within the depths of my being an action, a presence; in short, I seem to be the object, even prior to being the subject, of an action that it is spiritual. This is in part a rudimentary, half-conscious belief, in part it is simply the expression of a fact the testimony to a sort of profound and vague sensation. I tell myself that this sensation may itself be an illusion, that there may be nothing real about it apart from my subjectivity; but it *is*, and that is enough to live by. It is a part of my being and has for the rest of my being an importance and a value that are supreme—that suffices me. And for the rest, I tell myself that the very fact that I possess this experience called "religious," is a witness in me to the existence of the inaccessible reality; of the union within my consciousness of the me and the not me; that in it I have in some measure an immediate knowledge of the roots of my being, of a bond between me and something else. And just because I have become an agnostic, and because every intellectual formulation of the inaccessible is for me simply a representation of the Reality, without any value in itself, I feel myself on solid ground. I have the experience there within that I have not to act but to receive; that I have

> not the initiative but the duty of waiting and listening; that the source of life is beyond the conscious self, for me, for all men.[4]

After all, the difficulty with mystic experience is the matter of establishing its objective witness. Socrates claimed to follow the guidance of a "daimon" who constantly admonished him. To him this "daimon" was completely objective, a super-person commanding him. To the realist this objective reference is an illusion. And as a matter of course consistency requires the realist to deny the reality of the self, simply because it is forever subject to the knower, never known as an object. We find no difficulty in explaining why we walk around a stone wall. The wall is there objectively and we cannot ignore its presence. It is not quite so easy to see that Socrates could not ignore his "daimon" any more than the stone wall, and to Socrates both were objective realities forcing him to submit. In the last analysis the mystic experience is the witness of the spiritual medium within which we live.

Ultimately, it seems to me, all men experience the mystical in the sense of ought. The sense of shame and remorse follow as the pro-

[4] *Religious Consciousness*, p. 474.

found consequence of failure to respect this insistent command. And it is in this experience that its otherness appears most clearly. "I cannot do otherwise, God help me." It is imperious. It is relentless. Matthew Arnold was disposed to call it "a power not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." Reduced to the logic of realism it is a command given by that which is not, to that which is, and the latter must obey. To the mystic, on the other hand, it is the voice of moral reality speaking to the potential moral nature commanding it to realize its powers.

Let us call another witness: "I am as certain as that I live," says Meister Eckhart, "that nothing is so near to me as God." To the mystic the evidence for the objectivity of God, or other sources of mystic experience, is quite the same as the evidence for the objectivity of the experience of color or odor. Even these sensory experiences are what they are because of the structure of the sense organ. But the sense organ normally does not produce the quality in the absence of the objective stimulus. In like fashion our personal wills bow to the categorical imperative and in the act know immediately that the command comes from God.

Professor Pratt furnishes the following brilliant example:

Dr. Bucke writes of his experience: "The vision lasted a few seconds and was gone; but the memory of it in the sense of the reality of what it taught me has remained during the quarter of a century which has since elapsed. I knew that what the vision showed me was true, I had attained to a point of view from which I saw that it must be true. That view, that conviction, I may say that consciousness, has never, even during the periods of deepest depression, been lost." And still another, Mr. Benjamin Blood: "This has been my moral sustenance since I have known it. In my first printed mention of it I declared, 'The world is no more the alien terror that was taught me. Spurning the cloud-grimmed and still sultry battlements whence so lately Jehovan thunders boomed, my gray gull lifts her wing against the nightfall, and takes the dim leagues with fearless eye.' And now, after twenty-seven years of this experience, the wing is grayer, but the eye is fearless still, while I renew and doubly emphasize that declaration. I know, as having known, the meaning of Existence, the sane center of the universe—at once the wonder and the assurance of the soul." [5]

[5] *Religious Consciousness*, p. 475f.

Our realistic friends are off the track when they seek to resolve the mystic vision into physiology and tradition. When Dr. Coe, for example, says: "The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from it," [6] he completely forgets that the characteristic thing about all mysticism is its transcendence and its purification or criticism of experience—a rising to something higher. On the Damascus road, Paul, under the mystic spell, repudiated the theology he had brought with him and took away a new one. On the *Scala Sancta* Luther rejected all he had brought with him and derived a conception that revolutionized all modern thinking.

The first fact which we discover the moment we enter upon a consistent research in the field of personality under the guidance of mystic data is this: *The truths men live by are whole truths known in mystical apprehension.* However much mankind may have spent itself in the search for gold, this has not been the driving power of civilization. Absorption in the quest of things has rather been a barrier than an inspirer to progress in humanization. Striving for conditions which would permit complete self-expression—the impulse to "be a person," as Hegel puts it—seems to be the central motive of civilization. Material goods may contribute

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 450.

something toward the conditions, but they can never serve as the guiding ends. Man is set to the task of realizing more manhood. The inspiration which urges him on proceeds from an inner witness to the truth.

Present-day realism has built its psychology on an extreme interpretation of John Locke's idea that at birth the mind is as a blank tablet. Experience furnishes it through sense perception. And, of course, the personal self is never presented in sensation. Leibnitz and Kant, who hold that experience presupposes something more than a blank with which to start, are ruled out almost violently. This procedure may seem plausible to scientific psychology, but it fails utterly when it comes to the problem of a philosophy of life. Now it is precisely a philosophy of life that the deeper witness of the human soul demands. This demand of the soul must find room in any adequate psychology. How we shall account for it matters little, but the fact is, the human mind does not start as a blank tablet. Professor Rogers has put the matter much more adequately in the striking phrase, "the dice are loaded." That is to say, man comes into the world charged with potential personality and his life's experience is occupied with realizing on his powers. This means that the interpretation of man requires us to take account of vastly more than what comes to him through

sense perception. Much of what we know comes from what we hear, but Beethoven got more; much of what we know gets its character from what we see, but Raphael got more; much that enters profoundly into the shaping of life's conduct gets its character from social conventions, but Moses, Socrates, Paul, and Kant got vastly more. The plain fact is that the men who have given us the truths we respect and reverence sufficiently to make them directive of civilization, bear witness to mystical apprehension as the source of their wisdom. The truths by which we live are made up and led on by this plus, this something more than what comes from our sensory environment.

In the previous chapter we defined personality as *being which formulates ideals and moves toward their realization.* It is this moving forward involving ideals and realization that is the characteristic thing. And we must not forget that the movement is self-directed, chosen. Call it creative, if you like. The inspirations of art and religion, as they have found expression in sculpture, painting, music, and literature have issued from the creative soul of man. It is this profound power to respond to and to produce spiritual expression that makes man. It is the undying witness to the consciousness that a world of mere things is not his home. He is everlastingly seeking truths of a different order.

Plato describes this as homesickness. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of it as "seeking a better country." To the philosopher, trying to be fair to all the facts of human experience, this homesickness and seeking a better country must be accounted for by a full recognition of this mystical yearning.

Life among human beings is pioneering. When standing by the rail of the sinking *Lusitania* Elbert Hubbard is reported to have observed: "Death is a strange, but beautiful adventure." Coupled with the contribution which mysticism makes to our attitude toward the universe, this observation is sublime. Reduced to physiology and tradition, it is flat nonsense. Death is a beautiful adventure because life is adventure in all its parts. What is birth, adolescence, marriage, choosing a career, success, failure? I tell you, from the viewpoint of physiology and mere tradition, it is all blatant nonsense; from the viewpoint of personality, it is all sublime adventure. We are everlastingly at boundaries; horizons are constantly closing around us in the most forbidding fashion. But the pioneering spirit of personality breaks through the crust of custom and insists on pushing farther on. And, moreover, it succeeds. The ultimate standards of this success come from the mystics. When Moses, Plato, Socrates, and Kant propound the foundations upon which our

life rests the sources to which they appeal are mystical.

Columbus' fellow sailors feared they might drop off when they arrived at the edge of the sea. So great was this fear that the intrepid pioneer had difficulty in keeping them at their posts and sailing on. They failed to share his faith because his mind had been opened to a larger world than theirs. Crito, you remember, inquired of Socrates shortly before his execution for instructions concerning his burial. To the superficial, Socrates' reply seems like a rough jest, "If you catch me, you may bury me as you like." Even his bosom friend stood dumbfounded. He failed to share his faith because Socrates' mind had been opened to the experience of a larger world. The thorough mystic penetrates beyond the horizon of Socrates and sees God. We understand the difficulty with which Columbus was embarrassed because the consummation of his project was confined to the limits of time and space. The mystic's difficulty is less easily understood, because his visions and his programs outstrip physical limitations. We all suffer much from the same difficulty which troubled Crito.

The method of research in the mystical field is by contemplation. The mystic is absorbed in the mysterious strivings of his own soul. He goes apart lest the hum and whirr of things dis-

tract him. And then, communing with the thoughts that rush up from the deep places of his own soul, he tries to penetrate their meaning and solve the problem of destiny. The mad rush for excitement and the getting of possessions has gone far toward quenching the spirit of contemplation. Hence the effort to discredit it. It is a mistake to regard mystic apprehension as identified with the working up of passion. In either anger or love the passion readily rises under the activity of the subject. In mystic contemplation, on the other hand, apprehension rises as the subjective activity recedes. The soul of the mystic strives for quiet that he may hear the voice of the everlasting. His topic of contemplation is the meaning of life. His subjective activity is his most difficult obstacle, as it continually persists in projecting the petty interests of his narrow self into the foreground. This accounts for the almost inevitable tendency to pantheism which is common to the mystics. He sees the One and reposes in his identity with Him. Let us follow this thread of his contemplation. We accept the physiological explanation of color-blindness as due to the lack of certain pigments in the retina. By an analogous logic the mystic holds that he cannot see and know the good without possessing its quality. But possessing its quality means identification with it. We don't possess spiritual qualities

as we possess things. Their possession involves being. We must be good in order to possess the good. This is the real root of the mystic's ecstasy. The sense of entering into oneness with the ultimate is calculated to thrill. We constantly use this mystic formula in the marriage ceremony. "They twain shall be one flesh"; meaning that when love has done its perfect work their spirits blend as one and become identical. In this spirit the mystic contemplates his aspiring personality over against the nonaspiring absolute. When his contemplation has achieved its task, he is enraptured with the sense of having been lifted up into oneness with Him.[7] "If reality is one, we can only know it truly when we merge with it."

All of which simply means this, that our personal nature blooms under a light that is ineffable, for which names seem sacrilege or blasphemy. And, further, that the data thus apprehended furnish us the heart of the truths by which we live. On the mountain Moses turned his back upon the unspeakable glory; at the burning bush on the plains of Midian he listened. What was the result? From the mountain experience came the Decalogue, from the experience at the burning bush came the program of deliverance from Egyptian bondage. The listening Moses identifies himself with the

[7] Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, p. 381.

program of the Eternal Spirit protesting against tyranny. Some time close to his crucifixion Jesus prays "that we may all be one." Mystical apprehension challenges us to realize the perfect marriage with the One.

I have frequently tried to get into a mood to interpret Moses at the bush in Midian. In the background were the edict of tyranny by which his kinsmen were enslaved, his childhood training in respect for Jehovah, his years as a prince in the house of Pharaoh, his bloody resentment of the cruel injustice which he beheld, his flight to Midian and establishment there. He had experienced forty years of apparent peace and prosperity. Now in ripe maturity, he is confronted with this halting phenomenon. I am not much concerned about the bush. The important thing is what was going on in the mind of Moses. The bush burned but was not consumed. The interpretation came to me when I, too, came to stand beside the burning bush. In the background of all history there is the everlasting flame of personal striving for liberty burning itself out against the incessant tyrannies of men, but forever unconsumed.

Every martyr's stake belongs to that burning bush; every battlefield drenched in human blood for the achievement of justice and the rights of men belongs to the fire that never dies and promises not to die until the creature per-

son has risen into likeness with the God who made him. From out this unconsuming flame there comes the insistent voice of the Eternal Spirit commanding, "Go set my people free." This is the central theme of history. It is the eloquent expression of the mystic soul throughout the ages. It is never a closely reasoned conclusion from the facts of sense perception. In the presence of this supreme achievement of personality the instruments of scientific measurement stand mute. The matter-of-fact world treats the mystic vision as folly in the person of the seer, but the ages bow before his message in reverence. They just do. What we need to note is the insistent fact that after the fires of persecution die down and the mystic agitator is out of the way, humanity takes to heart his message and adjusts itself to it. St. Paul was adjudged a fool; Dante was banished as a disturber of the peace; Luther was excommunicated; Abraham Lincoln was hounded and eventually shot; but the mystic visions that were the guiding stars of these men have shaped the course of history and to-day they are heroes, men who stood at the burning bush and heard the voice of God.

We have too long allowed ourselves to be taught history in a way that leaves the impression that military men and princes, whose power is rated in terms of extent of domain,

shape the course of history. Whereas the fact is that these are largely the flotsam and jetsam of the stream of human progress. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, together with Euripides, Æschylus, and Sophocles have entered into the warp and woof of civilization as Alexander the Great, with all his wars, has not. In the history of the modern world Paul of Tarsus, who appealed to Cæsar, is mightier than Cæsar. The world still wants more of Paul and less of Cæsar. When, after another thousand years, the historian undertakes to interpret the past two centuries of European history, Kant, Goethe, and Shakespeare will outshine the names of Frederick the Great, Wellington and Napoleon. The reason for the ultimate recognition of their supremacy in the longer perspective of the ages is due to the fact that they have stood at the burning bush and there, listening, heard the voice of God and proclaimed what they heard. Verily, the essential elements of the truths by which men live come through mystical apprehension. They just do.

Continuing our research into the interpretation of mystic data we *find that the mystic consciousness comes to its awakening under a profound sense of objectivity.* Naturalism refuses the objective voice and reduces the mystic guidance to the mere process of constructive imagination. In so doing, by denying God, it well-

nigh makes a god of man. According to such interpretation, man's imagination outstrips his past and projects his future. The inherent defect of the naturalist contention is the constant witness of the men whose experience furnishes the data. Instead of feeling that constructive imagination is leading him on in architechtonic fashion, the mystic is rather under a profound sense of defeat and helplessness in which he takes on new courage by the inrush of power from above. The appeal to psychology, in its physiological methods of analysis, will not help us any. Strict adherence to the observed data makes it difficult, if not impossible, even to establish the objectivity of the things of sense. Berkeley's contention that our knowledge extends to our nerve-endings and not beyond is rather supported by physiological psychology than the contrary. But as Lord Byron observed, "Who can believe it?" Hence it is by a sort of *tour de force,* at least so far as science is concerned, that the objectivity of human experience is established even on the level of sense perception. That is to say, when I experience certain retinal agitations my conscious awareness stops at the retina, but in spite of that I project my knowledge beyond this limit to the rose which stimulates the retina. I insist that the retinal agitation is witness of the external stimulus. Whilst the mystic cannot as readily

illustrate his contention of objectivity, his own witness within him is always insistent. Elijah's still small voice and Socrates' "daimon," as well as Moses' experience of the voice at the burning bush, were definite objective experiences.

Professor Hocking heads a chapter in his suggestive volume, *Human Nature and Its Remaking,* with the following striking title, "The Divine Aggression." As a beautiful epitome of history, that chapter title implies that God has not given up His claim nor even His responsibility for the man He has created. To the philosopher this conception is at once challenging because of its plausibility. It partakes of the same kind of plausibility that he finds in the objective interpretation of sensory experience. Human imagination does not fabricate its objective physical world from sensory hallucinations, but the mind constructs a definite world of space relations by directly assuming objectivity. So in the realm of spiritual aspiration, the human soul assumes the objectivity of the source of its inspirations by which it climbs to higher levels. In His aggressiveness God breaks through the crisis and leads on to higher things. Witness Joan of Arc, or Paul on the Damascus road, or even Kant's interpretation of the categorical imperative. The inner witness is of an external command that must be obeyed.

Our modern evangelists are prone to speak of breaking through to God. But mysticism at its best speaks of this breaking through as coming in the opposite direction. The thing that happened on the Damascus road came as a lightning stroke through the black clouds of Paul's revolting consciousness, made up as it was of Hebrew theology, Greek philosophy, and Roman politics. In the face of these three, civilization was evidently going to smash. When hope had fled, the force of Roman arms offered no hope, the constructive genius of the Greek imagination was just as barren, the dry formalism of Hebrew religion was empty mockery, it was then that the unmistakable voice commanded him to "stand up and go to Damascus" where he would receive instructions as to his mission in undertaking the establishment of a new order. That divine voice inspired hope. In that hope he carried on until, "having kept the faith," he was "ready to be offered up." So with Elijah under the juniper tree, and on the mountain as he heard the still small voice.

Here we come upon what is, perhaps, the primary difficulty in the interpretation of the mystic consciousness. Sabatier has put the matter well: "God is not a phenomenon that we may observe apart from ourselves, or a truth demonstrable by logical reasoning. He who does not feel Him inside his heart will never find Him

outside. . . . The subject feels obliged, and this obligation itself constitutes the revelation of the object which obliges us." [8] In Kantian terminology, this would mean that the categorical imperative is anchored in the mystical datum of an objective command which we may disobey but which we cannot destroy. The difficulty is complicated by the fact that we conceive sensory objects as existing in external space, whilst spiritual matters are not related in terms of space. Things which are dependent on my own constructive imagination are within my power. They are the product of my subjective activity and, as such, may be obliterated. Such is not the case with the witness of the moral order, or of the order of spiritual aspiration. I may refuse to obey or respond to the inspiring voices, but I cannot destroy them. This is the essence of their objectivity. It is not a matter of space, but of source and of authority.

Even though analogies fall short of demonstrative validity, most of what we know is tinged with analogy. We get knowledge of places we have never visited from the reports of those who have and we fill out those reports by analogies. It is poor enough, but it is not blank ignorance. Let us, then, attempt a sweeping analogy. If we might in imagination ascribe consciousness to the earth, and if the earth

[8] *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion,* p. 308.

were then to probe into the problem of how it kept its orbit, it must somehow find out its relation to the sun. To explain its own orbit without recognition of the determining factor of the sun would be a clear case of subjective excess leading to fundamental error. It is as if a man with his back to the sun were to boast of the splendid shadow which he casts, whereas the fact is he is only obstructing light from the radiant sun. It is thus that the mystic witnesses to spiritual values and explains our moral orbit with reference to the Sun of Righteousness which governs the moral universe. In this situation Socrates and the rest of the wise of earth have noted the governing control of the "power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." They would regard it the height of egotistic vanity to claim that their own constructive imagination had produced these sweeping commands. Our disposition to shy off from the supernatural results from our magnifying the natural. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he," is good psychology. And when he is at his best he finds himself striving to do his Father's will, not his own. This mystic datum refuses to be ignored. In the scheme of reality it must receive adequate reckoning. In religion it is fundamental.

The third point to which we are now led has to do with the matter of discipline or training.

The mystic consciousness responds to training. All teaching begins by the more experienced inducing the less experienced to imitate. The fact is that the teaching that gets beyond this stage is rather rare. We have rules for inducing imitation; but who shall devise the rules for inducing spontaneous originality? This seems a contradiction in terms. And this is precisely the difficulty in all education, and especially in religious education. Even in the laboratory the student learns to imitate in the matter of making experiments. If he ever breaks through to conduct an investigation of his own it will be by his own genius. In the field of religion, prayer is perhaps the most common exercise of mystic function. And, just as in the laboratory, it begins by imitation. A cultured lady, now past middle life, related her experience with the Lord's Prayer. She had learned it before she knew the alphabet. Owing either to defective enunciation on the part of her tutor, or defective hearing on her own part, she had learned it thus: "Our Father who art in heaven, Harold be thy name, etc.," and it was not until after the age of fourteen that she discovered that Harold was not His name. Now let the reader ask himself how many of his acquaintances have learned to pray, as compared with those who have merely learned to imitate pious formulas. Prayer falls into discredit just because

we never really pray. We remain on the low level of imitating forms. If the laboratory investigator rose no higher, his work would make as poor a showing.

Let us try to be practical here. We should never expect a Newton to compete with a Beethoven, nor a Beethoven with a Newton. And when we have said this we should not be regarded as having cast any disparagement on either of these great souls. But it does mean that each of them has introduced us into depths of reality that are entrancing, and for us lesser souls the way to their vision must be along the pathway of imitation until the spontaneous disposition on our part is awakened. It is quite as hard to invent a mathematical formula as to invent a prayer, and it is quite as difficult to lead in prayer as it is to lead in mathematics. I am getting mathematics only when I acquire the ability to apply the principles I have learned by imitation to problems which are not imitations. So I am learning to pray when I have acquired ability to apply forms which I have learned by imitation to real spiritual problems of my own. When it comes to this level, prayer really becomes "the heart's sincere desire, uttered or unexpressed." Whilst a Newton might never be capable of creating a Fifth Symphony he can be trained to respond to the thrill and the glory of it. So the seers have beheld larger

horizons and felt mightier presences, but the rest of us have not been left without the power to respond. Out of this have come rites and ceremonies, prayers and sacraments. Shall I call these lessons, exercises, practices, in mysticism? Such they are in reality. But so long as these remain on the level of sheer imitation of sacred formulæ, they are no better than the Hindu prayer wheel. So long as they lack the mystic reaction the spirit that makes it real is absent.

By way of illustration I am reminded of an incident that took place in Baltimore when the Shakespearean dramatist Booth was at the height of his fame. Booth dropped into the prayer meeting at St. Mark's Church. The pastor called on him to lead in prayer. The congregation rose in an inquiring mood. There was prolonged silence which led many to suspect Booth would not respond to what seemed to many to be out of his range of practice. The tension was broken when the trained expert in the expression of human sentiment thrilled the audience with the Lord's Prayer. At the end most of the congregation was in tears. The pastor inquired of Booth for his interpretation of the impression which he admitted was out of all proportion to his own use of that sacred formula. The dramatist's reply is significant: "We dramatists," said he, "perform fiction as if it were reality, whilst you preachers perform real-

ity as if it were fiction. What else should you expect?"

Here we are at the crux of the whole matter of mystic discipline. We stop with the form of words and, finding no results, conclude that prayer does not avail. I have on occasion inquired of men in the active ministry as to whether the preparation for the sermon or for the prayer was the more difficult. I have found much amazement at the question, and I have yet to find one to admit that the preparation for the prayer was the more difficult. Most of them admit that they take no thought of preparation for prayer. In the name of all that is holy, what should we expect? Is it not an insult to the very dignity of the high court of heaven that we should presume to present our petitions so slovenly, in such slipshod fashion? But for the philosophy of religion, the important point is that prayer is discredited on the basis of a failure of something which is but a poor caricature of the real thing.

The same line of thought applies to the sacraments. Isn't it a burning shame that doctrinal history records long drawn out battles over the *ex opere operato* efficacy of the sacraments? Isn't it even more a shame that much theology still builds on the affirmation of this conception? Like prayer, the sacraments are high exercises of mystical fellowship with Eter-

nal Spirit. Below that level there is no sacrament, and it is useless to criticize the futility of the sacramental on a plane where it is not even present. This is but another error superposed on apostolic Christianity when Rome despiritualized religion and drew a sketch of God and His kingdom after the imperial pattern. Under the Roman construction the whole spiritual scheme of religion was artificialized and its spiritual power destroyed. What, then, is to be done about it? The formal answer should not be difficult. Prayer and sacrament must be restored to the level of genuine spiritual exercises, and their interpretation must be made on that level. As mystic communion with God, both prayer and sacrament have power. The response of the soul is quickening and profound. All our Church liturgy and ecclesiastical art are born out of the effort to produce the mystic consciousness in worship. And the reverent approach to these high themes must supplement these rituals and lead the worshiper beyond the forms to the appreciation of the spiritual essence which inspires them. We know the multiplication table when we have memorized it. We do not know the Lord's Prayer as prayer by simply having memorized it. But I fear most of us get no farther than that in teaching it.

The vital force of mysticism receives further illumination by an analysis of the conception of

the sacrament. This can best be illustrated by Rome's conception of the sacramental character of marriage. So far as I can see, it is a sublime conception and profoundly true when its validity is based on the spiritual witness in the souls of the participants rather than in the administrant. The participants pledge their persons in complete spiritual fidelity to each other and ask God to sanction it. That sacred presence sanctifies in their own hearts what is taking place. Remove this mystical experience by taking away the spiritual presence and marriage degenerates to the level of a "gentleman's agreement." I greatly suspect that the behaviorist sociologist may retort, "Why not?" To which the real answer is simply because the dignity of man's personal nature requires that it be kept on the spiritual level; the error of the lower level is showing its statistical results in the rapid increase of divorce. So long as marriage is left on the level of a mere contract its status remains in the category of commodities that are bought and sold on the exchange. The same fact receives further illustration in the decline of respect for the oath. Civilization is suffering from disease of the heart when it ignores the witness of mystic experience.

There may still be mystery in mysticism, but it is not the mystery of how an external formula should create a new status in a human soul

without the active response of the soul concerned. It is rather the mystery of all mysticism, the mystery of the inspiration that thrills the soul in the felt presence of God. All genuine worship, all genuine prayer, all real sacraments, cultivate this felt presence and achieve a corresponding inspiration and dedication.

Everywhere it is formalism, and not atheism, that devastates religion. The course of least resistance appeals to the inherent laziness of human nature and fits admirably with formalism, but it is fatal to true religion. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels and have not charity, I am as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." No matter how brilliant the formula, if the mystic thrill fails, the whole performance is but sounding brass.

When our investigations deal as honestly with the mystic data as they ordinarily do with sensory data we find a consistent sanction of the world of spiritual values, and a vista of personal prospect stretching into the eternities which does justice to the dignity of man. Without this, man is degraded to the level of a beast whose strength is wit. On this level history is a stage play of sham.

We are claiming only that we shall be as scientific with mystic reaction as we are with other types of reaction. When this is done the personal dignity of man, his response to the

God who inspires him, and the insistent spiritual struggle of the ages, each receive an adequate interpretation.

When Charles Steinmetz came to this country he knew mathematics and a little about electricity. He followed the lead of fact in his further investigations of electricity. The General Electric Company was organized to exploit his knowledge of this mysterious energy. As a result we have the tremendous expansion of electrification, all because he followed the normal functioning of electricity according to its own laws. The religious mystic has done the same thing in his field. By him civilization is charged with the sense of the presence of God. The religious prophet has listened, and he has proclaimed what he heard. All genuinely prophetic spirits are keenly aware of the fact that the deadly enemy of their program is formalism. This was the heart of Jesus' criticism of the Temple as He found it. But it is easier to drive a machine than to inspire a person. Taking the course of least resistance, mankind tends to shirk the difficulty and satisfies itself with forms that long since have lost their inspiring efficacy. In this situation it should be clear that it is not religion that is discredited, but man's lazy attitude toward it, resulting in a formalistic counterfeit. The fact is that when the prophet comes and vindicates his genuineness, mankind re-

sponds and civilization steps up to a higher plane.

Raising the question why we pray, Professor James replied, "because we cannot help it." This is certainly very much closer to the truth than the very modern disposition to reply, "because I can't get out of it without losing caste." We have come to treat prayer and worship as a mere act of respectability instead of the ultimate attainment of fellowship with God. Prayer is serious business. So also is the sacrament. It is absurd that anyone should seek to discredit either because formalism has obscured the real thing. Paul prayed and it made a difference; Gandhi prays and he is sustained in his appraisal of spiritual values; Abraham Lincoln prayed and came through the dark mazes of the Civil War triumphant. All these men were out of line with the traditions of their respective ages. This is generally the case with prophetic spirits. But it is just this fact that authenticates the witness of mystic experience. They do see truth before it has been made common experience, and posterity vindicates their vision.

Now don't misunderstand. We would not disparage institutions. It is our purpose rather to call the great institutions of religion to rise in power to the highest effectiveness of which they are capable. By cultivating the mystic presence the Church of God has His sustaining power

and is invincible. But without the mystic presence it tends to degenerate into barren formalism. And, finally, it is unfair to discredit these high functions on the basis of the showing of the low performers.

CHAPTER III

ITS PROVING GROUND

In previous chapters we have seen that man's fundamental nature is personal. The distinguishing characteristic of personality is aspiration. Inspiration and aspiration are as pervasive in the realm of the personal as gravitation in the physical realm. This irreducible personal character of man accomplishes its characteristic results in the spiritual realm. Man is under the guidance of God by inspiration. His highest loyalties and his most secure sanctions are achieved under the sense of the divine presence. These facts of man's most intimate experience find expression in religion. Religion, therefore, is founded in fact in a fashion similar to physical science.

We have further found that man's personal nature is in touch with spiritual reality through mystical apprehension, which is quite as compelling in its witness as sense perception. The great builders of civilization, the leaders who give its abiding direction, achieve their tasks under a compelling sense of divine guidance

mystically apprehended. These prophetic souls, inspired with the heavenly vision, issue their challenge in the name of God. Their program is all the more challenging because it goes so strongly against the natural current. The fact that the rank and file respond to the challenge and follow the lead of the prophet is quite as striking a witness of the force of mysticism as the prophet's vision itself. The prophet's program is reduced to creeds and built into institutions. Three tendencies then unfold themselves: a central current maintains its balance and carries forward the cause to which the prophetic voice issued the call; the excessively enthusiastic are overborne by the glory of the vision, and, in the effort to speed the cause do it much damage by their fanatical zeal; a third group, incensed by the extravagances of the zealots, become just as hasty and renounce the mystic witness entirely in favor of cold reason. But the first of these groups finds difficulty in keeping its faith alive and vital. The strong tendency to formalize is most deadening. Witness the Temple in the days of Jesus Christ, and the Christian Church at the end of the Middle Ages. In the protest that follows an awakening, creeds and institutions fall into discredit and reason is unduly exalted.

This brings us to the theme of our present chapter, the proving ground of religion. Reason

is called upon to sift, to organize, and attest by constructive system in the field of religion in the same way as it does in the field of the natural sciences. The authoritarian, Cardinal Newman, paid this high tribute to religion, "No doctrine, no matter how sacred, can in the end hold out against reason." The Free-thinking John Locke joins hands with the Cardinal and says, "To support religion by force instead of argument is to admit that argument condemns it." The point of agreement between the Cardinal and the Free-thinker is on the importance of the rôle of reason in matters of religious doctrine. It is the purpose of this chapter to study that rôle.

The Civil War is over. Now, after the second generation is passing, the grandsons and the granddaughters of the North and of the South can see in a much truer perspective the issues around which there raged so much bitterness of spirit. In cooler temper they contemplate the stakes and admit the errors. In similar fashion, we are far enough removed from the fires of the rationalistic controversies of the past to take stock at face value of the factors involved. Human history is filled with pathos. The enlisting slogan of the World War was "a warless world" and the Armistice was signed in that spirit. But the Peace Conference came near to drafting the terms of the next war. The Protestant Refor-

mation was born and nurtured in its infancy by the inspiring slogan of the universal priesthood of all believers, and salvation by faith. But before the close of the century that saw the birth of this new spirit, Protestant Europe had developed a paralyzing dogmatism such as even Rome had not known for well-nigh a thousand years. It was this perfervid dogmatism at the close of the Reformation century that gave rise to the protest of rationalism. Against blind submission to dogma the rationalist advocated enlightenment. Enlightened reason was to supplant dogma and revelation as the guide of civilization. At the crisis of this conflict Immanuel Kant appeared with his *Critique of Pure Reason.* This dealt a withering blow to rationalism. In sum, Kant's thesis is this: reason is the organizer of all knowledge, the source of none. With this crushing assault the hopes of rationalism were at an end. To such as could see no hope except on a rationalistic basis, blank agnosticism was all that was left. In others a profound return to mysticism, under the leadership of Schleiermacher, took place. Kant had prepared the way for this. For, while Kant had shown that Pure Reason knows no ultimate data of reality, Practical Reason, under the drive of the categorical imperative, is in touch with the ultimate reality of spirit.

Now that the confusion of these controversies

has died away and the emancipation from dogmatic traditionalism has gone into effect we see more clearly that there is a certain wholeness about faith that can neither ignore reason nor depend on it alone. Authority is no longer a matter of dictation or of external right, but rather experiential and personal. That is to say, our personal nature does bow in submission before the presence of the absolute spirit as experienced in the categorical imperative, in the sense of absolute dependence, and in the awe inspired by the glory of the starry heavens. Religion is restored to the dignity of a genuine subjective experience. It is fostered by inspiration, in which personality makes an active response, rather than by an inhibitory code.

The place and the function of reason, as well as its reliability and power, received its vindication with the rise of the new logic, the logic of induction. One of the marvels of China is the fact that until 1905 her educational system was based on books and methods written and devised three thousand years ago, and that since then she has introduced the books and methods inspired by John Dewey and Kilpatrick. The abrupt revolution involved is without parallel. Here in the West thought was dominated by Aristotelian deduction for two thousand years. With the revival and development of induction in the seventeenth century came a complete

shift of the basis of authority. Deduction starts with profound assumptions. Induction starts with facts given in experience. Hence the prestige of science. It starts with given facts. It respects general principles only as they rest on sound conclusions from these facts. It is the business of reason to conduct the interpretations which produce these general principles.

To me the pathos of the controversy between Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux illustrates the process of this vindication of the place of reason. Both these men acclaimed themselves faithful children of the Church. Bernard was profoundly mystic, the promoter of the Second Crusade, and at the same time a typical devotee of dogma. From the dogma of God's goodness and love he deduced the program of the divine guarantee of the success of the Crusade which ended ingloriously. He was canonized. Abelard was by nature a rationalist, burning with a furious zeal to correct the follies and errors of Christendom by a sharp critical sifting. He was excommunicated. But the course of religious thinking has followed the lines of Abelard. This fact may well give the controversialist pause. It seems quite probable that it was the contemplation of such facts as these that brought Cardinal Newman to the conclusion quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The important difference between these two men was that Bern-

ard stood for the doctrine that truth is closed, whilst Abelard held that it is open and growing. Bernard was in line with papal inerrancy; Abelard was more humble, and contended that man should increase in his knowledge of God as in all things else.

In order to grasp the true function of reason let us study an example in the field of laboratory science. For two thousand years we have been speaking our wisdom concerning the constitution of matter by describing it as made up of atoms. No one ever saw an atom. As a matter of fact, its etymological source reveals that the idea came from reason rather than observation. An atom represents the indivisible component of matter out of which all compounds are made. Reason simply infers that the compound is made up of the uncompound. But recently this indivisible, indestructible unit of the material universe has been broken to pieces and the term has lost its original meaning. Science now says the atom is composed of electrons and protons, and these are further described as positive and negative charges of electrical energy. And, as Professor Mather has observed, we have a new definition of matter "which though somewhat facetious is nevertheless true: 'Matter consists of tiny particles of nothing, moving very swiftly.'[1] No scientist

[1] *Science in Search of God*, p. 65.

ever saw an electron and yet every well-trained scientist is ready to stake his reputation on the fact that electrons are." [2] Here reason is responsible all the way. That is to say, the activities and functions of matter are such that reason demands an active principle for its explanation. Protons and electrons answer this demand for an active agent.

So likewise do we find reason functioning in its interpretation of personal experience as manifested in aspiration and the response to inspiration. Applying the inductive principle, we find that aspiration and inspiration are as evident in the constitution of personality as electrons and protons in the constitution of the atom. And when reason does its work in the field of religion with the same freedom from prejudice as in the case of the atom, when it does full justice to the mystical data of personal experience, it is simply bringing faith up to the level of consistent thinking. If the "just shall live by faith," then somehow the rational principle of justice and the mystic principle of faith must blend. Reflect a moment. Do you accept that proposition? On what grounds? Luther, on the *Scala Sancta* in Rome, came by rational processes to the discovery that it was utterly absurd, irrational, to believe that the formality of climbing an antique stairs had

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

spiritual value. When challenged at Worms for his rashness, he replied, "unless convinced by sound reason and the clear word of God I will not recant."

This brings us to the consideration of the primary function of reason in religion as well as in all experience; namely, *reason checks experience and organizes it: the result is faith and knowledge.* It is clear that the data with which reason works comes from other sources. We have seen that our sensory system is the source of data about things; that mystical apprehension is the source of data about values. In each group of data reason insists on consistent definition and rational system. We must not forget our previous contention that our personal relation to ultimate reality, as we apprehend it mystically, is essentially religious. Mystical experience furnishes data of spiritual meanings and values which cannot be ignored, and they demand adjustment in a rational system. If we fail to apprehend the inevitableness of mystical experience we are bound to miss the most profound reality of our own nature. Faith is forward-looking. Destiny is our supreme concern. We can't ignore it. Our whole being would revolt. Herbert Spencer, whose agnosticism was unduly popular a generation since, left the following last will and testament as respects the ultimate philosophy of life: "The thought that

I shall presently cease to be, is a thought from which my whole being revolts." [3] That seems to say that I am compelled to accept the forward reach of my personal aspiration.

We have treated faith too much as a matter of privilege; as if we might choose to believe what we please. The fact is that we cannot take privileges with faith any more than with sensation or with reason. If we refuse the witness of sense or of reason the consequences are disastrous. The same holds true of faith. That is why Spencer's faith repudiated his agnosticism. Antecedent to faith, the constituent factors which produce it are our self, with its dispositions and powers, together with the environing universe to which the self reacts. At its foundation faith is the reaching forward of personality toward destiny. This upreach of faith is as characteristic of personality as sprouting toward the light is characteristic of every seed that grows. As Professor Hoeffding says: "Faith is akin to faithfulness and implies faithfulness in the object." [4] So conceived it is of the very nature of faith to grow. Its growth results from the continuous assimilation of its enlarging experience, but always under an insistent demand that faith must conserve the interests of the self. "It implies faithfulness in the object."

[3] *Facts and Comments.*
[4] Leighton, *Man and the Cosmos,* p. 555.

Verily. So does the sprouting seed imply the efficacy of light for its growth. And it is in this light that Donald Hankey wrote even more strikingly: "Religion is betting one's life that there is a God."

Faith does look much like a sheer act of will, but it is much more profound than that. It is quite as much a result of reason or of mystic apprehension. It is neither of these alone, rather all of them blended into one. The issue resolves itself into the problem whether the idea of God is a discovery or an invention. Superficially faith does have the appearance of volition. But the reduction of the idea of God to a fiction of the will is gross superficiality. Just as rational inference went from given facts to the atom to explain the structure of matter, and later to the electron and the proton, so reason infers the aspiring nature of the self and the inspiring nature of God as the only possible way to explain the functioning of the aspiring self. God, therefore, becomes a necessary rational postulate, and the basis of religion finds a foundation as secure as any scientific datum of which we have knowledge.

Professor Hocking is quite to the point when he says:

> In that imaginary picture of ours of the psychological birth of the idea of God, we

> may discern beside the stroke of will an experience of discovery . . . And whatever is matter of experience must also become, in time, matter of reason; for reason is but the process of finding, by some secure path of connection, a given experience from the standpoint of other experience assumed as better known.[5]

This something better known issues out of the depths of self-experience.

> The human self is more than a thing of nature, because it is more than a fact; facts are not conscious of facts,—the self is; facts are not values,—the self lives on values and is a value; facts are particulars, not universals,—the self is both; facts are present, —the self spans past and future. And because of these things, while facts are as they must be, the self is free; it determines out of the matrix of plural possibilities, which one shall be the fact of the next moment.[6]

Here reason is functioning in precisely the same way as in physical science when it speaks of protons or electrons. Faith always goes beyond rational demonstration, but it can never

[5] *Meaning of God*, p. 154.
[6] Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, p. 442.

go against reason, simply because faith involves the whole personality, and rationality is an aspect of personality.

In our search for truth, we find it necessary in every line of investigation to postulate something. These postulates are the rational demands of our more intimate experiences. In our intimate experiences we find matter acting in a definite way. Careful analysis leads us to postulate the electron. The personal self is a similar rational postulate. These postulates become part of the stuff of knowledge, but only as they are implied in what is given in experience. The law of parsimony acts as a sort of traffic policeman insisting on a minimum of postulates. And this again is a demand of reason. Thus reason at once constructs our ultimate conceptions and limits them to the needs of the case. It is this limiting process that eliminates superstition by keeping the postulates consistent with the given facts of experience. Religion lives, and moves, and has its being in the realm of values. Values exist for selves. As Professor Hocking puts it, "religious values are found in selves plus the fact of the self." Materialism invariably goes to pieces in the presence of values just because of this checking up of reason. Social relationships are governed by values, and all our knowledge of value comes from this field of experience. Beauty, goodness

and truth, are factors in experience only as values. They are found somehow to enhance life; they heighten its joys; they expand its powers; they shape destiny. They are the chief occupation of the self. Personal aspiration clusters around them. They furnish the materials out of which social standards are made. This is tantamount to saying that beauty, goodness, and truth exist in and for themselves, *i.e.* they are not mere subjective fabrications. They are objective realities to which personality responds. The beauty of form, or of color, or of harmony are more than sensation; the goodness of love and the badness of hate are more than mere feeling; and truth of every form is more than a cold experience of assent. These are realities that have a pull about them, and in the final check-up reason calls them inspirations. The philosopher of religion finds that the conception of inspiration has the same kind of validity as gravitation. The former operates in the realm of personality, the latter in the mechanical realm of things. As Durant Drake has observed, "Love is good. And this is the bottom fact of ethics." But love means personal fellowship, and, moreover, fellowship of a definite kind. In this, its native meaning, we know it as the most amazing force in the world. It works by inspiration and accomplishes miracles of regeneration against obstacles of vice and hate. This

gives it its distinctive saving power in the universal order.

Man has made for himself a concept of the physical universe by the rational construction of a system out of what he has observed. Reason has exercised its compelling insistence at every step. And under the same insistence of his rational nature he has worked out his universe of values, and built his religious program in its terms. In an age such as ours, it is well to remember that the conception of a moral order, with a Deity ruling over all, has been the philosophic conclusion of all the first-rank thinkers from Socrates to Whitehead. Without the concept of Deity, the moral aspect of experience remains irrational. Hence God is an essential concept in the final check-up of reason.

We hear a great deal about magic as the forerunner of religion. But magic has likewise been the forerunner of science, and it is quite as absurd to discredit either one by this reference to its ancestry. The fact is that reason has a way of injecting itself into human processes, regardless as to whether such processes belong in the field of religion or of the physical order. And the elimination of the magical conceptions in either field comes from the discovery of their irrationality. Psychologically, reason represents a sort of mental level, a stage of maturity. It

functions in early childhood, but it does not become compelling until late adolescence or at maturity. This is likewise true of the social mind. When the Scholastics of the fourteenth century stressed the rational attributes of Deity, the coming of natural science and the elimination of magic was definitely forecast. There still may be room for miracle, but there is no longer any room for arbitrariness or for irrational magic. Faith may rise above rational verification, but it cannot go against it any more than knowledge can. Reason checks up and organizes and reorganizes faith in the same way as it organizes knowledge. Protestantism rejected the priestly conception of the way of salvation largely as a result of the conception of the rationality of God and of His relation to man. The very arbitrariness of the priestly plan, as compared with the responsible plan of personal faith, was unworthy of God. Rational faith demands that the way of salvation be construed according to the known moral processes. Doing penance, in the form of arbitrarily imposed penalties, resulted in ludicrous conformities, whereas the moral processes of salvation required transformities. Protestantism insisted on repentance that transforms from within. This removed every vestige of magic, and brought the doctrine of salvation into consistency with the laws of the mind.

> In science we collect evidence, observe facts, and form hypotheses to explain those facts, and proceed to verify the hypotheses with reference to additional facts. The scientist considers that in doing this he is avoiding metaphysics. . . . But thinking further we see that observation of facts and colligation of facts, forming of hypotheses, would be impossible unless we held the fundamental assumption that nature is uniform, that there is rationality in things. . . . There is a belief in the uniformity of nature, a belief in the rationality of things which is the background of the scientist's work. . . . So faith in the friendliness of the universe, in the goodness at the heart of things, is the background, the support of all effort at personal achievement.[7]

Let me here recall the translation of the Creed in a previous chapter. It is faith in the friendliness of the universe that ultimately vindicates religion. Any other conception must necessarily fail because of the irrational interpretation which it puts upon the intimate experiences of personal striving. The fact is that the friendly conception does succeed. Love, sacrifice, and holiness do inspire. And the inspiration does lift men to higher planes of achievement. So

[7] Brown, *Science and Personality,* p. 221.

far as philosophy of religion is concerned, Christianity will vindicate itself as the universal religion because it meets the needs of man. No power of statesmanship or force can in the end prevent it. The irrational can no more survive in the field of religion than in the field of science.

I trust that this will not be construed as rationalism. As previously noted, rationalism claimed authority for its ultimate conceptions on the sole basis of their rationality. This authoritativeness of the concepts of pure reason is what Kant destroyed. What I have been trying to show is that reason takes the data furnished by mystic experience, sifts it, and organizes it into systems of truth in the same manner as it does in the field of science. Thus religious faith comes to partake of the security of knowledge, and reaches out toward the unrealized with the confidence of the adventurer in any other field. This may be personalism, but it is not rationalism. Reason does furnish the final vindication, but the primary data come from experience.

The second point to which we are thus led is *the form of reason in matters of faith.* Professor John Macmurry has noted a commonplace in a very striking way in saying: "What lies beyond knowledge is action. Knowledge for knowledge's sake is an empty thing. Instead, faith

treats such shaky knowledge as we possess as a diving board for a plunge into the future." [8] And it is from the same point of view that Professor Ayres speaks of Science as the False Messiah. We live to produce what *ought to be.* If this is not a fact, then I am at a loss to know what a fact is. And our answers to the query as to what *ought to be* we must make out of our shaky knowledge and plunge into the future to produce it. That is to say, that any rationally consistent interpretation of our personal nature discovers that in the very nature of things we must live for goals which science knows nothing about. Science studies the things that have been; we live for the things that are to be. And our ideals are as constantly under the critical scrutiny of reason as are our scientific conclusions in the physical realm. Ideals are of the very essence of rational structures.

Let us illustrate this by taking the example of human brotherhood, as it is expressed in Christian and Buddhist doctrine and as expounded by St. Paul. According to this conception, there "is neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor free, but all are one in Christ Jesus." This is the very essence of St. Paul's repudiation of Pharisaism, and it is the basis of the Hebrew repudiation of St. Paul. And, moreover, this same issue persists in all our world conflicts of

[8] *Adventure,* pp. 41, 42.

religions, whether Roman against Protestant, Hebrew against Christian, Occidental against Oriental. Reason interposes its demand, if the mystic witness is true, the response is uniform regardless of race or color of skin. The race of men must somehow be capable of unification. Reason protests against many religions, as it does against many gods. Reason insists that there must be a God and that He must be one. And it similarly insists, concerning the human races, that they must be brought together. There are difficulties, as a matter of course, but no well-informed man will contend against it on that account. And the ground of it is the same principle of rationality that extends the principle of gravitation to the farthest star.

In the field of religion, reason takes over the data of mystic apprehension, these compelling visions in which the soul is confronted with ever-widening spiritual vistas, and reduces them to conceptual systems, just as physical science reduces the sensory world to system. Witchcraft and superstition are eliminated by the recognition of their irrationality. When St. Paul came to Mars Hill and reproached the Athenians for their superstition, he brushed aside all the gods to whom they had given names and began to expound to them the one they professed as the Unknown God. The many gods of their temples had found their place by

uncritical tradition, and the absurdity of the confusion of such a Pantheon was sufficient to discredit it. Superstition still persists so long as this rational criticism fails, simply because of the peculiar psychology in which tradition tends to grow blind. At this point fundamentalism becomes an easy victim to superstition because of a mistaken attitude toward tradition and toward the nature of the self. The doctrine that truth was revealed once and for all goes dead against the fundamental curiosity of the self. To rule out this curiosity as an evidence of sin is refuted by its achievement in science, on the one hand, and on the other by the fact that if the mind cannot be trusted no one can interpret even the Scriptures. It is almost ludicrous with what naïve self-assurance certain men presume to be sufficiently free from the taint of original sin as to be capable of interpreting the mind of God to those who are prevented from so doing by their sin-blighted reason.

All history supports the conception of the growth of the understanding. As Professor Macmurry says: "Tradition should be a starting point, not a resting place. To appeal to authority is to reject freedom, to turn from our duty to our comfort, to exchange courage for cowardice." [9] This furnishes a viewpoint from which to conserve the *dignity of human person-*

[9] *Adventure*, p. 28.

ality together with *the inspirational character of Deity.* Man is called upon to build the kingdom of heaven. His whole self is enlisted in the undertaking. Mystic vision, rational construction, and courageous will—each has its proper place and function. Man is challenged to undertake and to carry on.

The functioning of reason was the same in the mind of Newton under the apple tree, in the mind of Luther on the *Scala Sancta.* In each case there was a prevailing tradition to settle the case. In each case active curiosity challenged the tradition, removed a superstition, and carried civilization forward by a great bound. The irrationality, the superstition of the conception that climbing stairs should make a sinner acceptable to God revolutionized Luther's faith. Tradition held a view that was discreditable both to the conception of a gracious God and to the conception of an achieving person. The "cake of custom" was dead against him. On the surface, tradition was against him. In a profounder sense, tradition was with him; but he had to discern the implications of that profounder sense. The fact is that living tradition does make progress. As in the case of all living things, cessation of growth spells death. Luther's faith took on life, and in the courage of it he acted.

In any field of investigation the only valid

appeal from reason is to experience of some more intimate nature. Tradition can be used only as it is vitalized by reference to the living experiences which produced it. In the field of religion, which we have seen is the peculiar field of personality, this appeal meets the insistent nature of mystic sentiment as well as the nature of intuition. These are as clamant as sensation. The worthiness of the impulse of striving for nobility of character is as real as a stone wall, so far as experience is concerned. No matter whether it is Socrates in his Athenian prison or Luther at Worms, their conclusion to refuse recantation is a profound expression of personality in which reason and sentiment unite in a superb act of will. Instead of the action of these men being construed as having taken place without reason, fairness to the facts demands that we recognize that it was just because reason had done its perfect work that their conviction remained so steadfast. To them it was perfectly clear that compromise meant spiritual suicide.

Rationalism failed because of its divorcement from the mystical element in man; reason requires data of experience to give content to its concepts. Pietism failed through its divorcement from the rational; sentiment untempered by rational system tends toward fanaticism. Dogmatism or traditionalism failed because of its utter disregard of both the rational and the

mystical in real man. Dogma is unavoidable. It is the form under which religion defines itself and gives objective expression to its faith and its ideal. It is always beset with the danger of becoming dead, formal literalism. "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." When dogmatism does its perfect work, unchallenged by reason or uninspired by mysticism, devotees take their places submissively and objectively, instead of aggressively and spontaneously. Living faith falls into abeyance and gives place to credulity. Primitive religion is largely obliged to operate on this level because the mentality of primitive man remains on the level of the child mind. But when a larger maturity arrives, credulity is forced to give way to faith. That is to say, when the critical faculty is aroused and credulity is called on to give account of itself it has neither the stuff nor the method to meet the challenge. To the rank and file the challenge has the appearance of vicious destruction, and much confusion may result. But the fact is that every such challenge means the building of a better faith, just because it refuses the letter and demands the spirit.

It is difficult to get away from the mischief of the faculty psychology. We yield to the temptation of treating reason and will as independent functions. The truth of the matter is that the mind is one. It is a unit. Reason is the mind

functioning rationally. The mind is simply getting at peace with itself when its native rationality asserts itself in criticism. It is sadly true that much criticism gets no farther than mere negations. The bare rejection of superficial credulities looks like unbelief. It is a tragedy that this cannot be avoided. But no one can accept the new, which conflicts with the old, without rejecting something. And if he lacks either constructive power or persistence, he will quit at the halfway station of skepticism. But skepticism is essentially the position of unfinished thought. As such, it represents the early stages of an awakening from credulity. Every great reformer began his reconstructions by becoming skeptical toward the accepted traditions. By analogy, this skeptical procedure is like digging the foundation for a cathedral. Much loose earth and rubbish must be cleared away in order to get to the solid base which will sustain the superstructure. If we quit after having dug the cellar, as the skeptic frequently does, we are in the absurd position of having done even that much to no purpose. For what is the use of digging the foundation if we do not intend to build on it. It is, however, gratifying to note that skepticism generally remains much an individual affair. It is too paralyzing to become the spirit of the age. And the spirit that carries the age past the position of the skeptical quitter

is man's rational nature. And it does this by the tacit appeal to the inherent rationality of the universe. Let us then not be too greatly disturbed by the negative aspects of criticism. They represent stages that must be passed through. The same rational urge, if kept alive, will insist on going through to the more secure foundation. Protestantism began by skeptically rejecting, and ended or rather established itself by rationally constructing a more consistent doctrine of the way of salvation and of life.

It follows from this that faith is never final any more than knowledge is final. It is of the very nature of the finite mind to grow toward the infinite. There just must be growth. But it is a mistake to conclude from this that faith itself is unworthy and unreliable, just as it would be a mistake to hold that knowledge is illusion because with the increase much is discarded. The knowledge and the faith to date becomes the "diving board" to the larger knowledge and the purer faith. It is of the very essence of personality to increase in refinement and nobility by purifying its faith and improving its knowledge. It accomplishes this refinement, not by setting reason in opposition to mystic sentiment, but by carefully treating them as complementary, as they are by their very nature.

The third point I wish to make has to do with

the discipline of reason in the field of religion. Owing to its normal function of the organizer of knowledge, reason is perhaps the most susceptible to discipline of all our powers. At least in importance it is second to none. And just because religious faith represents the projection of the meaning of life beyond the limits of demonstration it is of the utmost importance that the construction of this projection of faith be done with the most accurate care. No one can qualify as a constructive engineer who has not mastered the rational processes of higher mathematics. He simply can't do the work. Why then should we assume that the engineer in the realm of spiritual things should succeed with undisciplined reason? I have already paid my respects to the primary value of the mystical. But the leader in religion must think consistently. St. Paul was profoundly impressed by his mystic experiences, and without them would scarcely have become a Christian. But in expounding his faith he used the fine rational discipline of the Stoic mode of thought with which he was familiar.

Mankind seems to have a vain disposition to wish to usurp the place of Deity. History is rather full of it. It commonly shows itself in the form of thought which, with variations, says, "God made the world, and He told us how and why in His word, and I guess He ought to

know." This type of attitude has not altogether vanished. Most men would not wish to put it quite so baldly as this, but they nevertheless like to be accepted as the spokesmen for the Deity. This is what led Giordano Bruno, after fleeing the monastery and Italy to sojourn for a number of years in foreign lands and at last to return to Italy and death, because he preferred to be in a land where there was but one Pope rather than where every bishop and priest assumed papal prerogatives. It is very difficult to maintain the humility of spirit required by tolerant faith. The unobserved fallacy of this attitude is that the advocate of such a conception fails utterly to see that, as interpreter of God's word, he still remains a finite man with the inherent possibilities of error. This was the pathos of the position of the late William Jennings Bryan at the Dayton trial. Bryan was a great, a good man, but grievously misled by the assumption that God's word is self-interpretative. Even on the assumption of the most literal copy of the divine mind in the sacred writing, the human reader still remains a fallible interpreter and hence rises toward a correct reading by discipline. We read and interpret effectively with the whole mind. This is true no matter whether we are reading a book or a bit of nature. The improvement of our reading by discipline and consistent thinking, which ac-

companies the improvement of our powers of understanding, does not stop short when we open the Bible. The assumption that here is revealed God's will toward us should induce us to approach it with sharpened understanding. Intolerance and bigotry have been so terribly devastating that the stupidities which have fostered them need to be studied with the greatest care. It is difficult to exercise the necessary caution just because prejudice is so prevalent and so hard to overcome. The notion that it requires much training to understand nature, but that God's will can be discerned without training, is most mischievous. It is one of the intellectual vices of our sophistication. Before we became so scientifically worldly wise the religious leader of the people was the superior intellect and the deepest student which the tribe possessed. This error is so largely responsible for the present predicament of the Church that I am constrained to emphasize the crying need for training in this field.

To me the fact that St. Paul grew up in a Hebrew home in an environment that was largely Greek is of tremendous importance if we would understand his contribution to the founding of Christianity. He imbibed enough of the Greek critical spirit to rise to a more personal reading of history and even so he had great difficulty. Stop a moment to reflect on the

stupendous revolution that took place in the mind of Paul. A Pharisee of the Pharisees repudiates his hope as based on the Pharisaic way. No matter whether we study him under the mystic spell on the Damascus road, or before the court of Agrippa; in either case he is revising his faith under the reading of experience by a disciplined reason. He wants to establish respect for his precious heritage, contained in the Hebrew traditions, and accordingly affirms, "I am a Pharisee of the Pharisees." But now he has come upon an experience that doesn't fit into the Pharisaic pattern. The vital, the dynamic Jesus has preached religion in terms of life rather than of ceremonies, in terms of a subjective aspiration toward personal perfection rather than as of objective conformity; and his Pharisaic sect had voted death. He had seen Stephen die preaching the hope of the world in the name of Him whom the Pharisaic court had condemned. Like Moses at the burning bush, Paul stopped, reflected, and found himself outside the pale of Pharisaic Hebraism. I am only trying to show that we must reckon with the rational discipline of the Greek spirit if we wish to understand the conversion of Paul. Here again faculty psychology has done much harm. This marvelous conversion has frequently been treated as if the divine so completely overwhelmed Paul that there was no active response

on his part. If that were the case, his experience would be unusable. We can learn from him only as we can find points of contact in the normal ways of the mind.

We have previously shown that reason cannot become the source of religious authority simply because reason has nothing but empty forms until it gets data from outside itself. If we keep that fact clearly in mind we will free ourselves from a very unnecessary fear; namely, the fear that reason is seeking to supplant revelation. It is as impossible for reason to do this as to supplant sensation. But the opposite mistake is just as disastrous; namely, that revelation can be accepted, interpreted and applied regardless of reason. Accepting absurdities by faith was once regarded a sign of commendable reverence on the part of the believer. They thought it showed a superior confidence in God in the face of conflicting experience. But such a conception of God is unworthy, and it certainly places faith on a low plane of intelligence. On this level the charlatan plies his trade and thrives. If the critical function of reason is ignored there is no recourse against the religious quack or fad. Reason finds its true function, not as a substitute for revelation, but as the organizer of the content of revelation. Once we understand that there is no danger of supplanting revelation, we should be prepared

to see not only that there is no danger in the most exacting use of reason, but that the only safeguard against the ever-present danger of error, both of knowledge and of faith, is found in the organizing and constructive power of reason. Paul was a much maturer man when he discovered the irrationality of his conception of Deity, acquired and held under his system of Pharisaic loyalties.

Religion functions as a series of loyalties. And it is in this aspect of personal conduct that it lends itself to investigation. So long as Moses remained loyal to the Egyptian Pharaoh he enjoyed the prestige of a prince, but at the burning bush he rose to a new and higher loyalty. As a good Pharisee, in loyalty to the institution of the Sanhedrin, St. Paul voted for the death of Stephen. After his mystic vision on the Damascus road, he transferred his loyalty to Jesus Christ. He remained steadfast to this loyalty to the end. The difference between these two loyalties was that the older was a blind acceptance, the later was the spontaneous response of his whole personality.

In conclusion, let me challenge you to answer for yourself this primary question and tell me how you arrive at the answer: What is the difference between doing right, and doing what is expected of you? This is the everlasting question all through the march of the ages. The

course of least resistance is to keep in line with popular expectation. But creative personality discovers that such a course results in drifting, and man is made to aspire. The only way to distinguish the right from the expected, is to appeal to rational analysis of a very high order and to a rational synthesis of a very comprehensive order. The vital force of religion rises and falls according as this appeal to a spontaneous response is kept in the foreground. Doing what is expected will produce a splendid Pharisee. That was what St. Paul had found out. But doing right meant a personal choice in consistency with a grand whole of experience in which he undertakes an active attitude toward destiny. He is thenceforth "betting his life" on the proposition that there is a God. I contend that this is the only way that religion can live. When it departs from this plane it goes to seed and dies. To speak of religion as embodied in the vast temples that have been reared in its name is to divert attention from its soul to its body. If we would know living religion we must concentrate on its soul.

In a previous chapter we spoke of religion and of religious leaders as the pilots of civilization. Paul became such a pilot after his religion took on life in his personal finding of the meaning of life in his new conception of God. When I say that revelation must be brought to the judg-

ment of reason, I am not setting reason above revelation, nor am I making the subjective the standard by which I judge. I am simply keeping true to the ways of the mind, "Prove all things, hold fast to that which is true." The only way the mind has to appraise the claims of revelation is by this sifting and organizing by rational processes. Practically speaking, therefore, the attempt to advance religion by discrediting reason or minimizing its functional value acts as a boomerang and casts discredit on religion itself. Reason belongs to our nature and can neither be laid off nor ignored. It has vindicated its trustworthiness by the brilliant achievements in the realm where the argument can be carried through to demonstration. With this attested reliability it becomes a most efficient instrument in the business of advancing the programs of faith. The mind, just because of its rational nature, cannot in the long run hold out against its own reason. I must build my faith in the field of spirit in the same way as I build it in the physical realm; namely, with rational consistency. I must read my Bible in the same way that I read astronomy; namely, with an active reason.

This brings us to the border of the next two chapter topics. Science furnishes us with control within the sphere of the mechanical order of the physical universe; and religion furnishes

direction in the sphere of the personal order of spiritual values. Hence science must be treated as a friend rather than an enemy, and metaphysics has the unique function of unifier.

This brings us face to face with two further problems. Man lives in a physical universe where he achieves control by the methods of science. The order here is mechanical. Religion, as we have seen, functions in the personal order of spiritual values and furnishes inspiration and direction in the essentials of self-realization. It is evident, therefore, that man must achieve a twofold adjustment and maintain a proper balance between the two. Hence science must be treated as the ally of religion in the field of the mechanical order.

Furthermore, the facts which have revealed the distinctive characters of the personal and the mechanical orders of experience require us to press our inquiry into the field of metaphysics. That is to say, we have to trace the phenomena of experience to their ultimate sources in the nature of reality. Metaphysics has the unique function of seeing things whole, that is, of unifying the conclusions that issue from the various special fields of experience. The faith that will effectively pilot civilization is obliged to learn the method of science with all diligence and just as effectively apply this method in constructing a thought-system of the

whole of reality. It must diligently cultivate an exhaustive and coherent metaphysics in order that the dignity and worth of personality in both knowledge and faith may hold its proper place. The ancient claim that man must submit his judgment to those who claim divine prerogatives even against sound reason is the essential error of medievalism. Such theory destroys the essential dignity of man's personal nature. As previously observed, it is of the very essence of personality to idealize. The attempt to throttle this fundamental disposition is to fly in the face of truth. The just who shall live by faith shall not do so by proxy. Faith is the natural expression of personality. It gives character to ideals and brings knowledge to the support of practice.

We are talking much these days about the international mind. Somehow we believe that we are not talking nonsense. Let us not forget that it is a creed. If we were asked to give an account of this faith, we must do it by showing its rational consistency with the best we know about personality. Some sweet day when religion rises to the sublime heights of a consistent metaphysics, which is at the same time vitalized by a sound mysticism, we shall see to what extent we have allowed racial bigotries to obscure our judgment. We will then be prepared to join with earnestness and sincerity in the Master's prayer that "all may be one." That is the only

consistent way in which it is possible to think God. It is the only possible way that we can consistently construe the implications of the personal urge in its relation to ultimate destiny.

CHAPTER IV

ITS ALLY IN THE MECHANICAL ORDER

In order that we may keep our bearings true let us recapitulate briefly. The taproot of religion is found in the fact of personality. Man's aspiring character is more adequately known than any other fact of experience, because we know it from the inside. The impulse toward knowledge leads man forth to the understanding of his environment. But his most intimate concern is personal and the values which affect personality are spiritual. Man apprehends them mystically. In this mystic apprehension he finds both the meaning of life within him and the call of the spirit above him. The mystic voice furnishes data which he cannot ignore. He must therefore reduce his mystic experience to system. But man comes to his inheritance with the innocence of a child. He must achieve his own faith as well as his own knowledge. He may profit by the blunders and by the achievements of the generations that have preceded him. But he can profit only as he selects and appropriates with wisdom. That is to say, no generation can

endow posterity with its own wisdom either legally, mechanically, or institutionally. The generation which receives the tradition must suffuse its inheritance with life. The dogma, the mystic data, the institution, must each be born anew in each succeeding generation. Each must find the truth for itself and express it for itself. Just as the inheritance of material wealth frequently destroys initiative, so the notion that our spiritual heritage gives us prestige may result in a sort of spiritual paralysis. It was thus that the Jews boasted of their grand inheritance, "we be Abraham's seed," to which the Master replied: "If ye were Abraham's seed, ye would do the works of Abraham." No, we can inherit neither faith nor knowledge. Past achievement may give us certain advantages and help us to higher levels more swiftly. But it may almost as readily prove an encumbrance. It is for this reason that rational sifting must likewise be kept alive. Both in the interests of knowledge and in the interests of faith, we must learn to read and to interpret rationally.

The division of labor began early in human history. It has its advantages. But these advantages are sometimes purchased at great cost. This is especially true when it so breaks off experience into sections as to set one section against the other. This, alas, has all too frequently been the case with the grand divisions

between science and religion. We shall, therefore, proceed with a discussion of science as the great ally of religion in the field of the mechanical order.

Much that has happened in the recent past has fostered the conception that there is necessary conflict between these two factors of civilization. This is a vicious perversion of the facts. It is no more true than that speaking of husband and wife necessarily implies conflict. Conflict there may be, but it is not essential. It is rather the result of somebody's blunder and may be resolved by correcting the blunder. The normal relation is one of harmony and complementary function. This is the normal relation between science and religion. What God has joined together, let not man put asunder, or set at variance one with the other. It makes no difference whether it is the man of science or the man of religion who sets forth the irreconcilability of these two, he is sinning against both. They are parts of one great whole of experience and as such should be kept in team work for the benefit of all. The fact is, they belong together so naturally that when anyone magnifies their disagreements, which are really misunderstandings, it arouses suspicion as to the motive.

Our age has fallen rather deeply into the habit of speaking of science and religion as if

one or the other must eventually withdraw as a useless relic of an outworn aspect of civilization. On the other hand there is much talk of science and religion which seems to imply that our world is made up of two entirely distinct, almost noncommunicating realms. The alleged fundamental hostility is magnified into a conception that utterly obscures their complementary relation. The philosopher knows better, at least he believes better. Philosophy has been beset by similar storms of conflict all through the ages and it finds that invariably the conflicting conceptions are superficial; that a more thorough understanding reveals a fundamental harmony. The philosopher still believes this to be a *uni*verse.

When the philosopher comes upon an age in which he finds scientists and religionists at each other's throats, he sets himself to his perennial task of seeking the terms of a fair and lasting peace. He knows that civilization suffers from war. And he knows, moreover, that the war does not inhere in the nature of reality. The strife has come from part-views magnified beyond their legitimate meanings, and fostered by petty bigotries. The story is told of a little boy who, while reading a party newspaper, came upon the word "bigot." This was a new word to him; so he inquired of his father its meaning. The father replied, with perhaps more accuracy

than he was aware, "A bigot is a man who differs from me and sticks to it." It is this kind of thing that led Bacon to regard prejudice as the most formidable obstacle to finding truth. Reconciliation and peace always require that combatants rise to the comprehension of larger perspectives. Lord Balfour closes his brilliant introduction to that splendid book, *Science, Religion and Reality,* with the following pungent sentence: "A science which declares itself incompatible with religion, a religion which deems itself a substitute for science, may indulge in controversies as interminable as they are barren. But there is a better way." It is our object in this chapter to seek a conception of this better way.

There is a general feeling that it will be difficult to keep Italy and France from war during the next five years, even though one would think that each has had enough of war's devastations. The difficulty seems due to the fact that the Italians are more Italian, the French are more French, than human. Nationalism, as at present conceived, and universal human brotherhood may be incompatible, but that does not mean that the incompatibility is necessary or even insuperable. It should challenge the effort to produce a national spirit in harmony with brotherhood. The psychology of narrowness and bigotry is exceedingly simple. Things

which occupy the mind steadily for a prolonged period take on an importance proportional to the intensity of the application given to them. The arrogant ambition of Cæsar, or of Bismarck, or of Napoleon, or of Mussolini, is not hard to diagnose. Their whole thought is occupied with the potential greatness of the people whom they are serving. The chances are that what they think of the potentialities of their own people is, in the main, true. But their concentration on these virtues to the utter neglect of possible virtues in other peoples results in an utterly false depreciation of other nations. Hence the comparative judgment is false. If we start with the comprehensive view of brotherhood, we are saved from that false judgment without detriment to a just pride in the potential virtues of our own people. The Hebrews, in contempt, calling the rest of mankind Gentiles, the Greeks, calling non-Greeks barbarians, the Romans reciprocating, were utterly false in their restricted loyalties. This false conception of others can be corrected only by a truer interpretation of the universal nature of personality as well as of the God who rules over all.

In the field of scholarship the same kind of psychology prevails. A man who has achieved great things in a given field speaks with authority in his field. He does not always realize that outside his field he has less right to speak. No

one questions Thomas Edison's right to speak with finality in the field of applied electricity, but when he compares the soul of man with a dry-cell battery he is outside his field and should not be taken seriously. Professor Mach was a great physicist, but when he undertook to reduce reality to mechanical energy, ruling out the whole realm of personality, he was magnifying what he knew and understood, and misrepresenting what was outside his field. Oswald was guilty of the same error in the field of chemistry, and Haeckel in the field of biology. Each of these men claimed more for the principles of their science than could be properly interpreted by them. This was not a case of science and religion in conflict, but conflict between the sciences themselves. But the psychology of the conflicts is the same. We magnify our own interests at the expense of others. These scientists induced Professor Wundt to make the following pertinent rejoinder: "These men assume the absurd position of saying, Science has made it possible to dispense with metaphysics, just accept mine." This is somewhat as the late Kaiser was reputed to have said: "The Germans are supermen and, as such, owe it to the world to act as guides to civilization."

I have seen Germans who seemed unable to pronounce the name of France without a sneer, and Frenchmen who reciprocated heartily. But

frankly, these men did not inspire much confidence as sources of truth touching these matters. They were, no doubt, honest enough, but pathetically purblind. In our present discussion we are confronted with a somewhat similar situation with respect to the attitude of Fundamentalists and Modernists. I wish I could obliterate both these names. They stand for something which should not be. They are slogans of conflict where coöperation is so badly needed. All we can do here is to note the fact, and to indicate the psychological process by which they came to their respective positions. No doubt they are honest, but if they can speak only with contempt of their brethren in the other camp, they have already gone far toward establishing their unworthiness as witnesses for truth. I am not sure that I know the meaning of either of these terms, but I shall use them as standing for extremes of conservatism, on the one hand, and extreme progressivism, on the other. Like St. Paul, I trust that I can in fairness claim, I am debtor both to the Fundamentalist and to the Modernist, and from each learn something of importance. At the same time we should avoid being misled by them.

It frequently happens when children come to a disagreement that they resort to calling each other by unbecoming names instead of making an honest effort to correct their differences.

They are too much preoccupied with their grievances to take account of the fact that they are missing the point entirely. They seem to assume that they are winning their case by the amount of opprobrium they can heap on their opponent. Similarly in the recent controversies between men who, claiming disagreements between science and religion, have shown considerable passion where a more sober search for truth would be more creditable. Much that passes in such controversy is but little above the level of calling names. If it went no further, it might not be so bad. But such procedures perpetuate differences, and they do this by obscuring main issues and building on false bases. This should not be.

I have much sympathy with the view expressed by Professor Nixon in his recent book, *An Emerging Christian Faith:* "I believe," says he, "that religion is a valid and essential interest of man; that science in all its phases is complementary to religion but no substitute for it and that the greatness of the achievement of our generation depends upon our ability to appropriate life's meaning, the sense of direction, the incentives and the energies which it is the function of religion to make available." There are men who find it easy to see how much poorer we would be without the achievements of science, but some of them profess difficulty

in seeing our abject poverty if stripped of what religion has done. After all is said, science has turned us away empty-handed when we seek an answer to our most insistent questions: What is the meaning of life and what are the things that are ultimately worth while? We may admit that the answer of religion has been vague, but it is still better than no answer, and the answer given has crowned human achievement with glory.

I do not like Dr. Ayres's conclusion that we are in for a new inquisition under the popery of "pseudo-science." Yet I feel that, unless we can somehow come to better terms, his forecast is correct. Inquisitions and tyrannies result from the arrogance of power, and arrogance generally results from gross ignorance. The Spanish Inquisition resulted from the arrogant power of the Church. The present inquisition in Russia results from the arrogant power of the Soviet State against the Church in the name of science. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."

Let us, then, see what we can do toward sketching a program in which the respective functions of science and of religion can carry on in complementary unity rather than in conflict. One thing is certain, that neither science nor religion arises out of any fundamental motive of antagonism toward the other. Science never develops the Soviet inquisitorial spirit

from the prosecution of its normal business. Its unblazed trail of research is forever challenging, and the thought to turn aside and become persecutor comes from other sources. Religion likewise never developed the Spanish inquisitorial spirit from the prosecution of its normal business. Its work of mercy and of inspiring men to godliness of living is forever pressing, and the thought of becoming persecutor comes from outside. The disposition to declare war is a matter utterly at variance with the native spirit of both science and religion. War is generally caused by encroachment or the fear of encroachment. Encroachment manifests itself in the form of dispositions to forbid self-development. At bottom the conflicts are cases of conscience in the representatives from both camps. In the same fashion religion within its own peculiar field finds no motive for conflict until assailed and forbidden. In a very real sense the protest against inquisitions is the profound motive of the will to survive.

Let us then endeavor to set apart the respective territories or functions of science and religion, and to see whether we can find a way for them to carry on consistently without strife and, perhaps, even by a policy of reciprocal support. In the first place let us inquire *what is science and what is the business of science?* A simple, textbook definition of science is likely

to call it systematized knowledge. But textbook definitions are always made with a view to setting forth the aim of the book. To the man of science, the method and the spirit, by which the conclusions of the book were achieved and brought into system, are of far greater importance than the conclusions themselves. The conclusions will be superseded, but the method and the spirit remains. Furthermore, systematized knowledge may smack somewhat of the note of finality, which is likewise foreign to the scientific spirit. Open-mindedness is of the very essence of the spirit of science. The moment the scientist closes his mind his research is at an end; for what is research but the effort to find out something more. The fact is, the scientist is forever expecting new light and stands waiting to adjust himself to it.

It would seem, therefore, to be inaccurate to speak of science as a body of knowledge, for the reason that this body of knowledge is forever changing. Knowledge is rather the product of science than science itself. The thing that remains constant is its attitude and its method of procedure. In attitude it is open-minded, reserved in judgment, exact, and scrupulously honest. The spirit of propaganda is utterly subversive. Theory is always subordinate to fact. In method it starts with observed facts, studies the conditions under which the facts appear,

experiments with the facts by controlling conditions, and draws general conclusions with a relentless logic regardless of the effect such conclusion may have on accepted theories. From this it is evident that science is essentially a spirit and a method rather than a set of results. It is the assault on this spirit and method that the scientist resents. The distinctive feature of this spirit, which has brought it so often into conflict, is its utter and uncompromising opposition to authority. The scientific spirit and authoritarianism are diametrical opposites. Take the example of the state. It is traditionally either monarchical, democratic or oligarchical. It builds into its structure an economic system for the regulation of property. It may, by its authority, forbid the promulgation of theory at variance with the accepted system. This is what science resents. The scientist insists on his right to continue the study of the facts and to report his conclusions. He stands on the dignity of his position. He has built on fact. The authoritarian position rests on the affirmation of the monarch or of the popular vote. Neither of these are as reliable as his own conclusions. And when religion, through the Church, uses the political method of authority against science he regards it a declaration of war which, in good conscience, he resents.

Let us illustrate this spirit of standing by the

facts as against an appeal to political authority still further by a concrete example. The late Kaiser Wilhelm issued an Edict of Education very shortly after his coronation in which he gave orders: "We must use the schools to inculcate loyalty to the house of Hohenzollern by showing how much Germany owes her greatness to them." As a piece of practical politics this was promising. But to the social scientist it meant, as a foregone conclusion, that Germany could not have been as great or even greater under some other *régime,* and that the house of Hohenzollern must therefore be perpetuated. In like spirit, a committee of schoolmen in a great American city recommended that, "The history text books must contain no statement in derogation or in disparagement of the achievements of American heroes. It must not question the sincerity and purposes of the founders of the republic or of those who have guided its destinies." [1] This may be good politics, but it is bad science. And the scientist has the advantage in that such educational policy long continued must tend to obscurantism. It was such educational policy that gave Western civilization a thousand years of Dark Ages, and held China stagnant for even a much longer period.

I have gone outside the field of religion for

[1] Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method,* p. 325.

these examples with set purpose. I am anxious to make it clear that the rise of conflict which involves religion and science is *not in their essential nature. The conflict is a conflict of policies.* Science must be open-minded; when religion applies the authoritarian principle to proscribe this open-mindedness and claims that it must do so, I fear it is no longer true to its essential nature. When science invokes the principle of authority to prescribe the limits within which religion may carry on, as it has done in Russia it, too, is no longer true to its essential nature. It is clear that science is a method of searching for truth and there can be no charge against this aim. It is also clear that the thing it protests against is the method of authority. It must do so. The stake is truth. And it should now be clear that science has no quarrel with religion any more than with the State. It resists encroachment.

Sabatier, in his *Religions of Authority,* makes this important observation: "The life and letters of Hildebrand prove that though he was animated by an absolutely sincere conviction, faith did not in his case exclude the dexterity at once versatile and tenaceous of the man of policy. To him, above all others, the Church owes it that she was constituted an essentially political society." [2] It is this method of closing

[2] P. 402.

the door against research by the use of arbitrary power that is subversive of science. And it is against this mistaken use of authority that science protests. Science must protest against this for its very life. And it must do so for the sake of truth and for the sake of society, which would suffer the loss of truth should authoritarianism prevail. It offers its protest in the interest of mankind and of civilization with a zeal akin to that of religion and with as good a conscience. The alternatives here are the way of truth and liberty as against the way of obscurantism and tyranny. Science has the same philosophy of human nature as democracy has. Protestant Christianity likewise builds on the same foundation. It is the only principle that does justice to the personal nature of the human mind, which makes its response to truth rather than to force.

It is thus apparent that such conflict as there is results from institutional policies. This is the case at present with the Soviet State coming to the support of science with force. We are thus brought face to face with an issue that involves the whole program of civilization, and both the idea of God and the doctrine of human nature as well. Professor Whitehead observes that the origin of science

> must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality of God. . . . The inex-

> pugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedent in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible labors of scientists would be without hope. In Asia, the conceptions of God were of a being too arbitrary or too impersonal for such ideas to have much effect on instinctive habits of mind.[8]

Thus, by a singular turn, even the idea of God, which seems to be the monopoly of religion, sustains the scientific attitude and method. In other words, the modern world, comprehending the advance in science and the democratic trend in both Church and State, is the result of a revolt inspired by the observation that humanity was not coming into its own because of tyrannies which were based on the conception of an arbitrary God. Science is born of the conception of confidence in a rational Deity. If this confidence is misplaced, science becomes a false pretence. If the confidence is justified, then science has vindicated its right to reject interference by political authority.

On the side of religion it is most important to observe that its greatest spiritual achievements have been accomplished apart from established institutions, and at times even in opposition to them. Men have much more frequently lost

[8] *Science and the Modern World,* p. 18f.

faith in the Church than in religion. The Church, both in the form of the ancient synagogue and the later Christian institution, has all too frequently proclaimed a religion of an arbitrary God. And, as a matter of fact, religion can no more use an arbitrary God than science can. St. Paul seems to have this in mind in the twelfth chapter of Romans when he says: "My heart's desire for Israel is that they may be saved. For I bear them record that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge." They wanted a God whose interest and favor was arbitrarily restricted to the children of Abraham. They even seemed at times to expect such favor regardless of moral worth. Rome repeated this error, and Protestantism has not always kept clear of it.

By its method science stands committed to the principle that wherever difficulty arises with respect to interpretations we must wait for more light, and withhold judgment. Science ceases to be scientific the moment it ignores this principle. It is not the business of science to plan a social program. It is searching for truth, and it is doing this mostly in very abstract fields. Take, for example, the problem of crime. Science is searching for its cause and the means of its suppression. The process is slow. The scientist must wait for facts and interpretations before he announces his conclusions. But the

State can't wait. The State must have a social program. The same is true in religion. The scientist may study processes of education in religion, but the Church must have a program. If the Church program is unscientific the blame does not rest with the Church, unless the Church refuses to avail itself of the best that science offers. The chances are that the blame rests on science. As a matter of fact, science speaks a mightily confused language on all that has to do with education.

If we clearly grasp the fact that science must withhold judgment, and that the social institution cannot do so, we are in a fair way to discover the reason for the conflicts which science has had. Our social institutions are obliged, by their very nature to act, to cut the Gordian knot, and to announce a policy. In their institutional function both State and Church *must* proceed in authoritarian fashion. Accordingly, it must follow that their policies must invariably lag a few paces behind the discoveries of science. And, moreover, even with the best of intention, the machinery of readjustment is too cumbersome to keep policy up to the minute of scientific solution.

This should make it clear that the conflicts are all institutional, and that none of them are fundamental. Seen in its true light, *science is in harmony with religion.* It is as harmful as it is

untrue to foster the contrary conception. When the representatives of these two fields of human endeavor come into conflict, plain common sense requires that we make a critical review of the issues involved, with the calm assurance that the conflict rests somewhere on error, or on misunderstanding, or on both.

Another point of fundamental importance for understanding the tragic conflicts that arise is the fact that the very life of social institutions rests on the authoritarian principle. In the interest of clearness, we must drive this argument to its conclusion even at the cost of some detail. Institutions rest on the dogma that the individual is subordinate to the institution. Without this principle there could be no institution. Liberty of conscience is diametrically opposed to this. Athens disposed of Socrates on this principle; and Hegel brings this issue into forceful clarity in his *History of Philosophy* when he says, "Socrates could not recant his position and Athens could not let him live without his recantation." The Supreme Court of the United States but recently had to pass on this principle in the case of the naturalization of Professor Mackintosh, who reserved the right of conscience on the matter of the conditions under which he would go to war in defense of the Constitution. The institution speaks with authority; so likewise does science, but the author-

ities with which they speak, respectively, are of a different order. From the standpoint of truth the authority of science is superior; from the standpoint of the social order the authority of the institution *must be* superior, simply because the social order requires action. In the nature of the case, the institution resorts to force, and there are times when this resort to force seems arbitrary. But without the right to this recourse organized society would cease. It was his profound discernment of this dilemma that led Plato to write in the *Republic:*

> Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as I believe,—and then only will this our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.[4]

Plato is here presenting a practical program, the only practical program. But we have snubbed him as an idealist and therefore as impractical. That is the issue in a nutshell. We

[4] *Republic,* V, 473.

need the wisdom of philosophy and the force and authority of the institution combined into one. The difficulty is not in securing the force of the institution, but in maintaining the idealism which will keep it headed toward wisdom. Here we are confronted with the supreme task of religion and at the same time its indispensability. Here there is radical conflict in method. Idealism issues from the nature of the soul, and draws heavily for its support on mysticism. Science has little or no room for the mystical, and issues from the causal relation between things. Idealism is inspirational. Science is factual. But personal conduct is predominantly response to inspirations.

Science, we have seen, is predominantly a method of search for truth. It plays no favorites. It has no life program. It has no pet policies. Its truth seeking is its worthiest motive, its loftiest ideal. It is inspired by the sublime thought of "thinking God's thoughts after Him." Wherever it has accomplished its purpose it has shed blessing. Will you permit me to claim for science that it is fulfilling the command of Jehovah to "subdue the earth"? Instead, therefore, of science in pursuit of its real business being in conflict with religion, it is the real ally of religion achieving the control of things, while the personal spirit is developing character from within.

Let us, then, in the second place inquire into the *nature and business of religion.* If we have been correct in our interpretation of science, it is described as an attitude toward our environment together with a method of knowing its nature. The concern of religion is much more intimate and vital. If science is concerned with *knowing,* religion is chiefly concerned with *being,* or, better still, with *becoming.* Science is preoccupied with *what has been,* religion is absorbed in *what is to be.* By contrast, science is occupied with means; religion with ends. Religion is personal throughout; science is impersonal. The fact is, a science of personality is well-nigh a contradiction in terms; simply because personality is self-legislative, whereas science must find the law of all that it can know in nature as a whole. Hence religion has a different problem from the start. But even so it is not a problem to set conflicts. It is because of its interest in the things not yet realized that religion inclines so strongly toward metaphysics; and this at the same time accounts for the fact that science spurns these ultimate questions. Science can be agnostic on ultimate questions; religion cannot. Hence, again, the trend in an age of science is to make of life a joy-ride without destination, in an age of religious dominance to make of life an evil to be suppressed. Monastic asceticism is the logical program of a

religion that regards science as evil. Indulge life while you may is the logical program of a scientific age that discredits religion. Where science and religion regard each other as allies, life is regarded as good for its own sake, but at the same time it is subject to the discipline required for the sake of the higher order of goods to be realized.

When man puts his knowledge to use he is in the field of art. It is no longer science. We speak of applied science, but the application takes away the spirit of pure science which is research. It is a fact, verifiable by the method of scientific observation, that the results of applying knowledge vary widely in value. Putting it concretely, the question, What shall I do with my information? is more important than the information itself. This is what led Herbert Spencer to say that, "to educate people without educating them in character was equivalent to placing deadly weapons into the hands of savages." Hence, after knowledge, comes choice. Choice involves value. And value in the end involves the whole problem of the nature of man and his destiny. It is simply inescapable except by just flat quitting. The fact is that man is made by his choices. The important matter for him in considering his education is not what it will do *for* him, but what it will do *to* him. It is better that he should have some personal refinement

without much science, than that he be trained to the limit scientifically and be without personal balance. A difficulty that confronts our age grows out of the dominance of the educational philosophy which is concerned with a job. Our students are asking, What will this get me? We should lead them to ask, What will this make of me? This is the difficult task of religion. Strange as it may seem, man's greatest indifference is toward his most intimate concern, his own destiny.

We spoke above of the foundation of the state and of the individual conscience, the right of the latter to go against the former, and the right of the former to use force. Our problems concerned matters of policy. But now we are passing beyond human legislation into the realm of universal law. We are now raising questions which must receive their answers from the field of values, and values are cheap or precious in proportion to their abiding quality. Hence the metaphysical aspect of religious faith. In the light of what we know about personality, can these values abide?

Science describes its facts and processes in terms of weight, affinity, metabolism, and such like. But the right to an inviolate conscience lies beyond this realm, and we call it sacred. The final attestation of truth in these matters lies in mystic apprehension. Sense perception

has no bearing on these questions. All light on these problems must reckon with the nature of personality and the values inhering in it. The very impersonality of science rules it off this field. But let us be clear on this point, the fact that science cannot operate here in nowise discredits the field. The truth is rather the opposite. The interests of personality are the most intimate of all experience. Facts and things are incidentals outside of us. Personal values and their inspirations identify themselves with what we are. It is "by these things that men live." In an age when the conflict aspect is exploited, there is a danger that men should be led to think that either one field or the other is false. In such a situation, which one will be discredited will depend on who is in power. In Russia to-day science is in power. In Spain during the Inquisition it was religion that was in power. This is the tragedy of making science and religion appear as incompatibles. They are as different as sense perception and mystic apprehension, and each is as real as these respective modes of apprehension are real experiences.

Professor Oman speaks with masterful clearness to this point: "This valuation is sacred, therefore, we ought to esteem it as the spring of all self-mastery and all mastery over the world, as the sublime attainment by which man became truly man. The prophets, just because

their higher truths were sacred and required all their devotion, emancipated religion from material associations, in a way unparalleled elsewhere." [5] There come times when man is forced to choose between matter and spirit, between what perishes with the using and what enters into the very fabric of his being in ways that are unaffected by time relations. On these higher levels of choice he must choose between the temporal and the eternal, there is no possible evasion. Even refusal is choice. Science may laugh, but it cannot nullify the experience. And at this point the prophet is usually more scientific than science in the fact that the prophet takes this *fact* of his experience seriously. Under the inspiration of the mystic vision "the fear of death as the final ill was conquered in principle; and this victory is the condition of all progress, for there is no real spiritual good possible at lower cost than the hazard of our material life, *nor any impossible at that price.*" [6] And this is a fact as palpable as gravitation. Science may not know how to deal with it, but that is no excuse for trying to throttle it.

> Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; some-

[5] *Science, Religion and Reality,* p. 292.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 293.

> thing which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.[7]

Science has found in specific gravity a very definite method of determining the distinctive character of certain elements. The inveterate aspiration of personality for the realization of ultimate spiritual values possesses a specific quality which reveals its intrinsic nature. If science, as Professor Ayres observes, "eliminates the personal equation, by substituting the mechanical equation," religion takes each at its face value and allows science to proceed with the mechanical while it seeks to bring the personal to its full fruition.

The processes with which religion and science deal determine their respective modes of functioning. The pull of an ideal, if experienced at all, produces rapture and enthusiasm. The religious prophet has thrills which he cannot transmit except as thrills. Science is cold and must be suspicious of thrills. Religion worships. This

[7] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 275.

is the expression of the thrill of adoration. Science classifies and the evil and the good receive equal consideration because they are equally matters of fact. From the viewpoint of control, science controls *things;* religion controls *persons* by inspiring them to a sense of the dignity of their own nature—the realization of their potentialities in the divine program. Science controls from without, religion must control, if at all, from within—this is why its method is based on mystic thrill. Science remains within the realm of things as they are, religion is everlastingly dissatisfied with the actual and striving to realize what ought to be, but is not yet.

Civilization, what is it anyhow? It is more than getting a living. It is more than adaptation to environment and the subjugation of the forces of nature. It is essentially the modification of human nature. Religion is the deliberate effort to direct that modification toward godlikeness. In the prosecution of its task, it gives diligent attention to the witness of mystic vision, and it sifts these visions in order to find the will and the way of God. It does not claim to have done its work perfectly. There is no good reason why we should expect fewer blunders here than in science. The task is more delicate, and correspondingly more difficult.

In the third place, let us inquire *how science*

and religion may carry on by supplementing each other rather than in conflict with each other. The conflicts between science and religion are artificial. They are not between the fundamental principles for the simple reason that these principles interpret different sets of data which supplement rather than contradict each other. Conflicts arise when either one encroaches on the other by its method of propagation. The conflict then resembles a quarrel between equal parties to a compact who charge each other with failure to keep its terms. When each is at its best there will be no thought of incriminations. Each will be deeply conscious of its own incompleteness and led on by the high resolve to register improvement within its own field.

The charge that civilization represents a succession of victories of science over religion is not only superficial; it is untrue and pernicious. The fact is that civilization rather represents a succession of victories in each field over its past self. They simply can't be victorious against each other because their functions are different. Religion can no more affirm or refute evolution than science can prove or disprove the existence of God. Science and religion have each revised its own findings. Einstein has accomplished a victory over Newton, and Copernicus over Ptolemy, but these victories have not affected

religion. So Melanchthon accomplished a victory over Augustine, and, perhaps, Schleiermacher over Melanchthon, but these have not affected science.

In the abstract it is correct to claim dogmatically that Truth is changeless. But you must say it dogmatically; it must be so from the axiomatic definition of truth. But this changeless truth has never been the truth we know. Civilization has been hampered a great deal by confusing what is proclaimed as the truth of the day as identical with this theoretically changeless truth. The social nature of religion seems to make it the readier victim of this error. Science never appeals to the public for confirmation; religion constantly does. It defines God, man, sin, grace, salvation, sacrament, and treats the definition as an axiom, which it is not. The undiscerning accept the definition and consider the subject as closed. To protect it further from unsettlement and revision, it is proclaimed as divinely attested. God's word is final and papal infallibility must not be challenged. God's word is final, no doubt, but who has it? However, religion cannot escape this appeal to the people, because it is with people that it is dealing. Religion is a matter of faith, and faith exists only in persons. Hence the faith must find expression among people. Furthermore, this social appeal of religion con-

stitutes its laboratory. A stick of lead thrust into a jar of steel filings will come out clean, a magnetic bar will be loaded with the steel; just so the prophet thrusts his mystic conception of God into the age. If it is leaden, it will return to him void, if charged with spiritual magnetism, it will inspire the age. Witness the prophets and the apostles. But keeping the spirit of prophecy alive is the most difficult task ever undertaken by man.

When the adventuring spirit of the prophet subsides, priestcraft comes into power and there is a shift from inspiration to institution, from teaching to ceremony, from spontaneity to coercion. This becomes a menace to true religion. It is at this stage that there is constant danger of confusing the truth proclaimed with absolute truth. Man has not yet found the method by which to overcome his finite limitations, his fallibility. But at times he yields to the temptation to do so by the simple device of denying it. What we need to keep well in mind is the fact that judgment is an exceedingly private affair and must be held ready for revision.

Religion can learn two things from science. In the first place it can learn much in the matter of method. After all, in treating the data of experience the logic of method is the same, no matter from what source the data are derived. Religion need not feel any sense of humiliation

on this account. The logic of method rests on the laws of mind together with the objective tests made by science. In the second place, religion can learn from science what man has been able to decipher of the works of God as revealed in nature. The God-concept of mystic vision and the God-concept of His revelation in the works of nature must harmonize. They may reveal different aspects, but they cannot contradict each other. Hence religion must solicit the aid of science in formulating its conception of Deity.

Every student of the Orient is impressed by the crude superstitions prevailing there. The light of science must help to dispel this darkness. Superstitions are not abated by the thunder of dogma. India and China will discard their grosser superstitions under the light of science. And religion will be fostering its own enterprise by fostering science.

From these two lessons religion can take over into its own work the data which will enable it to redefine many of its own problems. Religion can refuse this only at its own hazard. On the other hand, science can learn at least two things from religion. In the first place science must learn from religion that man requires the realization of spiritual values for his fulfillment, which are apprehended by processes not reducible to scientific measurement. The force

that drives man onwards toward his truer self comes by inspiration. And in the second place, in the field of action, especially in the matters that go deepest into the nature of man, the waiting method of science is fatal. Hence science must learn to recognize the fact that man must respond to these deeper sentiments which science cannot know.

It is the business of religion to interpret the witness of man's mystical nature without ignoring his sensory and rational experiences. And surely science is no longer scientific when it asserts the right to rule out the fact of mystic apprehension. Creative arts in all their varied forms reveal the outreach of the soul. They constitute the expression of the nature of the soul in the same emphatic way as weight, color, etc., furnish us with the nature of physical things. Whenever and in so far as science seeks to disparage these inspiring realities of human experience it becomes a real menace. When science does this it is resorting to forces that are no longer scientific and it is appealing to arrogance rather than humbly pursuing its search for truth. It is this that leads Professor Ayres to warn against the "popery of pseudo-science."

> Many critics [says he] have pointed out what happened to Christianity in the early centuries of this era when it ceased to be a

> religion of revolt and social protest and became a religion of empire and conquest, of popes and bishops and a universal Church. We have no reason to expect otherwise from science. When the pillars of society are the priests of science, will freedom of thought in science be cheaper or dearer than it is at present? [*]

This world has only one hope against such ultimate tyrannies. That hope lies in its willingness to hearken to the voice of mystic apprehension with the same diligence with which it takes the witness of the senses. Under the mystic spell man somehow realizes that he is in the presence of Him who has said, "I am that I am," with its implication that "I will be what I will be." That is to say, the moral compulsion is just as ineradicable as the physical.

Science forecasts that some day the sun will be dead, that it will cease to radiate light and heat. I believe this forecast, but I am not much interested because of its long future and its indifference to personal concerns. But the spiritual witness is of increasing life and glory. I believe this forecast and am interested. The bases of the respective forecasts are facts of experience and bear similar warrants. It is then but fair that we should insist on as adequate

[*] Ayres, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

interpretation of the spiritual witness as of the physical. "Unless the individual develops respect for spiritual laws, and orders his life in accordance with them, his ability to become aware of the moral qualities in the administration of the universe will decrease, atrophy and eventually disappear." [9] This death of the soul does interest me. And when I find that there is a law of spiritual growth well authenticated in the individual and in social history I am confirmed in my attention to the mystic witness of the timelessness of spiritual things. Invited to ride in a high-powered car with a dead man at the wheel, I demur. Science at the wheel offers civilization the Unknown as its destiny, and it is not in the nature of personality to respond to such a prospect. The mystic may see "through a glass darkly," but he sees. It may be difficult to give an account of what he sees in terms that others will comprehend, but he still deserves a hearing in preference to those who announce that it is unknown and unknowable. It is not fair that science should rejoin by saying; better be honest and admit your ignorance than soothingly claim information where there is none. Better know the worst from the start. This rejoinder is frequently made to save the face of science. But it at the same time denies the power of the self to interpret the inner witness

[9] Mather, *Science in Search of God*, p. 153.

to its own being. The Seer's alternative offer over against the Unknown of science is not an error. It is but a fair confidence in the deepest experience of his own nature. It may be true that we can never know the real nature of matter for the reason that we are dependent on the ways in which our sense organs present it to us. But spiritual aspiration is something which we know from the inside and we have full right to claim its legitimacy.

> There are no other arguments to prove God real than just the experience of Him and this experience of values, and what is implied by a universe crammed full of them! We find them, we live by them and then we say, "show us some argument for believing in God!" A value is always a revelation of God; it always testifies to a guiding spirit. We seek Him because we have already found Him.[10]

What, then, can religion do? Science is fostered by observation and experiment. Religion carries on by inspiration and worship. It seems that religion can observe and perhaps experiment. But by whatever processes it "tries the spirits" it must forever maintain its hold on the primary fact that personal aspiration must be accounted for and room for its realization must

[10] Jones, *Fundamental Ends of Life*, p. 143.

be provided. This is no more than the scientific claim of sufficient reason in every field of investigation. In making its observations, religion will find much light by comparing the differences and correspondences between Orient and Occident, present and past, priestly and prophetic. When careful tabulations of results are made from such sweeping comparisons, it should know much more clearly what is essential and what is superstition. The religion of the West, for example, is aggressive under an early command ascribed to Deity to "subdue the earth." The Orient, on the contrary, before its contacts with the West had been static under the guidance of principles ascribed to revelation commanding them to "submit to fate." The contrasts could scarcely be more striking. The truth cannot be established by a direct appeal to Holy Writ. In the last analysis the human spirit will accept, will believe, what will best fit the conception of striving personality in relation to an inspiring Deity.

It must further be remembered that once such comparisons are undertaken every type of human prejudice will come to the fore to block clear understanding. Or again, a comparative study of priestly as compared with prophetic religious programs, the Protestant and the Roman Catholic, ought to yield results. But the difficulty of making such observations without

prejudice is surpassingly great. But it must be done. The scientific man has a right to insist that religion shall rise consciously above the petty and the prejudicial. Advocating a doctrine for the sake of justifying a sect is pernicious. Tolerance in these matters is absolutely essential and exceedingly difficult. I wonder whether we can here teach or learn a lesson "from the children of this world who are wiser than the children of light." I mean the lesson of evaluating the objective results of our procedures in worship without prejudice in the interest of truth. Doctor Niebuhr has undertaken to show that denominationalism is not doctrinal, but rather racial and national, or a matter of class consciousness. There are those who think he has made out his case. If these things are taken at their face value, and if we have learned what science should teach us on the point of objectivity in our judgments, are we not in position to get better light on the essentials of worship and of religious inspiration? We should find guiding principles by which to eliminate fraud in religion as well as the quack in the field of medicine.

> When we understand the real evidence that this universe is nothing but a spiritual universe and the manifestation of God present within and all around us, the churches

can again teach, in a manner which will carry general conviction, these old words which have brought strength to go forward, peace of mind, and charity, to so many: "For I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature can separate us from the love of God." [11]

[11] J. S. Haldane, *The Sciences and Philosophy*, p. 323.

CHAPTER V

ITS UNIFYING AGENT

We have found the taproot of religion in the aspiring nature of human personality. This aspiring disposition establishes religion on the foundation of fact. Moreover personality is so constituted that the highest satisfactions come from achievement. Achievements vary in the abiding quality of their results as well as in the number of persons affected. That is why thoughtful selection is required. In making the choice as to what type of self is to be realized, man is obliged to draw his data from the mystic apprehension concerning his own nature and the nature of the universe. The basic evidence for man's moral nature and of the spiritual order of the universe is the inescapable feeling that it must be so. This feeling compels the acceptance of the spiritual order as the experience of sense perception compels the acceptance of the physical order. Persons must be taken for what they are no less rigorously than chemical elements or physical forces. Left to itself, feeling is confusing. Feeling experiences require the correction that comes from logical system. Reason

checks the feelings and finds their true meanings in the implications which produce social stability. The feeling which insists on justice is much like the feeling for revenge so far as the individual is concerned, but the former sustains the social order and the latter disrupts it. In the depths of the human soul, the Mohammedan, the Buddhist and the Christian, feels the power of his respective revelations with equal intensity. They cannot be reconciled dogmatically. Reason must adjudicate and discover the principles that can be universalized. Religion and religious experiences, just because they are experiences, require rational treatment. "Prove all things, hold fast to that which is true."

Science is a way of knowing and of control which is exceedingly valuable and deserves not only the respect of religion, but its earnest interest. Within its field, science shows in a brilliant way what the creator has built into the physical universe, and the fact that the human mind is adapted and equipped to search out its meaning. Hence science and religion supplement each other and should treat each other as allies rather than as enemies. The method of knowledge establishes the conclusion that truth must be one and inherently consistent. Faith and knowledge, mysticism and sense, require unification and harmonization so as to be uni-

versalized. It is thus that all paths of experience eventually lead to metaphysics, not as to an authority, but as to an instrument of method by which all the part-views are coördinated into a harmonious whole.

Metaphysics has been the victim of a great deal of blackmail. Singular as it may seem, this has come both from scientists and from theologians. The opposition from men of science usually culminates in a veiled proposal to substitute the ultimate principles of a particular science instead of a general metaphysical principle. But even more surprising than the opposition of men of science is the unfriendly attitude of certain theologians. I say surprising, from the simple fact that of all disciplines outside the field of the distinctively theological subjects themselves, there is none from which the theologian can get as much help.

In order that we may clearly understand each other from the start, let me say that I am accustomed to tell my classes that if I had the power to regulate the terms of admission to our theological schools, I would make a thorough course in metaphysics, with a respectable passing grade, the primary requirement of all students seeking admission to theological studies. In the field of medicine no one is admitted without chemistry. He simply can't get along without it. In engineering a student is not admitted

without higher mathematics for the same reason. The engineer is constantly confronted with problems of construction for which mathematical principles are the only means of solution. But in attempting to produce leaders in the intricate and important field of religious thought we still proceed as if we can dispense with training in these highest matters of human aspiration. We have the normal harvest of this folly in the rank absurdities that are peddled in the name of religion. This does not mean that metaphysics should be made a substitute for the specific sources of religion, but it does mean that the teacher of religion should have an intelligent grasp of the meaning of the profound interests with which religion is constantly engaged. It seems that the opposition grows out of a mistaken conception of the function of the Holy Spirit. We assume that the Holy Spirit will relieve us of the necessity of thinking these concepts through, or, perhaps, that in attempting to think them through we are sinfully attempting to do for ourselves what the spirit has reserved for itself. In reply to this attitude, I can only remark that the gift of the Holy Spirit was not bestowed as a substitute for human laziness. He can be depended on to do His part, but we must see to ours.

It might be well to attempt a definition of metaphysics. It has frequently been defined as

the ultimate quest of philosophy. Again, it has been described as the philosophical interpretation of reality. Some have called it the correlation of the sciences. Others have regarded it as the clearing house of knowledge which seeks to maintain the balance between the various fields of research. Still others have made it the system of postulates used by the various sciences. I don't know that it adds anything to the understanding of the term, except perhaps to direct attention to another aspect of its purpose, but I have been calling it *the cöordination of the things that must be presupposed in order to render the common facts of experience intelligible together with the reasons for them.* For example, the freedom of the will is a metaphysical question. Science cannot admit it. Ethics cannot get on without it. Science can operate only where natural law is inviolate. Choice and self-direction closes the door to such investigation. But personality is responsible and suffers pain for its mistakes and finds satisfaction in its successes. This can be explained only on the assumption of the freedom of choice. Admit the claim of science, that there is no such thing as self-direction, and the personal order ceases to be a fact. Metaphysics insists that we be fair with the facts, *with all the facts.* It insists that the sentiment of ultimate obligation is as persistent as sensation, and that in our

system of thought we must make room for these experiences as adequately as we do for our experiences of physical things.

Again, metaphysics has been mistakenly spoken of as abstract, and, consequently, out of touch with reality. A more complete inversion of the facts can scarcely be imagined. Let us note with care what our abstract thoughts are. For example, I am observing an object and I abstract from the whole of it the color, or the weight, or the odor, or the taste. I may consider each one of these abstractions apart from all the rest. But no one of them can give me a complete notion of the whole object from which I have made the abstractions. I must bring all of these abstractions together into a unified whole in order to have a correct notion of the object. So it happens that science is abstract, rather than metaphysics. Chemistry, for example, abstracts from the whole of things and studies the transformations of matter; physics abstracts from the whole and studies the mechanical inter-relations of matter; biology abstracts and studies organic functions; and so on through the whole list of the natural sciences. But not one of these furnishes us a complete picture of the universe. It is the business of metaphysics to coördinate these abstractions into a unified world theory. Hence metaphysics is preëminently concrete.

There is a famous painting representing a great library. The books are so arranged that literature and science are on the shelves within easy reach because they are the ones in active use. In a dark corner, at the top of a ladder, is a wizened old man browsing among the books of the top shelves, and these are labeled "Metaphysics." They are out of reach without the ladder. Nobody but the queer old man cares for them. So even the artist has done his bit to discredit this important discipline. But the artist has almost refuted himself, because the picture places metaphysics above everything else and leaves science and literature within reach of the crowd, the majority of whom are unreflective.

Someone has said that metaphysics is like searching in a dark alley at midnight for a black cat which is not there, attempting to discredit this supreme undertaking by ridicule. All of these attempts to sidestep ultimate issues remind us of the ostrich hiding its head in the sand to get rid of its fear of the approaching enemy. The truth is that the issues of life all depend on metaphysical solutions. The attempt to see things "steadily and to see them whole" may not be easy, but surely this is no good reason to refuse the effort when the meaning of life is at stake. The joy-rider turns a deaf ear to the admonitions against recklessness.

Why should he be robbed of pleasure by considerations which have not yet happened? An age that is finding its entertainment in jazz, and constantly in search of new thrills to tempt its jaded appetite is too busy to take time to see things steadily, and it may be it doesn't want to see them whole.

Religion lives and moves and has its being in the realm of ultimate realities. It is concerned with the things that abide. That is the primary reason why the religious leader needs so badly to be well trained in the discipline which deals with these things. The nations are attempting to establish something in the order of a world court in the hope of putting an end to war. For religion, as for science, metaphysics serves as a world court, and it seems to me that the hope of rising above the unseemly conflicts between scientists and religionists rests on a more thorough training in metaphysics. Within a particular science the student must not ignore any phenomenon within the field of his research, no matter how insignificant it may appear. There are times when the slightest disturbance is fraught with profound significance. When metaphysics insists on the same procedure in seeking to understand the meaning of the whole of reality, including law and freedom, it is more scientific than science. It gives full recognition to sense perception, mysticism, æsthetic and

moral evaluation, and reason, when it constructs a conception of the universe which comprehends all the data of experience.

It may help us at this point to take testimony from men at the frontiers of science. Professor Eddington, the English interpreter of the famous Einstein theory, says:

> The problem of the scientific world is part of a broader problem—the problem of all experience. We all know that there are regions of the human spirit untrammeled by the world of physics. In the mystic sense of the creation around us, in the expression of art, in a yearning toward God, the soul moves upwards and finds the fulfillment of something implanted in its nature. . . . Whether in the intellectual pursuits of science or in the mystical pursuits of the spirit, the light beckons ahead and the purpose surging in our nature responds.[1]

Professor Lampier-Whetham, in his recent brilliant *History of Science,* says:

> Physical science represents one analytical aspect of reality; it draws a chart which, as experience shows, enables us to predict and sometimes to control the workings of nature. But the clear insight into the mean-

[1] Lampier-Whetham, *History of Science,* p. 488.

> ing of physical science which is given by modern scientific philosophy shows that by its inherent nature and fundamental definitions it is but an abstraction. And that, with all its great and ever-growing power, it can never represent the whole of existence. Science may transcend its own natural sphere and usefully criticise some other modes of contemporary thought and some of the dogmas in which theologians have expressed their beliefs. But to see life steadily and to see it whole we need not only science, but ethics, art and philosophy; we need the apprehension of a sacred mystery, the sense of communion with a divine power, that constitutes the ultimate basis of religion.[2]

Professor Ayres, in *Science the False Messiah,* says: "The problems of civilization are questions of what we want to achieve. Science has devised no technique for solving them." [3] Professor Whitehead in that baffling and thought-provoking book, *Process and Reality,* says:

> Yet the culminating fact of consciousness, rational life, refuses to conceive itself as a transient enjoyment, transiently useful. In the order of the physical world its

[2] *Ibid.,* p. xxi.
[3] Ayres, *Science the False Messiah,* p. 232.

> rôle is defined by its introduction of novelty. But, just as physical feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of causality, so the higher, intellectual feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck; "There shall be no more sea." [4]

Now, in writing on the general theme of philosophy of religion, I am aiming to show that religion is a fact grounded in our personal nature. Mysticism is an experience which requires as fair a recognition as sense experience; reason organizes the mystic results into system and finds the general truths implied in them, just as it organizes the facts of sense experience and builds science; science and religion are supplemental rather than hostile factors of civilization. This grand scheme of knowledge and faith, in which man finds the way of life, receives its final coördination and clarification in the view of the whole as achieved in metaphysics. Moreover, I am strongly of the opinion that science has made unwarranted claims, and that religion has lost prestige, partly because of the pretensions of science, and partly because of laxity in thought and method within its own sphere. In creating the impression of conflict

[4] P. 516.

both science and religion have erred most mischievously. In addition to producing ill temper and false judgments, it produces alienations that are unwarranted and last long. Metaphysics, largely neglected for a century, is the discipline through which this false conflict must be resolved. A thorough training in metaphysics will help the protagonist of religion to maintain an effective harmony in his psychology of knowledge and faith in their relation to the universe.

Let us note in the first place *the contribution of metaphysics to the advancement of religion.* Religion, conceived as the way to realize destiny, doesn't have any direct need for science. It draws its life and sustenance from different fields than those on which science is occupied. Similarly, science can prosecute its own peculiar task without regard to religion because its field is independent. Now it seems to me that this may help us to see why metaphysics has been spurned both by science and religion. To the scientist the metaphysician is too much concerned with transcendentals and ultimates, which are confessedly outside of his interests. He is concerned with the things that are subject to the conditions of time and space. What transcends these conditions, if such there be, does not concern the scientist. To the religionist, on the other hand, the metaphysician seems too

much occupied with the data and conclusions of exact science and with its method to appreciate fully the aspirations of the soaring spirit. He seems to the religionist to be denying supernatural revelation and reducing religion to mere philosophy, and he seems to the scientist to be denying the sufficiency of sensory facts in the interest of transcendent speculation. The error underlying this procedure arises from its abstraction. Science abstracts its particular field from the whole of experience and restricts itself to the known and measurable in the realm of change, and pursues this intensively. Similarly religion abstracts from the knowledge of the temporary processes to fix its attention on the abiding, on the things of faith that are to be. This error goes still further in its false divorcement between faith and knowledge. Science tends to disparage the faith of mystic apprehension, and to respect only the faith of rational inference from its own inductions. In so doing it can interpret things, but it cannot interpret man. Religious teachers, on the other hand, have a tendency to cut faith off from knowledge as if it functioned independently, and thus lose the support that naturally belongs to it as the inescapable implication of knowledge. But faith is much more organic than that. And this warrant for faith as well as its majestic sweep will be greatly clarified and

strengthened under the discipline of "seeing things whole."

By this time we ought to know that the monastery is not the normal place for the religious life. If religion is to achieve its end it must leave its Mount of Transfiguration and go in among the rest of the world to heal the sick and to cast out demons wherever they are found. If it can do this in certain classes by the methods of science, it must be willing to do it that way. Instead of setting the method of science over against or even apart from prayer, metaphysics will set them side by side, each to accomplish what belongs to its powers, no more, no less. If metaphysics is seeing things whole, it must become an instrument of prime importance to the worker in the religious field. It will lift him out of his abstraction and confront him with realities in their wholeness.

We have said little about the Church and perhaps even less about theology. We haven't had much occasion to do so. We have been interested in something more fundamental. Religion existed before the Church and long before theology. The Church and theology are social institutions which come into being as instruments for the promotion of this profound experience which we call religion. When faith on the part of individuals becomes sufficiently precious to inspire the will to spread its blessing to hu-

manity at large, he institutionalizes it. The Family, the Church, and the State, arise from social needs. Each is divine in the sense that it springs from the divinely implanted dispositions and needs; each is human in the sense that its forms and prescriptive rights are devised by man and suffer from his limitations. The Church and theology rest on this same divine sanction and at the same time suffer from similar human limitation. Disregard for this limitation produces confusion.

Theology likewise comes into being under social pressure. The individual experience of religion bears the character both of individuality and of universality. If theology is to serve as an instrument for effective socialization and at the same time make progress it must elaborate the universal characteristics of faith; it must expound its essence. This is the only way that faith can become a teaching religion. In this respect it does not differ from science. As a matter of fact, theology is the systematic presentation of what man knows and believes about God and man's relation to Him. The theologian aims to set forth the doctrine of salvation in a fashion that will cover the whole gamut of human experience. The Christian theologian aims to get the Bible way of salvation across to mankind.

Now let us stop to reflect a moment on the

degree of success the theologian has had, and let us try to get some light on the methods which promote success. We have previously referred to the modification of man's conception of the atom during the past twenty-five centuries. Let us now note the modification of his conception of Deity from Moses to Jesus Christ, and then again from Athanasius to the present century. The relation of God and the world had been so externalized at the end of the Middle Ages as to produce a doctrine which thought it impossible for God to interfere in any way with the order of events in nature. But since then thought has changed from the conception of an absentee God, and a creation finished once and for all, to the conception of a sublime process through which God is intimately active here and now and all the time. The God that is thought of is essentially the same great and inspiring thought that impelled Moses and Paul, but it is a vastly richer concept. Religion at heart remains the same, but theology changes. Enlarged experience makes it necessary for it to modify its fundamental concepts to fit the increased knowledge. It is just as much a mistake for theology to feel that it must not change as for the science of medicine to feel that way. As a discipline to promote this adjustment to the advance in thought, metaphysics is of the highest value to the theologian because of its single

interest in truth, and because of its lack of bias as between the various fields.

The schools established for the training of theologians began as catechetical schools, *i.e.* schools in which the teacher proposed the question and likewise furnished the answer which the catechumen was expected to learn *memoriter*. The idea of solving a problem or of thinking through the rationality of an answer, or of seeing the real connection between the answer given and the facts, never occurred in that system of education. There is good psychological ground for this method on the mental level of the child. The early schools did not rise above that level because the mental level was not any higher. Later this training passed into the monasteries where thoughtful research was generally the exception. The theological seminaries have found themselves confronted with great difficulty in trying to get away from this. They start with the teaching of their Church and they are chartered to advance the viewpoint of the Church. It requires rare genius to conduct scientific research under these conditions. It is in large measure due to this condition that men of science trained in other fields, where unrestricted research is the rule, feel constrained to question the conclusions of the theological schools and at times even the honesty of the teachers. It is aside from the point to go

into the merits of this issue here, but we must observe that the seminaries are themselves responsible for their atmosphere of the cloister, and they should realize the necessary result of working under such conditions.

There is no room for argument on the need for the theologian to know his Bible and its doctrine. This in itself is no small task. He must also know his Church history and its doctrinal development. Again, no small task. He must know the factors which led to the type of development which is revealed in the doctrine of his Church. This will require him to know the general currents of thought outside the field of theology. For example, it is futile for anyone to attempt to speak intelligently of the doctrines of the Nicene Creed without considerable familiarity with Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Orphism. The Creed was formulated with these in mind. And again it is useless to attempt to understand the teaching of St. Augustine and the origin of the Papacy without full knowledge of the prestige of the imperialism of Rome. The Papacy could never have originated in the democratic atmosphere of the Athens of Pericles. That is to say, the doctrinal expression of religious faith constantly takes on the color of the age, and the age is made up of the cross-currents of thought from every field of experience. Failure of adjustment is just as fatal as

acquiescence in the spirit of the age. The early Church acknowledged Stoicism but differentiated itself from it. So must the modern Church acknowledge science and at the same time distinguish itself from it.

There is a close analogy in the case of the doctor of medicine. He must understand *materia medica.* Even this touches a pretty wide field. In addition he must be able to diagnose, which spreads out into physiology, biology, bacteriology, sociology, psychology, physics, etc. It is even more important that the theologian be a skilled diagnostician. I know of no more pathetic example than the closing episode in the life of William Jennings Bryan. It was his crowning misfortune to have undertaken to play the rôle of theologian without understanding the science of the age in which theology had to speak. He is but the outstanding pattern of a multitude who in a less brilliant way did the same thing. The theologian cannot master all the sciences. Hence his need of training in metaphysics which will put him in touch with the essentials which are important for him to know.

Theology remains a dead letter so long as it is not the doctrine of God in vital touch with the needs of the age. Renaissance theology in the twentieth century is quite as effete as Renaissance astronomy is to-day. The student to-day knows the importance of the theory of

evolution in the interpretation of wide fields of knowledge. He knows, moreover, that it is not in conflict with the theory of creation. But he wants the doctrine of God and of destiny interpreted so he can fit all these things together. If the theology of his age is too antiquated to do this, the majority will not take the time to find the source of the trouble. They will simply ignore it and go about their business. They will be the losers, of course, but the blame is not theirs. To me it is a terrible responsibility for the representative of religion to be the cause of its disrepute.

During the Great War I heard of a "Y" secretary who asked for his discharge on the ground that "the only thing the boys asked of him was to buy postage stamps." His superior granted his request with the admonition, "I suspect the boys tried you out and found that postage stamps were the only things you were capable of delivering." This may have been a little severe. Yet it is not out of line with the nature of man. The man with a living message gets a hearing. If it were not so, truth could never get on. Don't forget that truth does not make its progress by building a fence around it. Men and women of every age are children of the age and must be addressed as such. The spirit of a past age is as a foreign language which they do not understand. The Reformation had to take

account of the scientific spirit in its theology and found that the difficulty was not nearly so great as it appeared. Bruno was burned at the stake for attempting a metaphysics which would reconcile theology with science, a noble attempt, and theology was the loser.

Christ commissioned His disciples to go and *teach*. The Roman Church took its program of inquisition from the imperialism of Rome, forgetful of Christ's commission. Teaching may make slow progress, but the inquisitorial method is retrogressive. Its fruit is either hypocritical submission or utter repudiation. Both of these are bad, but that the institution which stands for the fostering of religion should be the cause is almost past belief. Now in all frankness, if theology and the Church are to guide civilization—and it is my conception that this is their chief business—they must know the mind of the age and speak to it in a language which the age can understand. Maintaining a superior air and speaking disparagingly of the revolt of youth and the atheism of science doesn't meet the case. It rather antagonizes youth and stultifies the Church; and rightly so because it is not true.

The theologian owes it to the Church he serves to note the adjustments in thinking required by the advance of learning, and to bring them to such attention as will keep the thought-

life of his Church abreast of the age. These adjustments are the peculiar field of metaphysics. It is there that science is checked up and a fair estimate given of its implications. Here this attempt to see things whole will give him the best picture of the mind of the age which is to be had. Here, better than in any other discipline, he will get that breadth of vision and of understanding that will save him from narrow bigotries and enable him to present his own truths in such fashion as will give them the touch which leadership requires. He will of necessity carry the results of the best metaphysics into his teaching, and thus he will speak the language of universality adapted to his age.

Just now Western civilization is horrified by the ruthless assault of Soviet Russia on the Church. I refuse to admit that the assault is on religion. Religion is a living thing. Assaults on living things call forth movements of defense. But in the dead thing called the Russian Church there was no life to make such defense. At the point where the Soviet aims its thrust there is nothing but a dead Church from which the life of religion has departed, hence no counter-movement of defense from it. The lesson we should learn from the assault is that the intoxication of power produces inquisitions which strive for more power by assailing the obstacle that stands in its way. The obstacle in the way

of the Soviet is the old *régime,* Czarism and its loyalties. The old Church had degenerated into a corrupt system that supported this *régime* of tyranny. The assault is against the support of tyranny. When we hear that Kemal Pasha by an edict abolished the Mohemmedan veil and turban, so sacred to centuries of Mohammedan culture, or that the Chinese Nationalist Government forbade Buddhist priests practicing superstitious impositions, we are disposed to applaud, because these movements accord with our better knowledge. In the light of these things, what shall we do about the matter of forbidding the teaching of evolution in our schools? Shall we applaud, or be horrified? The former course represents our reaction to the decadent, the latter represents our reaction to scientific progress. What is the purport of the assault? Frankly, gentle reader, I am for an international court for the adjustment of disputes between nations, and I am for the interdisciplinary court of metaphysics for the adjustments of misunderstandings between the various fields of human pursuit.

The Church, *i.e.* organized religion, not only should be, she will be the pilot of civilization. This is her peculiar mission. The lesson to be learned from history is the fact that the temples of religion have held the focus of attention on the supreme matters of human destiny. Temples

have gone into decay from senility as they failed to adjust their religious program to the deeper understanding which man achieves both of himself, his universe, and of his God. Religions are organized and temples are built with the single purpose of piloting civilization toward God. And, be it remembered, this is man's best judgment on the problem of his own self-realization.

It has been noised abroad that the Church in our age is losing the confidence she once had. This may be debatable. But there is no debate on the method by which to hold the confidence of the age. Religious doctrine and scientific theory of the universe must supplement each other and together be adjusted to the central thought of the progressive unfolding of a plan. The dignity of the God-idea and the dignity of man's moral and intellectual nature are both conserved by the reciprocity revealed in the plan and in man's adjustment to the program.

In the second place let us note *the God-idea of metaphysics.* The Bible almost assumes that the people who will read it know the definition of Deity from other sources. The assumption of His personality, His power to do things and to inspire awe are in evidence everywhere. This must necessarily be the case when men report the experience of mystic apprehension. To me it is a brilliant confirmation of the mystic vision to find how closely their conception corresponds

to the conception of the men who have arrived at their conception by another route. The fact is that the great metaphysicians from Plato to Whitehead find a personal God who is clothed with majesty and power indispensable to the completion of their systems of thought. From this it would seem that one should expect the theologians to fraternize with these men who show such a kindred interest in their great themes.

It is true that the metaphysician has frequently drawn a somewhat different definition of this highest of human thoughts from that of the theologian. It is likewise true that the definition of Deity given by an Aristotle is not identical with that of an Athanasius or of an Augustine. But these men were learned; they had great minds, and they were honest. The problems of the theologian and of the metaphysician overlap in so many places that it is very important that they understand each other. The fact is, that the thinking of each has gone deeply into the making of the conception of ultimate reality. The conception of Deity is no exception. In view of this fact, we should make it our business to foster the process of refining and clarifying our idea of God rather than to assume that the human mind is closed to growth on this concept. If I want to know something about electricity, I will study the

objective facts of its manifestations under the guidance of a Steinmetz or an Edison. In the end, electricity will mean just as much to me as I will have mastered of its nature and functions. Whilst religion is more intimate, my mode of procedure in mastering its fundamental concept must be the same. The metaphysician's approach to the idea of God is different from that of the theologian. From him I get more of the relation of the idea of Deity to the world of nature, as science conceives it, and I am thus prepared to interpret my religious conception to the man whose approach is that of science.

What, then, does the God-idea mean to me? Or, to ask an anterior question, how does the God-idea get meaning for me? Several years ago I asked my class in philosophy of religion to answer the question, What does the idea of God mean to me? in the same way they would if the question were about electricity. They were good students, from good homes, and well brought up, but their answers presented a sorry account of our effort to give the rising generation a vital God. I think this must be done if we are to hope for deepening the grip of religion. And it seems to me that metaphysics will go a long way toward accomplishing this object, just because it puts the idea into the necessary relation of things. It is purely a matter of pedagogics or of educational psychology.

I see electricity between its poles. With a single pole I cannot get the electric phenomenon. If I may carry the figure with reverence, my own deepest experience of selfhood is, as the poet has it:

> Effort and expectation and desire
> And something evermore about to be,

in which I sense an obligation to a Being of a higher order Who bids me rise with an inspiring voice that I cannot resist. Here I have the poles of spiritual reality. With a single pole I do not get the urge. In that profound presence my soul knows that it is in the presence of God, the perfect person.

We have at times allowed our fear of pantheism to lead us to conceive God as so utterly transcendent as to cut Him off from us and render Him unknowable. The revolt against agnosticism, in turn, has brought us to a conception of immanence that threatens to reduce Him to a force of nature. Now these high questions cannot be settled by canonical authorities, for the simple reason that one of the poles in which the God-idea finds expression in the universe is the human self. We are in touch with Him. Pringle-Pattison, with profound penetration, has said: "As soon as we begin to treat God and man as two independent facts, we lose hold upon the experienced fact, which is *the*

existence of the one in the other and through the other." [5]

It is here that the metaphysician completes the unfinished work of science by constructing a speculative outlook adequate to interpret the facts. Thus human personality comes to its own. It finds itself in a universe which guarantees personal achievement, the only kind of universe in which it can believe. Chemistry requires belief in electrons, physics requires belief in energy, personality requires belief in God. Metaphysics takes a scientific attitude toward the fact that man lives on the boundary between the natural and the supernatural—and the supernatural means the personal, the self-directive. Naturalism arose as a protest against an arbitrary supernatural; a protest, as Lord Balfour expresses it, "against the idle profanity which thinks it has explained an event when it has said it is a work of God, as if anything were not a work of God." [6]

In 1883, the French Catholics of Quebec refused vaccination during a small-pox epidemic on the ground that the small-pox was a divine judgment imposed on them like the boils with which Job was afflicted, and that vaccination was a direct act of rebellion against God. It is against such an arbitrary conception that

[5] *Idea of God*, p. 254.
[6] *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 370.

naturalism revolts. Man as a personal being is subject to natural law throughout; in his spiritual nature he is self-legislative; that is, he is not the helpless victim of his heredity and his environment, but, though under the necessity of reckoning with them, he is neither damned nor crowned because of them. He may and does make himself. And, in so far, he participates in the supernatural.

In the light of man's insistent aspiration toward the true, the beautiful, and the good, the metaphysician chooses between the only possible alternatives. Either man rises only as he believes in God and responds to the inspiration of that faith, or by belief in his own ideal self. This ideal self, however, does not exist and it is therefore more impossible as a source of inspiration than the Unknown of science. The God-idea of the metaphysician is the perfection pole of man's spiritual struggle. When man wills *good will* among men he does it under the inspiration of a perfection that exists above him. In so doing, he is willing the principle of unity among mankind, where by nature selfishness and disunity prevail. He is willing the third petition of the Lord's Prayer, which is likewise a supernatural principle in contrast with man's natural instincts of self-will. He is experiencing God, and in his own deeper self finding the meaning of God.

Religion is life lived under the directive consciousness of God. It is far too profound and spontaneous a thing to be capable of complete reduction to language. But, with all its poverty of expression, language is the only medium in which man can communicate this profound experience. When reduced to language, therefore, religion finds expression as a philosophy of life. Man describes the wisdom of life's choices as the facts of his deeper experience reveal. In doing this, he is applying the method of the metaphysician. He is in the world and subject to its forces; its knowledge and beliefs cannot be set aside. If he thinks at all, he must somehow reconcile his beliefs and bring them into unity. Nature and the supernatural must belong together, just as he finds within his own self both natural instinct and personal aspiration. The personal governs the instinctive, suppressing some and inciting or encouraging others. This is his scientific warrant of his participation in the supernatural. Here he finds himself in fellowship with that higher order which he calls God. It is thus, by this discipline, that his immediate experience of the mystical presence finds support from the rest of experience instead of being hampered by it.

In the third place, let us note *the metaphysician's interpretation of faith.* Technically speaking, the interpretation of faith belongs in the

theory of knowledge. But in its sphere of seeing things steadily and seeing them whole, metaphysics must include a theory of knowledge. The late Professor Ladd, the philosopher of Yale University, left as his philosophic last will and testament three small volumes under the following suggestive titles: *What Can I Know? What May I Believe? What Can I Hope?* Can you think of any profounder questions; or any that have a deeper interest to you and me? Now the chief reason the metaphysician raises these questions is the stern demand of his intellect to avoid deception. He has found that there are false prophets, both in the field of science and in the field of religion. He is convinced that it is not wise to accept the prophet without a thorough review of his credentials. And the only method of conducting this review is a comprehensive examination of all experience, together with a thorough examination of human powers. What can I know? If sense perception is the only avenue of knowledge, then, naturally, I can know only material being, and spirit has no place in the sphere of knowledge. If, moreover, I find that the senses deceive me, or give me evidences which are determined by the structure of the sense organ rather than by the thing itself, I may feel that I cannot even know matter. Or, again, if I know the pain of shame after violating the principle of honor, I

may conclude that knowledge gets into the realm of spirit and perhaps that it is even more secure there than in the realm of sense. At any rate, the metaphysician reduces the criteria of knowledge and of faith to their foundations. In this procedure he is scientific both in attitude and in method. This constitutes the supreme value of his work to the field of religion.

What may I believe? This question starts from the modes of belief in the more ordinary affairs of life. It examines the warrants which either sustain or weaken belief. It "tries the spirits." At the close of the World Conference of Religion in Chicago in 1893 a Hindu Brahman observed: "The world may just as well take note that the religion of the Babe of Bethlehem, which within three short centuries made its way to the throne of imperial Rome, and since that time pervaded the Western world, is slowly but surely becoming the universal religion." Having said this, this Brahman priest invited the whole assemblage of world religions to unite in the Lord's Prayer as the best expression of what is common to them all. This type of conclusion must eventually come when metaphysics has done its work perfectly. It will find at last that faith has a compelling quality about it that gives it a certitude akin to knowledge, both in the field of science and in the field of religion. Man cannot carry on without faith in either sphere.

What may I hope? It is this that makes the interest of the religionist so pointed. Personal life is set for the realization of spiritual values. If I have no ground to hope that these realizations can be achieved, why perpetuate the folly of striving? There philosophy is at its pinnacle in its search for wisdom. And here, as at no other point, religion needs and gets profound support from the careful discipline of metaphysics.

I can't accept a world view which denies the witness of sensation. Sensation is insistent. I can't accept a world view which is irrational. Reason is insistent. But note well, both of these acceptances are already acts of faith. I believe the system of sense. I believe the system of reason. But the preëminent function of faith has to do with the self. It is neither sound thinking, nor is it even honest, to accept the beliefs which pertain to our temporary adjustments and are based on reason and sense perception, and then quit cold in the presence of the mystic witness and its rational implication. The self is insistently challenged by its positive pole, perfection—God—and this insistence is just as inevasive as the other two. The categorical imperative is just as inescapable as reason. "As the hart panteth after the water brook, so thirsteth my soul for thee, the living God." On this challenge alone the personal self

must believe in God, otherwise it cannot believe in itself consistently. I must believe in the attainability of peace of mind. I must believe in the opportunity for self-development. I get confirmations to my faith by acting on it. The satisfactions of achievement, even in a small way, illuminate the way of trust in the program of faith. Moreover, we see that faith is ultimately under just as straight restrictions as reason. We can't keep on believing against reason and against fact. Faith just works itself toward truth by the very nature of the believing process together with the witness of the universe. Love, sacrifice, holiness, the three great items of our Creed, inspire an increasingly deeper faith as we see them accomplishing the advancement of the personal growth which we crave. Columbus believed and sailed. Confirmation or refutation had to come. Let religion believe and love, believe and sacrifice, believe and be holy; and confirmation must come. In the last analysis, this is the final criterion of the metaphysician, the inherent unity and harmony of the universe. Faith culminates in self-identification with the program of the universe and is satisfied. That program is personal and the satisfaction is the satisfaction of persons. Religion calls that heaven.

To the Church and to theology, therefore, metaphysics becomes a discipline in humility.

It does the same for science. As far as it is possible to do so, it imposes the scientific attitude of reserved judgment. In this way it checks the follies of the fanatic, and discards the blasphemy which denies both personality and plan. It joins diligence with tolerance and thus promotes an earnest striving which admits that it "has not yet attained." Having admitted its humility, it at the same time encourages painstaking effort to effect successfully the slow climb toward its destiny. It is an everlasting reminder of man's finite, unfinished nature. The theology that speaks of its Church or of its Creed as the *same yesterday, to-day, and forever,* is speaking near-blasphemy. It is the very common vanity of wishing to possess the prerogative of Deity, claiming for itself what belongs to Deity alone. This claim has done much harm by putting God in the position of blame for the follies of men. On the other hand, it casts reflection on the persons constituting the Church. Among creatures only things remain the same; persons grow. A Church that admits it doesn't grow seems to admit—well, the dead no longer grow. Plato was profound when he observed there are three classes of persons, "Gods, fools and philosophers. The gods do not strive because they are perfect; fools do not strive because they assume they are perfect; philosophers strive because they have risen above their folly and know their im-

perfection." This is what the metaphysician knows, and he humbly strives. He is much disturbed by the excessive claims of the "fools." He knows the damage they do. His appeal to theology, therefore, is to grow, to penetrate more deeply, to grasp more comprehensively, to redefine more courageously.

Again, let me insist that the metaphysician does absolutely nothing in the way of setting up or of casting out data. He does not touch the sources either of science or of religion, either to confirm or to deny. On the contrary, he takes these experiences and the resulting conclusions and heroically reduces them to system and consistency. This constructive process may require redefinition; and when it does, it leads toward a more correct understanding.

The most intriguing experience of the human mind is the joy of the increase in understanding. This is what accounts for the curiosity and delight of children as revealed in asking questions and in pulling things apart, as well as in putting them together. This is the basis of the thrill of the adventurous explorer and the patient observation of the scientist. It is the secret of all education. Keeping this spirit alive is the only guarantee of progress. There is no patent on it. It resists monopoly. This is the open secret which ultimately disrupts every stagnant period of civilization. It exists in the

very nature of mind. Nothing is so paralyzing as the opposite attitude, the attitude that truth is closed and understanding vain. Let religion address its appeal to this yearning to understand, lead and guide faith understandingly onward and upward, and there will be no want of life and zeal in the churches and in the aspiration of the followers of religion. When the Church indulges in entertainment instead of inspiration, devises artificial programs in order to attract the public instead of an earnest effort to increase the understanding, it is substituting sham for reality in a most fatal way.

Truth is stranger than fiction and correspondingly more interesting. Fiction is ephemeral, the classic abides. The motive of the former is the market, of the latter it is the desire to illuminate the path of destiny. The former satisfies a passing whim, the latter quenches the everlasting thirst for truth. This is what keeps the research student on the frontiers in his lonely pursuit. "There is no pleasure comparable to standing on the vantage ground of truth." Metaphysics is research into the nature of ultimate reality. As such it is the most intriguing adventure of the human spirit. It offers the most precious findings. Only its counterfeits are barren. Here, as in every other worthwhile pursuit, eternal persistence is the price of success.

CHAPTER VI

ITS INSTITUTIONAL FORM

THE philosopher takes life as he finds it. He seeks to interpret it with a view to finding its meaning. Man's personal nature gives the meaning of life an importance which is beyond every other concern. Destiny is the one thing that cannot be evaded. It is not inherited; it must be achieved. Hence the importance of a correct understanding of the meaning of life. We have seen in previous chapters that on the deep matters touching destiny man's personal nature finds expression in religion. We have seen that religion comes to expression just as normally as language or as science. Man belongs to a universe in which he is impelled to make an abiding moral adjustment. When he reflects deeply upon his own nature he feels a profound need of fulfillment. When he reflects upon the great All of his universe he finds his need satisfied in reconciliation with God. This brings him peace such as the world cannot give. In working out the aspirations of his soul he finds that his limited understanding subjects him

to many mistakes and much error of judgment. This requires him to be constantly alive to the need of critical sifting and logical construction. In other words, his whole nature must be satisfied. His mystic sense of spiritual reality and his intellectual demand for rationality must each be met.

Man's world is twofold. His spiritual struggle makes him feel that he is in this world but not of it. But so long as he is in this world he is obliged to adjust himself to it. This absorbs much of his time and energy. The scientific interpretation and control of the mechanical order becomes most absorbing. With this enlistment of his interest in things he finds a tendency to neglect values. His science, then, takes on the appearance of being hostile toward religion. Returning on his tracks he finds that the apparent conflict arose at the point where he allowed his interests to divide. Here the natural unity of experience and of the world is impressive, and the severance between the physical and the spiritual is found to be artificial. Science, then, comes into its true position as the ally of the spiritual in the field of the mechanical. But now he is still confronted with the duality of methods and of principles in the two orders of experience. This leads him to seek for the unifying agent in the nature of ultimate reality. Here he finds the principles with which

to correct his mistakes and his excesses both in his scientific claims and his claims of divine revelation. He finds that both science and religion by themselves represent abstractions of a larger whole. And the ultimate vindication of truth comes about when things are seen whole. In the last analysis all knowledge culminates in metaphysical principles, and all faith that has in it the promise of survival, finally rests on an acceptance of the personal implications of these principles.

We have had occasion only casually to note the fact that religion is fundamentally social. Man can neither be happy nor can he achieve the best when alone. He is made for society. He finds his individualism a thing that must be overcome. His social nature gives rise to the necessity of institutions. He institutionalizes the sex relation in the Family; the acquisitive instinct in property; the administration of social rights and responsibilities in the State; the nurture and spread of religion in the Church. In each case the origin of the institution is traceable to an idea which the institution is intended to realize. It is made for ends. It must be understood from the ends it is to serve. Its whole function and purpose is to make the idea effective both socially and individually. The important fact to be observed is that the soul of the institution, the essential thing about it, is the

idea. The form it assumes is secondary. This is clearly manifest in the history of religion. Religion is older than the Church.

Men experience religion individually, but they cannot keep it to themselves. It becomes a socializing factor in a variety of ways. At its best it spreads to others under the motive of a generous sharing of the joy it inspires. From this it develops into a deliberate effort to teach the ideas and principles underlying the experience. Associations are formed for fellowship and mutual helpfulness. But in every case religion is more fundamental than church fellowship. In other words, man joins the church fellowship because of his experience of religion; not the other way around. Religion is cause, church fellowship is effect. There has been much confusion at this point. It is this confusion that has been responsible for much of the discredit that has been charged against religion. To speak of the Church as the cause or the producer of religion puts a premium on church membership which it does not deserve. It makes religion a very human affair and it may even leave God out of account. This is the point in the incident quoted from Mr. Wells in a previous chapter. The Church is made a substitute for God. If we keep the true relation clearly before our minds, religion remains the cause and end for which the Church exists. The Church is the

means and instrument for carrying on. In the language of theology, when an individual experiences the saving grace of God he is impelled to participate actively in promoting His kingdom. He joins the Church as the most effective way in which to participate in this grand enterprise.

During the Middle Ages it was quite common to use the example of Noah's Ark with which to illustrate the place and function of the Church. The Ark was built to meet the catastrophe of the Flood. All who were in the Ark were saved. The rest were lost. That was simple and easy to understand. Hence it followed quite simply that getting into the Church meant safety. The very simplicity of this doctrine contributed much to its general popularity. The effect of it was to lead men to substitute getting right with the Church, for getting right with God. The grandeur of the personal process of spiritual quickening was obliterated. In its place came the objectively formal procedure of affiliation with the Church. Conscious hypocrisy was not necessary, but it contained all the invitation that could well be offered for the practice of pretense. Getting into the Church, because it is the Ark of safety, is far removed from a mystical awakening to the sense of sin and the redeeming grace of God. In short, the type of faith that was encouraged by this analogy of the

Ark remained on the surface of human experience. I am not sure that we have even now fully delivered ourselves from this medieval error. The central fallacy turns on the fact that getting into the Ark is an objective affair, whereas the experience of religion is wholly a subjective affair. The natural result was that the Church was encumbered with much irreligion. The same thing will follow in any age and in any place under similar conditions. If we create the impression that church membership in itself is in effect salvation, there will be multitudes who will profess membership without the least notion of a religious experience.

Religious institutions are easy victims of this error. It is not our purpose to find fault, but rather to warn of a patent danger. The Church came into existence under the finest motivation. Godly men organized with a view to carry forward a grand conquest. They were naturally anxious to see signs of progress. The church register still remains much easier to read than the deeper signs of spiritual experience. The great Teacher has warned us of the difficulty of distinguishing between the tares and the wheat. Jonathan Edwards tried to make this distinction in his Northampton church by laying down the principle that no one should be admitted into church fellowship until he had "shown fruits meet for repentance." But how was this

principle to be applied? Standing by it for upwards of eight years no one was admitted into the fellowship of the Northampton congregation. The official board of the church saved the congregation by asking Edwards to withdraw so they might humanize the conditions of church membership. Edwards went to live with the Indians and the congregation waxed in numerical strength.

The Church has suffered much from the statistician. I do not know the remedy with which to cure this infirmity. But I am sure it is sufficiently grave to receive serious study. It is a sort of cancer at the heart of the Church. So much is made of the number of accessions that the reports look like the comparative statement of insurance salesmen. The insurance man who shows the longest list gets a premium. I wonder whether the preacher ever gets any similar premiums? Jesus and Paul showed short lists. But each of them left an indelible impression of godliness. During the first century it was common experience for pagans to note "how these Christians love one another." A professor of political science in the Imperial University of Tokio propounded this question during the late war, "How do you Christians square your religion of love and brotherhood with the fact that the greatest war of all time was incited and carried through to the bitter end entirely by

nations that call themselves Christian?" The fact is that the State will not stand for churchmen whose religious conceptions interfere with the program of the State. Neither pacificism nor communism may be preached. And the State is right. But this does not answer the Japanese professor. When he is answered, that answer will show that there is a discrepancy between our Christian statistics and our Christian spirit. The question carries with it the embarrassment which results from assuming that church membership is the antecedent and religion the necessary consequent.

Let us hope the reader will not get the notion that this is inveighing against the Church. It is quite the opposite. We are writing about the taproot of religion. We are here noting the fact that as a living thing religion carries on by institutionalizing its faith. And we are also describing a natural difficulty involved in this procedure. The difficulty of distinguishing the wheat from the tares; the difficulty of maintaining a steady spiritual consciousness within a State absorbed in other interests; the difficulty of carrying on a program of high idealism and deep spiritual consecration; all of these and many more would seem sufficient to relieve the Church of blame where honest effort fails. The science of medicine has thus far been baffled by cancer and various other infirmities; but the

science is open-mindedly inviting suggestions from everyone who has had dealings with the disease which may point toward solving the problem. Our object here is to defend the Church. It has failed to force the millennium. But it has succeeded marvelously in that it has kept faith in the spiritual vision alive in spite of the worldliness, both within and without, that threatens to choke it. We have the further object of indicating possible ways in which the Church may increase her power. The Church is not only the best means we have for carrying on our religious enterprises, it is the only means.

We have contended from the start that failure comes to us as a challenge. In institutional undertakings failure may represent mistaken objectives, or it may mean a false method of procedure. Jesus plainly pronounced the judgment of failure against Judaism as He found it, but He did not deny the value of institutionalized religion. The decadent state in which he found it had come from a thoughtless drifting away from the principles of their inspiring and inspired founders. But He went even farther than that, "It was said unto you of old . . . but I say unto you." The time had come for a deeper insight into the meaning of life and of the spiritual order. Old traditions must be superseded by a new life. The formalism of the past had set up artificial barriers which were hinder-

ing the growth of the spirit. To a Gentile suppliant He says, and He is speaking for Hebrew ears, "It is not meet to take the children's bread and cast to the dogs." And to another believing Gentile again He speaks for Hebrews, "Verily, I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." The practical difficulty confronting the Christ in leading men from their national gods to the God of the universe and of truth still remains. But the middle wall of partition must be broken down and God must be conceived as having "so loved the whole world . . . that whosoever believed . . . should not perish." The Temple and the synagogue would not stand for this. Accordingly He was crucified. By that sacrifice the institutional renovation acquired its inspiration; but the task of carrying it through remains.

The form that has come down to us harks back to something described in the New Testament under the term "*ekklesia*." The *ekklesia* is spoken of as founded on the rock which is Christ. This title has been ascribed to the institution, the Church. By this founding it has been called divine. By a subtly deliberate process a people with an imperial temper appropriated this divine character and laid claim to divine prerogatives. It gave the Church institutional strength. The time came when it was able to measure its institutional strength suc-

cessfully against the State. But trusting in the institution robbed the people of spiritual power. Let us see, then, how this "cancer" got started. The *ekklesia* are those who have *experienced the spiritual call.* They organize the Church after they have *experienced the ekklesia.* Their membership in the Church is not for the sake of salvation; but, being saved, they join themselves together into a Church in order to bring the call, the *ekklesia,* to others. The rock of salvation, therefore, is the immediate experience of God. This is the taproot of religion. St. Paul and St. Stephen had this experience and set out to tell others of it. Among those who heard them, some had a similar experience. These kindred spirits, with common experiences, found mutual help in fellowship. As a natural result this fellowship of spiritual communion and worship soon became a very practical base of operation. Thus the object of the fellowship turned toward producing the conditions which tend to produce the spiritual call, the *ekklesia.* But religion remains this tremendously intimate affair of a personal experience of God. The mystic witness of the divine lifting man up to the full dignity of his being is the essential thing. This is the *ekklesia.* But, oh how easy it is to substitute the simple matter of joining the fellowship without paying any attention to the deeper matter of the call. The reflective

thinker regards accuracy at this point most important. He is less concerned about church statistics than he is about the evidences of genuine fellowship with God.

Agrippa was much puzzled when St. Paul was brought before him under criminal charges. Marcus Aurelius decided that this whole thing of mystic experience was the result of diseased mentality, and undertook to stamp it out by a sweeping sentence of death upon all who made any claim to it. The results of these judicial procedures certified the genuineness of the mystic visions and the spiritual experience spread. The astute Constantine saw vast political possibilities in these devotees. He took over the Church and made it an institution of the Empire. Statistics rose by leaps, and the bishop increased in power accordingly. The voice of the institution now eclipses the voice of God. External authority takes the place of mystic experience. Religion is submerged and the Church, with an erroneous conception of its function, becomes the instrument which brings in the Dark Ages. Our concern here is to show that it is utterly false to discredit religion on account of this tragedy. The tragedy resulted because a political institution strangled the voice of spiritual prophecy. The Church fell a victim to imperial conceptions of institutionalism. Once it was established on this basis it pro-

ceeded to defend itself as an institution with exclusive ambassadorial powers from God. The institution claimed the keys to heaven. How bitterly the institution fought to maintain its lucrative office is shown in the long-drawn fires of the Inquisition. The abject failure of this form of propaganda proves how utterly false it is to defend religion by cruelty and force.

The lesson of the Dark Ages, so far as religion is concerned, is simply this: religion is a matter of the immediate experience of God and there is no power on earth capable of suppressing it; so far as the Church is concerned it teaches that, no matter how divine this institution may be regarded, it can never supplant God. It teaches further that the Church may become religion's worst enemy. In the long history of civilization the vicissitudes of the Church have varied widely. There have been times, and some of them have lasted long, during which the Church openly played a very discreditable rôle. It has done so in old Russia. There is no question about the corruption and the irreligion of the old Russian Church. The same was true of the French Church before the Revolution. Buddhism, once a vital power throughout the Orient, has likewise lost its influence through institutional formalism.

The only adequate explanation of this striking phenomenon is the fact that the institution,

notwithstanding its importance, when given the central position and endowed with authority as an institution, tends strongly toward substituting the power of organization for the power of the spirit. The viciousness of the situation consists in the pretense, though sometimes veiled, that this arbitrary use of power is guided by the spirit. This is the explanation of Jesus' severe judgments against hypocrisy: whereas, on the other hand, he spoke tenderly his forgiveness of the common sins of the flesh. It has always given me a profound shock to reflect on the fact that the execution of Jesus was accomplished by the representatives of institutionalized religion. Pilate is generally made the goat by the high priests of religion. Perhaps he did act the part of a coward, but have you ever tried to figure out what type of courage would have been required on his part to resist the whole organized clergy of his realm?

The glory of religion shines forth in its power to survive the wreck of the institutional forms in which it is encased. The vices of institutionalism come from man's lust for power. Man has not hesitated to use religion for these selfish ends when it suited his purpose. This perversion of religion should never be allowed to obscure the vital meaning of religion itself. The whole blame for this abuse of the spirit rests with institutionalizing policies. This is true of

all institutions. Even the State suffers from the same kind of abuse. A prophet or an apostle may tell of his mystic experience with a, "thus saith the Lord." But to claim divine authority for no deeper reason than official position in the religious institution does not hold. The practical result for the student of religion is this; he must differentiate the spiritual power of religion, which relates man to God, from the formal power of the institution, which associates him with a social movement. The social movement may continue to have social standing and influence long after its soul has fled. Institutions pass away as other and better ones take their place. Religion survives.

This relation between religion and the Church carries much farther than this. "Come now, let us reason together, saith the Lord." It is very difficult to see any good ground for the exclusive attitudes of Roman Catholics and Protestants toward each other. There is less reason for exclusiveness between Protestant bodies. Magnifying the institutional form in these cases threatens to becloud the spiritual vision.

At the beginning of Christianity the aloofness of the Hebrews was not essentially religious. Racial prejudices and institutional forms prevented the unifying leaven of the spirit. Again, at the rise of the Protestant movement, national pride and race prejudice contributed largely to

the divisions which arose. Even now this principle is being tested out in the Orient. China, for example, is ready to hear about the religion of Jesus Christ, but it is hostile to a Western Church. All of which emphasizes this one fact, that religion is one of man's deepest concerns and he responds to its inspirations. To carry it forward as a social program requires it to be institutionalized; and man needs to be warned against the seduction of substituting the institution for God.

Jesus prayed that "all may be one," and the mystic sense responds to the spirit of that prayer. St. Paul wrote "there is neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor free, but all are one in Christ Jesus." These are sentiments which beget a unifying response. They reveal in this response that human nature at bottom is the same, the spiritual universe is one. It gives rise to the very pertinent question whether religion has not suffered more from religions than from any other cause. That is to say, the Oriental and the Occidental have difficulty in understanding each other in matters of religion because of the institutional forms in which they have built their respective civilizations.

Benares, the holy city of the Hindus, has marked the site where it is proposed to build a College of Universal Religion. In South China the representatives of Buddhism, Confucianism,

Mohammedanism, Judaism, and Christianity have joined forces in building a retreat where the votaries of each may come for rest and fellowship on equal terms. The professed motive is religious. Who shall impugn its genuineness? What spirit animates these movements? Do they point in the right direction? Are they signs of dawn, or do they proclaim the despair of lost hope? What is the meaning of the Sphinx? What of the ruins on such grand scale at Angchor, or at Luxor (the site of ancient Thebes), or at Baalbek, or the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem? Do not all of these imposing relics teach us that the form perishes, that certain things must pass away in order that the abiding spirit may come to fullness of expression? Do they not teach us that religion is far more fundamental than its institutional form and that our very attachment to the form may blind us to the truth? On the morning of the Resurrection the undying voice of the spirit said, "Why seek ye the living among the dead?" In these ancient cemeteries of religious institutions we read the eloquent voice of the spirit proclaiming again, "Why seek the living among the dead?"

Doesn't all of this reveal how closely institutions and our experience with them resemble our fellow beings? We must go to the cemetery with a broken heart to discover that what we really loved was a spiritual being. It is hard to

part with friends on whom we have learned to depend, but the separation is part of the high discipline by which we learn the independence and superior worth of the spirit. So in religion, the bodily form may pass, but the genuine spirit abides.

Is there not some way by which to distinguish between the essential and the temporary, so as to facilitate the progress of religion and protect it against the discredit which results from the undue stress on its nonessential trappings? The antipathy toward religion arises largely from hostilities aroused by its nonessential forms. That is what happened in Russia; in Turkey, Kemal Pasha has put an end to a prominent list of Mohammedan forms by an edict; and the French atheism of the seventeenth century was a protest against the tyrannous institution that made a travesty of God; priests then tried to shift the blame to science and thus inadvertently paid science the compliment of being closer to the truth than themselves.

Civilization is desperately costly. We carry along such a heavy burden of things that are obsolete. We keep our attention fixed on the past while we are moving toward the future. The spirit goes forward haltingly. When we think of man in the abstract, endowed as he is with such extraordinary powers of reason, noble sentiment, and self-control, it seems he should

be able to travel toward his goal by a straighter path. He should be able to study his own nature, his forecasts of destiny, his witness of Deity, with the same kind of humble tolerance as he studies astronomy, or biology. It should not be necessary to crucify, to behead, to burn at the stake, good and honest men in order to discover the genuineness of their faith. In all the long, sad history of persecutions conducted in the name of religion—and these are the most gruesome of all history—the accusations are based on things peripheral. Where is human genius? Why can't we devise some method to fix our concentration on the things that are of central importance? Can't we somehow vitalize the old prophet's admonition, "Come now, let us reason together," and thus reduce the casualties of religion?

The writer is fully aware that he has called attention to a hard record. No one wishes more than he that the record were not so hard. He wants to adjust the Church to its highest task. He is so enamored of religion that he loses patience with its enemies—a loss of patience that is intensified by a masquerading of the enemy in the house of the Lord.

The situation is not hopeless. Let us reflect on the function of the Church; we have said enough of its mistakes. Its first responsibility is mutual inspiration within the fellowship of

believers. It is not a secret order cultivating the spirit of the clan, but a brotherhood bound for a glorious destiny. The journey is arduous, beset with many trials, and the fellowship keeps faith and hope bright. Its second function is to spread the good news of its faith-experience and thus extend the fellowship. This is the way the founders of religion conducted their work. We have seen, in a previous chapter, that both scientists and statesmen have a tendency to magnify their own work and their own people. It is not strange, therefore, that this should happen likewise among religious leaders. But it is more fatal in religion than in any other department of human experience.

In its primary function of mutual inspiration the real concern is a deeper understanding of our own religious nature and of the ways of experiencing God. If this is to succeed we must practice diligent self-analysis and take the problem of our spiritual nature seriously. The Sermon on the Mount remains nothing more than a beautiful piece of classical literature until it has been translated into the spiritual force of personal life. The sublime law of love set forth in the Gospel is but poor philosophy until it is taken on as a guiding principle of personal conduct. The mystery of death and the glory of immortality are brought closer to solution as our lives are led into the appreci-

ation and practice of spiritual fellowship. In discharging this primary function of mutual inspiration, the fellowship of believers will have plenty to do with the spiritual teachings that transform life, without wasting time on controversial problems suggested by the dialecticians.

Man's intellectual and social background is constantly changing. His achievement in science has taught him confidence in his powers of research. By the confidence he has thus acquired, he has made bold to repudiate the errors of the past and build better in the future with clearer light and knowledge. The Church fellowship will succeed in its work of mutual inspiration and encouragement by appropriating this confidence in the witness of experience and rational construction.

The function of Church fellowship is teaching. And teaching can never succeed except by following the laws of the mind. Comenius and Pestalozzi were pioneers in calling attention to the need for training in observation. They laid a new foundation for education by their insistence on learning from things—from experiences —rather than from words. They were thinking of the things of sense, and the impulse they gave to teaching was tremendous. In an earlier chapter we described the mystic process in which man finds both himself and his God. The Church can learn much from Comenius and

Pestalozzi. Effective teaching is based on getting the learner to experience the things he is talking about, instead of accumulating words and formulas. If it is true, and the writer thinks it is, that man knows the high dignity of his own nature, his personal aspiration with its glorious promise, by an inner mystic experience; that man knows by that same inner witness the God who fulfills his need; it must follow that religious teaching should make large use of this type of observation. If faith rests on mysticism it must follow that we must cultivate mystic modes of apprehension if our teaching is to get beyond meaningless words.

The Church has recognized this in its utilization of art in painting, sculpture, architecture, and liturgy. The lofty motive of all of these adaptations of art is its sufficient justification. But the motive fails, so long as these splendid compositions fail to carry into the soul of the worshiper the mystic quickening implied in their structure, just as a textbook of science fails without the laboratory. Mohammedans take pride in the fact that their mosques have no images, no Buddha, no Siva or Vishnu, no crucifix, nothing but a pulpit from which to expound and a place on which to bow down and pray. One wonders whether their negations of symbols enhances the genuineness of their prayers. At least they do much formal praying.

Jesus' disciples requested him to teach them to pray. All the evidence indicates that they were impressed with the value of prayer by His own success in it. They were not thinking of a common custom, but of a real thing, the power of which was being portrayed before their eyes. Let me ask the patient reader in all seriousness whether he knows of many similar cases? Let me ask further whether he has heard many sermons or lectures on the subject of prayer that inspired the hearers to ask, "Teach me to pray"? The writer knows full well that he is discussing a difficult theme. But he believes so strongly in the genuine place of religion in human life, is so thoroughly convinced that it is suffering from an unfair disrepute, that he is making an earnest plea for a deeper study of the forms of religious expression. He believes that all the art that has been inspired by religious experience has inestimable value, but he fears that this high value has been lost because of the way it has been treated; it leaves us indifferent.

The psychologist has studied prayer as a problem of behavior. His results have shown certain physiological accompaniments. But these have thus far brought little of worth to the man who would learn its value. The psychologist frequently fails to get to the real problem because he leaves personality, the source of prayer, out

of account. He has concluded that there is something of the nature of autosuggestion in the prayer process which may be of real positive worth to religion. At least here a scientific study attests the fact that prayer does make a difference. In addition to this there have been a number of theological essays on the subject of prayer. The religious fellowship should make a larger use of the positive efforts to translate the idea of prayer into religious dynamics. The history of the lives of the great religious leaders attests the genuine function of prayer. But it seems to be a lost art. It is highly important that it be revived. The Church needs to study the problem and point out the way.

The same thing applies to the whole body of art which the Church has produced. The Gothic and the Romanesque each represents a grand idea. Each idea reflects an aspect of experience which illuminates man's experience of God. Why is this inspirational experience left to stand in the cold form of stone? The paintings of Raphael or da Vinci, the sculptures of Michelangelo or Botticelli, were born of a mighty experience. Each one reflects some deep striving of the human soul for expression. Each magnifies a personal aspiration for enrichment of apprehension. Why have we neglected their interpretation? Where the soul comes to expression, we have remained satisfied with words.

We need to get back to the mystic experiences from which these creations issued.

All of these splendid achievements, together with the liturgy, are the creations of the spirit. The sacraments and the Holy Scriptures are instruments of inspiration whose apprehension requires training. But we have not trained our powers of spiritual discernment to the same sharpness to which scientific method has trained the powers of physical discernment. All along the line of our educational program the laboratory has encroached on the classic spirit. We have no criticism of the laboratory. It has fully justified itself. But the religious fellowship cannot afford to surrender the classics. It is in these that the soul of man has come to expression. It is here that mystic apprehension must get its discipline. It is not grammar and philology that is needed. These are necessary as tools. The great objective must be the study of the human soul in the places where it has found its best expression.

In 1893, Dr. John Henry Barrows conceived, called, and organized the Congress of World Religions. Its objective was the achievement of mutual understandings on the great theme of God and man's relation to Him. That congress represented both vision and courage. Its achievement was splendid. The next congress that should be planned and carried through

should bring together the foremost representatives of science, art, philosophy, statesmanship, and religion, for the same purpose of mutual understanding on the great theme of God and man. We are at cross purposes at present. The men who are working in each field have lost touch with the men who are equally earnest, equally capable, and equally successful, in other fields. They have intensified their respective abstractions and produced the appearance of conflict. This is not surprising. It is remarkable that the superficial evidences of conflict are not greater than they are. Nothing can be gained by the small talk of calling names. The way out is to get together; lay down the truths of each field, and again reorganize the grand whole of knowledge. When science sees that mystic vision supplies facts where its instruments fail, when philosophy understands that personal life goes deeper than rational principles, when statesmanship faces the fact that the safety and success of the social order involves a program that comprehends the whole truths of which each of these divisions represent a part, when religion surcharges this whole with the spirit of humility, tolerance, and brotherhood, the present sense of defeatism will be at an end. This grand coördination must be brought to pass by the Church. The Church is engaged in the single business of inspiring men

to achieve their ultimate destiny. It is for this that the coördination is necessary. Hence the Church must take the lead in bringing it to pass.

We have emphasized the need to train men in mystic apprehension in the interest of getting the real data of religious faith. But religious education must likewise undertake the training of the intellect in the importance and in the method of consistency in interpreting the mystic data. Reason is just as important in religion as it is in science, but no more. Reason furnishes no data of reality except the principle of rationality itself. But it organizes all data and reveals their implication. Faith comprehends this grand total, the factual data and the coördinated system of truth built out of it. The principles of philosophy result from the honest search for truth. These principles interpret the powers of man. Mystic vision experiences God. When the principles deduced from the powers of the human mind interpret and coördinate the facts experienced in mystic vision, we are at least approaching the best statement of the whole truth of which we are capable.

The Church must not forget that it is a confessional institution. Professionalism is not of its nature. By this we mean that a profession partakes of the nature of a job or a business enterprise. The Church is an enterprise, as a

matter of course, but if it is not more than an enterprise it can be abandoned with as little conscience as any other enterprise. The Church confesses a program of such intimate concern to humanity that it cannot relinquish it and remain true either to itself or to humanity. "Woe is me, if I preach not the gospel" is of the very essence of the confessional position of the institution born out of faith in God. The professional may be hired, but the shepherd guards the flock for its own sake. The religious ministry must forever remain an *ekklesia,* a call. It cannot be reduced to a profession and retain its spiritual power.

I once heard a wonderful sermon on the text, "The heavens declare the glory of God," with the theme, the glory of God in Nature. The sermon was packed full of astronomy. It was filled with the awe-inspiring grandeur which the preacher had experienced in the contemplation of this sublime handiwork of the Creator. It was a marvelous, gripping, challenging sermon. The audience was held in rapt attention. But the preacher was admonished that he was expected to preach the Bible. The pathos of this situation is in the fact that we have formed the habit of requiring the trite and the formal. It is the original and sincere that inspires. The New Testament is our best example of this type of procedure. Every line is charged with living

truth and vital experience. There isn't a trite sentence in it. This is peculiarly true of the recorded sayings of Jesus: "He speaketh as one having authority, and not as the scribes." The Church must get above speaking like the scribes. The impressive thing about Jesus' teaching that made it authoritative was its mystic truth, not its institutional warrant. All Palestine was aroused by the challenging presentation of the deep meaning of life. The Greeks came from their far country to see and hear this marvelous Teacher. St. Paul challenged the whole Roman Empire. The power of the challenge lasted as a soul-transforming power until Constantine subsidized the Church and professionalized the ministry. Thereafter, authority was transferred from the compelling power of a living faith to the enforced authority of a social institution. We must go back to the original spirit. The Church must lead the way by encouraging the expression of living conviction. If it refuses this, its high calling, another Church must take its place.

If we face squarely the fact that the Church stands sponsor for the religion of the age, we have stimulus that is overpowering. No other institution is concerned with this task. If religion fails, we should know that the failure must not be charged against the essential nature of religion. The responsibility must rest with the

medium through which it functions. It may be true that the age is absorbed in other things, but it is not true that it is unwilling to respond to the things of the spirit when these are brought to it in vital form. We must remember that the reliability of mystic experience does not rest on the prophet's vision alone. It is quite as important to note that the rank and file are just as discerning in things mystical as they are in things sensory. Hence, if the age is absorbed in things to the neglect of spiritual values, the high responsibility rests on the Church to meet the counter-attractions with the liveliness of its doctrine of man. It must know that religion does transform men; that where this does not take place it is false to speak of religion. The end to be attained may require modifications in method. The objective should be sufficient warrant to justify any modification that promises to effect this grand result. It may mean less preaching, but greater preaching. This is not criticism. It is defense. Our institutional life has led us to ascribe a sort of sacrosanct character to a certain schedule of sermons, a schedule that no man can fulfill effectually, and then blames the ministry for the dullness and the triteness of their sermons. As the Church is at present conducted, the preacher hasn't half a chance. Loaded with responsibilities of administration, with his energies dissipated by the

commonplace social demands made on him, how shall he have time for that intimate fellowship with God to be filled with a challenging message. This "performance" bears on its face the judgment that we don't attach much value to it. Why should we expect an intelligent age to listen to such a message?

Here is a typical case. A community of less than one thousand inhabitants has four churches of as many denominations with an aggregate membership of five hundred. What right has anyone to expect spiritual power there? Why shouldn't a city of ten thousand population concentrate its preaching in a single great cathedral under the inspiration of a man with talent and time for the discharge of his high calling, and then support him with a corps of adequately trained teachers and pastors to carry on much needed personal work. Why is this folly perpetuated? Is it not because of magnifying the importance of nonessentials? Shouldn't we hide our faces in shame at the divisions we perpetuate? The tragedy of it consists in the fact that in this way we attempt to do the most important thing in life in the most commonplace way. We should not be surprised that it gets a commonplace rating.

Let me repeat the question proposed in an earlier chapter; What is the difference between doing what is expected of you and doing what

is right? Let us now follow it with another. Are we perpetuating these nonessential handicaps because we think they are right, or because it is expected of us? What must happen to break this spell? How did the old Church of Russia become the obsolete institution it was, so that it fell to pieces as soon as the Czarist tyranny came to an end? The reflective thinker is much disturbed by conduct that discredits the things for which it stands. It creates the impression of insincerity and pretense. There is nothing more damning than this in spiritual things.

Accepting its high responsibility of inspiring men with a sense of God, the Church can diligently prosecute its work of preparation with the same thoroughness that characterizes other social undertakings. It can administer its affairs with the same business principles as are successful in other lines. It can exercise the tolerance which love inspires, and the careful consistency which truth demands. It can show a diligence and understanding in solving problems that will inspire confidence. Having done these things, the Church will recover her place of dignity and respect which will enable her to fulfill her function as pilot of civilization.

In previous chapters we have shown the intimate oneness of faith and knowledge, of science and religion, and the need of maintaining an in-

timate spirit of harmony and coöperation. The Church, if it would be effective, will cultivate the sense of the wholeness of knowledge and the harmony of faith so it can speak a language that all can understand, and use a mode of expression that all will respect. It may pay less attention to statistics than at present, but it will be in dead earnest about the task of getting respect for the name of God. It will work with the same patience and application with its mystical data as the laboratory scientist does with sensory data. Its work in the pulpit as well as in the school and the home will carry the dignity of its ambassadorial character. This spiritual power will lead the people to God rather than to the Church. With the consciousness of God thoroughly awakened, identification with the Church will take care of itself. The Church is the only institution in which this office is carried on. Just as the State is required to hold the adjustment of civil relationships on even keel, so the institution of the Church is indispensable to maintaining the purity of the faith. Anarchy is a social contradiction in civil affairs, and individualism in religion tends toward fanaticism. The State avoids anarchy by justice and the Church avoids individualism by diligent devotion to truth.

Summarizing our argument in this chapter, we find that the taproot of religion has grown

sickly from the formalism within the Church. The corrective principle comes from the spiritual nature of the mystic witness. What we need to guard against is the substitution of loyalty to the institution for loyalty to God. It is more difficult to do, because of its subjective complications, but its modes of procedure are the same as in the sciences. The divisions of organization encumber the work. Practical wisdom should produce a higher efficiency by organizing for the task rather than for the maintenance of decadent forms. This must happen. Religion will survive. The Church that will carry on will be the Church which will adapt itself to the needs and temper of the age. This does not mean that the temper of the age will strangle religion. What it does mean is that the age will find God as the solution of its own problems. It may be agreeable information to know that God was the solution of the problem of the Hebrews under Egyptian slavery. But what this age wants is to be shown that God will solve the problems of the present. The age will respond to the genuine man of God, now as always.

CHAPTER VII

THE MASTER OF CIVILIZATION

We have presented a survey of the central characteristic of our personal nature, the grandest fact in the universe, the fact that man strives to find God. This fact is our superlative interest. It presses for adjustment and the solution of the problems of human achievement in each generation. The assaults of naturalism fail in the face of the insistent mystic witness to something beyond mere nature. The principle of consistency constructs the confusing data of experience into a rational creed. Science furnishes factual evidence of the lordship of the personal. It reveals the methods of thought which produce reliable results. It carries its research to the boundaries of the physical universe and lays down its task at that boundary. The data which lure man to press his inquiry further come from his own inevasive nature. By applying the same methods of thought which are attested in the physical world to the mystic data, man builds a religious conception of the spiritual order which furnishes a consistent interpretation of

his natural impulses. This leads to a program of individual and social achievement in which he is both learner and teacher. He organizes the Church for the prosecution of this program. His organization is immediately beset with the temptation to usurp the place of the spirit and become the end instead of the means. But, notwithstanding this tendency, the Church remains the indispensable institution for carrying on this high function. It maintains its place of power and respect by a constant adjustment to the peculiar problems of the age in which it lives. With this inherent principle of self-correction the Church holds its place of pilot for civilization.

It remains for us now to describe the glorious fact that *faith is the master of civilization.* With all our boasted knowledge, we live by faith. This is not some old doctrine first conceived by naïve medicine men that persists into an age in which it has outlived its time. It describes the specific character of finite persons. Persons project themselves forward and achieve their projections. "Faith is the substance of things hoped for." The hope is based on the implications of factual experiences. But the fact that man searches out the meaning of his experiences with a view to building a better social order is due to his personal nature. Birds and beasts do not plan and achieve progress.

Western civilization is a composite of three great confidences. The Hebrews developed the principle of confidence in God, in which they produced a grand conception of devotion to things transcendent. They remained weak in self-reliance. The Greeks worked out the principle of confidence in man, in which they produced that spirit of self-reliance and mastery over nature that is represented in natural science and in political democracy. The Romans elaborated the principle of confidence in the State, and created the principles of institutional organization that still remain the foundation of our Western social order. The point of this is that each of these confidences, the Hebrew faith in God, the Greek faith in man, the Roman faith in institution, planted a seed which has flourished. By each of these faiths man hoped to effect an improvement, and his creations in each case were animated by faith. In each of them he believed in something which was not yet, and he set to work to see to it that it should be.

On the other hand, we see from the things accomplished that each of them represented a personal need which demanded fulfillment. Our personal nature needs God and by faith reaches out after Him. It looks to Him for enlightenment and guidance as children look to their parents. Our personal nature needs self-expression

which it finds in "subduing the earth." Personality needs to be self-legislative, *i.e.* persons crave to make the law which they obey. There is a sense of incompleteness so long as the rule of conduct is imposed by another. Hence the Greek spirit taught man the need to bring his moral thinking up to the level of the universal. This accounts for the aggressive spirit of Greek civilization which led Sir Henry Maine to observe, "Nothing moves in civilization that is not Greek in its origin." But self-legislation must be learned within the social order. Persons crave society. They are made perfect by association. So Rome countered the Greek self-legislation by social legislation in the hope of effecting a discipline by which individualism would find its fulfillment in harmonious social relationships. For two thousand years we have been working this threefold faith, reaching forward toward the realization of a personal character that makes the law of God its own, toward a social institution in which personal spontaneity and social law, personal initiative and public demand shall become identical. Religion calls this objective, heaven, or nirvana—the culmination of personality. This makes faith something vastly more than an act of will; it is rather personality reaching out after destiny. Personality does believe; it can't help it. It may select what it will believe, but it cannot

refuse to believe simply because it cannot deny its own nature.

In the last analysis psychology has not been able to furnish much enlightenment on why we believe any more than on why we rationalize. It is a great ultimate truth founded in the nature of personality. Despite the unparalleled advance in scientific knowledge the universe seems to become increasingly a mystery. Within the boundaries of scientific solution the mystery has been overcome in a way that satisfies. But we can't let the mysteries alone. Science has reduced the mortality rate in a most gratifying way, but it has not abolished death nor reduced its mystery. We have knowledge that enables us to discharge and direct physical energies of stupendous power, but how the purposes of this control shall be kept safe is still as baffling as ever. The simple fact is that our attitude toward the mystery, toward what lies beyond knowledge, is what determines the value of all we know. Knowledge is the handmaid of faith. It is by faith that we ferret out the differences in the meaning of life. And it is when we have found the meaning that ultimately satisfies that we dedicate ourselves to its realization. The practical consequence of this functioning of faith is that it contains within itself the principle of its own correction. Honesty with the facts, accuracy in thought, con-

sistency in conduct, succeeds. The universe answers man's faith, and man confirms his dignity by identifying his life with his faith.

"As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he," is about the most fundamental philosophy we have concerning man. It describes his attitude toward the mystery just beyond the border of knowledge. It shows the stuff of which he is made, the stuff he has made himself. Once we grasp this fundamental fact and comprehend its sweeping implication, we see at once that faith far out-classes knowledge in its importance for the understanding of human nature and of human life. As a matter of fact, all the fundamental virtues reveal the qualities of faith which a man has. Shylock takes pride in his straight justice until it is brought home to him that, untempered with mercy, what he calls justice becomes unjust. Courage is vastly more than facing danger or enduring pain. This might be very stupid. Virtue is conduct governed by a long-ranged view of life as contrasted with a short-ranged view. Carried to the limit, it is what Spinoza called "from the viewpoint of eternity." If it be true, therefore, that the quality of man is essentially determined by his virtues, and the quality of virtue is determined by the eternity of its point of view, it follows that man's faith in the eternal order is the capstone

of his personal nature. Faith is, therefore, the most exalted experience of the human soul, the one discipline for which all others exist. Instead of speaking patronizingly of "mere" faith, it is more befitting that we should exalt and revere it. We pay high tribute to the research scientist because of his achievement. The saint takes his place alongside the scientist, for both have achieved by faith. The scientist believed in his personal abilities to search out the secrets of nature and its uniform rationality, and his confidence was rewarded. The saint believed the challenge of the mystic voice, and his confidence was rewarded.

It is evident, therefore, that faith is "personality in action," as defined in a previous chapter. When the theme of faith touches the intimate problem of human destiny, it is religion. All knowledge bears a vital relation to faith either as supporting the faith or as carrying out its implications. Civilization follows its master, which is faith. It is likewise evident that the only faith that promises survival is one that harmonizes with the meaning of personality. It is this that constitutes the wisdom contained in the ancient Greek admonition, "Know thyself." We give ourselves to the support of faith in a worthy destiny in proportion as we understand the deep meaning of self. An age which is so completely absorbed in knowing about *things,*

is in great danger of underestimating the value and the dignity of the personal.

Science has accomplished so much, that we have come to respect its modes of thought as well as its conclusions. The method of induction has acquired a sort of religious veneration. That is to say, we begin with facts of experience and require our general principles to stand the test of these facts. For some fifteen hundred years we have treated faith as a work of God by contrast with knowledge as a work of man. It was assumed that this gave it prestige and standing. But as a matter of fact it took away from man all responsibility and put God in the precarious position of being the most arbitrary being imaginable. If God is the sole active agent in producing faith, to what vicious propensity shall we ascribe His refusal to produce it in some men? If God is the agent, what becomes of our own personal responsibility? To offer the answer that it is a mystery which God has refused to divulge, and that He has a perfect right to withhold His reason, still leaves God in the position of a very immoral being. If the preceding paragraphs of this chapter are true, man is the active agent in faith. We arrived at our conclusion by the inductive procedure of starting with the facts of experience. God reveals Himself in the glory of the heavens as well as in "Moses and the prophets and if man believes

not these, neither will he believe though one should rise from the dead."

We have previously observed that shortly after Christianity became the state religion of Rome, the idea of God was drafted after the pattern of a Roman emperor. An emperor is above the law and he may smile on whom he wills and for whatever reasons that please him. The ancient doctrine of grace was deeply tinged with imperialism. But imperialism broke down in both State and Church during the Renaissance. The Greek insistence on the dignity of man checked itself against the Roman insistence on the preëminent authority of the imperial institution, with the result that both Church and State were brought into closer accord with the facts of human personality. The modern doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers contains the gist of the correction achieved during the Renaissance. For the purposes of our interpretation of the taproot of religion these facts reveal that human personality is endowed with the capacities of self-correction in faith as well as in reason. It is for this reason that Jesus based his program on teaching. "Can a man by searching find out God?" implies the expectation of a negative reply. And the results of his search will be negative so long as he refuses to conduct his search in accordance with God's own terms.

"He that doeth His will, shall know of the doctrine." The faith that is ultimate master of civilization is the faith that appropriates God actively. "Faith is personality in action."

Both mystic vision and rational consistency impel a faith in a God who challenges personal self-realization. As Cardinal Newman said of reason, "No doctrine . . . can in the end hold out against reason." Neither can any doctrine hold out against the dignity of personality. Man cannot believe in a tyrant God. Neither can he live by any faith except his own.

During the early years of the Reformation, Melanchthon undertook to construe the doctrine of faith in harmony with the facts of the faith-experience. But the Augustinian imperialist conception was still too strong, just as the Aristotelian physics were too strong for Galileo. Melanchthon's doctrine was condemned as the synergist heresy, and for almost two centuries the name of Melanchthon was under a cloud, and the inductive treatment of faith was under the ban. To me this is one of the prime misfortunes of modern times so far as religion is concerned. Bruno was burned at the stake for attempting to construe the universe in harmony with the findings of the Copernican astronomy which led him to pantheism; the writings of Copernicus were placed on the index of forbidden writings; Galileo was imprisoned for

teaching that the earth moves; Sir Isaac Newton was debarred from the sacraments for substituting the principle of gravitation for the spiritual guidance of planetary motion; yet, notwithstanding these persecutions the new science of physics kept on its way. It was hampered, but it did not stop. As a result, the physical sciences went forward. Had reactionary persecution succeeded, it is difficult to imagine the course of the past three centuries. But the synergist controversy throttled the movement toward a sounder psychology of religion, and the effort was not renewed until about the middle of the nineteenth century. This accounts for the difference in the progress of thought in the field of religion as compared with the field of science.

This is nothing more than a simple description of a very deplorable fact. It, in part, explains the criticisms so frequently heard that religion is behind the times. My contention is that it is not religion that is backward. Religion seeks expression quite as actively as science, and it breaks through the crust of prejudice just as inevitably. Personality is faith in action, and it will correct the encroachments on its dignity as inevitably as planets, asteroids, and comets will correct the deductions made from their observed movements. The institution checks the individual, and the individual checks the insti-

tution. The balanced result is the way toward truth and certainty. Faith is forward-looking, and there will be much gain if religious leadership will give this aspect more consideration. Ancestor worship and hero worship are very definite modes of social reaction, but each one readily leads to false conclusions.

During recent decades faith has been studied inductively. It is being treated as a fact of experience which takes place within the human mind. It can be analyzed into its constituent elements and the experience can be described just as any other phenomenon of nature. We are slowly achieving a psychology of religion. Mystic apprehension is found to be as real a source of experience as sensation. We know the large place which the structure of the sense organ holds in furnishing us with the quality of objects. Even with this discounted we still do not get reality through sensation. So the mystic compulsions of personality are all thickly beset with the subjective obsessions of selfishness and of habit. But when these are analyzed at their face value, we apprehend the immediately personal in the fullness of its glory and its power. We know it better than we know sense objects for the simple reason that here knower and known are identical, the subject and the predicate are one and the same thing. As Jean Paul Richter, when a child, is said to have observed

in great excitement as he made the discovery, "Oh, Mama, I am an I."

This conception of faith has rescued the idea of Deity from the arbitrary character in which He was conceived during the Middle Ages. The moral responsibility of man is accurately defined. The meaning of aspiration comes into its own. And inspiration becomes a definite factor in human history. Just as gravitation maintains the relation of the planets to the sun, inspiration determines the relation of persons to their God.

Let us understand, therefore, that we are describing a real experience that takes place within the human soul, that it is an experience which we can cultivate and, if we are wise, we will cultivate quite as assiduously as the other powers of the mind. Faith is both a personal act and an attitude at one and the same time. Much confusion has resulted from a misuse of the definition given in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." In its misuse this definition has stressed the objective content of faith. Faith then becomes a creed, and swiftly becomes detached from its spiritual life in the human soul, its normal place of abode. A creed is a faith reduced to words or symbols for the purpose of teaching. In its proper use it may become the means of inspir-

ing a similar faith in others. But the creed is never a faith except in the soul of a person who makes it his own. Faith identifies a person with its object. "The kingdom of God is within you." What does this mean but the fact that by faith man identifies himself with God, and by that identification he appropriates God. It is no longer a matter of an objective loyalty to the great leader of a cause, it is the subjective appropriation of the cause as one's own. This is the witness of the mystic's experience which he expresses in the striking phrase, "God and I are one."

Orthodoxy all too frequently resolves itself into external conformity to an objective creed. Assenting to a creed that is true may look good, but on the very face of it lies the infirmity of externalism. The faith that is master of civilization forever remains the living reality of personality in action. "The letter killeth." In the program of socialization man is obliged to reduce his experience of faith to a creed for pedagogic purposes. But in teaching it his object must forever be the quickening of the mystic vision of which it is the expression. "The spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." The multiplication table is reduced to writing for pedagogic purposes. It has been effective when the pupil has mastered its principles. But religious teaching that does

not inspire a similar mastery by mystic apprehension fails.

"The substance of things hoped for." By faith I am hoping for greater godliness on my part, and a happier social fellowship in a social order which I call heaven. It appeals to me because my whole personality finds its fulfillment in this conception. But the whole thing, "the substance hoped for," is based on subjective achievement. Its objective bestowal is out of the question. Heaven is not a locality and godliness is more than a written formula. Place can produce neither. Hence, when this "hoped for" status is made my own, then its substance has not only become mine, it has become me. This is the real master of civilization. The faith that constitutes the me, the personal aspiration of a given age is master. Religion seeks to make faith in God hold this place. The course of history reveals the constancy of this purpose. With all his failures, man has nevertheless put his best into his religion as he understood it.

The critic may be disposed to say that this is nothing more than shallow humanism. But this misses the point entirely. Humanism ignores the mystic data and seeks to build its system on abstract principles. The vitality of humanism is a little like the value of counterfeit money. So long as no one discovers the fact that the money is counterfeit it will pass in exchange

just like the real thing. So with humanism, so long as no one notices or challenges the abstractness of its foundations it passes for genuine. But personality is insulted when treated to abstractions in response to its deepest needs. Personality bows before superior personality. Love is a bond between persons. There is no "pull" in an abstraction. Finite personality responds to the inspiring "pull" of the Perfect Personality. The personal faith that is the taproot of religion and thereby the master of civilization is more than a humanistic whim. It is the incontestable conviction of personal fulfillment: "To whom shall we go, thou hast the words of eternal life." "The heavens declare the glory of God"; not glory in the abstract, but the glory of the Author. Glory apart from authorship is a meaningless term.

What then has God had to do with my faith, with your faith? He has surrounded me with a universe of law which I have thus been taught to respect; He has placed me in a world of wondrous beauty which I have learned to enjoy; He has followed me with His precepts of love in which I have found the meaning of this and of all else. "Earth's crammed with heaven . . . but only they who see take off their shoes." I take off my shoes in reverence for the holy ground on which I stand and utter the only exclamation that my soul can think, "Lord I

believe." Man has responded as he must respond, but he has not lost his identity. His prayer has been answered. God's will has become his own. They twain have become one, the one of a perfect fellowship. This is bliss. Here the soul finds peace. Here is freedom. The soul does what it pleases, because only the good pleases the good-will. Such a soul experiences its conduct as its own, and its moral status has been lifted to its climax. This explains the peace of the martyr, the triumph of the faithful. God has extended His hand and the believer has laid hold of it. If He had not revealed His grace we should be left to grope in a dark world where we could find nothing but abstractions. Abstractions do not satisfy. If God had so made me that I could not respond to His revelation, or that I must respond regardless of my choice, His compulsion would depersonalize me and at the same time destroy the personal character of God. Inspiration prevails within an order of personal beings; compulsion belongs to an impersonal, mechanical system. In this way I can understand my experience, retain my identity, exercise both my intelligence and my faith, and bring it all into consistency with my total conduct.

"The evidence of things not seen," raises the question as to what constitutes evidence. A careful analysis of experience confirms this

proposition. The things which are seen are temporal is a principle that holds everywhere. And the things which are not seen are eternal. Science interprets the law of temporary changes within the seen on the basis of an implicit faith in the unseen permanence that lies behind it. Should science deny the unseen permanent and act consistently with such denial, it must necessarily quit. It neither denies nor quits. It accepts, at least tacitly, the mystic witness, "it must be so." So far as the psychology of faith is concerned the religious act of faith takes place in the same way as it does in science. Behind the compound, science must believe in the unseen atom; behind the atom it must believe in the unseen proton. Pray tell me why *must* it; and what is this unseen proton? After all else is said—and most of it will not be very much to the point—the proton is the name given to the underlying changeless reality which is required to furnish an adequate interpretation of the changing world of the seen. In like manner religion believes in the unseen person behind the organic and glandular reactions. Religion believes in the compelling personal affinities in the form of the sense of moral obligations. As these come to us in the form of personal commands, it believes in the personal God from whom they issue. It *must* do so. The "must" is the scientific "must." If you refuse it and be

consistent you must quit. And who are we that in our vanity we should presume to nullify reality?

The "must" of faith is based in the mystic sense. If we refuse it the self is dissolved. Dissolve the self and there is nothing left. This is the limit of absurdity to which naturalism leads. On the Damascus road St. Paul experienced a revelation in which he was compelled to think and act differently with respect to his own unseen self and to the unseen moral order to which the self responds. On that spot and in that experience the external formalism of his Pharisaic Hebrew faith, together with the abstract rationality of his Stoic philosophy, are broken through. In mystic experience he penetrated behind the temporal seen of religious and philosophic conduct to the unseen and the abiding.

Faith apprehends the abiding. After Kant had shown the impossibility of knowledge based on pure reason, he found that the witness of the categorical imperative still stands unimpeached. Reason cannot justify my sense of duty, but I cannot escape it. Reason cannot demonstrate immortality, but I must be immortal. There is no proof for the existence of God, but He must be. The unimpeachable witness of the categorical imperative, the sense of duty, bears testimony that I belong to a moral order that has no temporal boundaries, an order in

which I learn to obey the eternal Person. At the outer boundary of his philosophy Kant's mystic experience carried him to the living reality, God. "Religion is living in accordance with moral principles conceived as the commands of God." The changing known leads us to faith in the unchanging. In this world of change this looks like the coercion of physical force, whereas it is the inevasive coercion of inspiration, the ultimate undeniability of our personal self.

This profound stirring of the soul, which I experience when I stand at the end of the pathway of knowledge and contemplate the meaning of *me* and of my struggle, gives me the mystic vision that enables me to penetrate the veil and see God. Schleiermacher described this experience as a "sense of absolute dependence." It is the witness of God supporting that dependence. We are still in the field of psychology because we are still talking about experience. What we are saying carries us behind glandular reaction just as the proton is behind the atom. And when the proton receives its final interpretation we will be beyond science, so when we attempt the final interpretation of religious faith we will be beyond psychology in the realm of ultimate reality, metaphysics. When I press my experience for an answer to the question whether or not this is mere imagination, there comes the unmistakable response that light has come from

outside me. I have beheld its glory. I have experienced fellowship. It has inspired me and I make the best response of which I am capable by walking in that light. Civilization walks by that light. It walks poorly because it sees poorly. The objectivity of the mystic vision of God presents no greater psychological difficulties than the objectivity of sense perception. The fact is, as Berkeley showed two hundred years ago, that every sense perception gets its quality from the sense organ through which it is apprehended, and modern psychology confirms this conclusion. If we give the same kind of confidence to mystic apprehension that we give to our sensory apprehension we will find the same kind of security in the realm of spirit that we have in the realm of physical things.

We have described faith as an act, personality in action. We might add that it is both act and direction at one and the same time. By faith personality acts and is thereby carried from what it is to what the act makes it. Faith in God is action in the direction of godliness. It is said that on the morning of the day on which the Japanese destroyed the Russian fleet, Admiral Togo remarked, "A night of a thousand conflicting thoughts, now one determined purpose." This is the very essence of faith. Out of the myriad possibilities it identifies its destiny and concentrates its whole self in one de-

termined purpose. It bears the marks of volition, but it is more than sheer will. It is personality expressing itself. When this expression is brought into accord with abiding truth, then faith will have done for personality what intellect has done for natural science when it has accurately applied mathematics to its interpretation. By the act of faith personality takes the object of faith into itself. In religion it appropriates God. This is the psychology of the proposition that "the kingdom of God is within you."

The north pole is a point in infinite space, but the compass in the laboratory gets its line of direction from it. God is the supreme person of infinite time, but the souls of men here and now get their line of moral and spiritual direction from Him.

As they consciously yield—by faith accept Him—they become, by that much, like Him. All psychology supports the fact that ideas are active; that by their activity the ideas produce a mind like unto themselves. The story is told of a visitor to Fénelon who was so engrossed with the spirit of the enlightenment as to think it impossible that so sensible a man as Fénelon should still sincerely hold the faith of a Christian. The great Fénelon did not argue with his guest. He simply maintained the humble, reverent spirit which his faith implied. In a little

while the guest cut short his visit and, on departing, left a note in his room addressed to his host to this effect: "Fénelon, I've simply got to leave your presence, else I will become a Christian in spite of myself." How marvelously this accords with Jesus' instruction to his disciples: "Ye shall be my witnesses." Bear witness and the rest will take care of itself. The hard thing is not faith, but faithfulness.

When I believe, therefore, I am growing, by the inevitability of spiritual law, into likeness to the type of being that I am allowing myself to think. The practical mystic applies this psychology to the limit. "Now are we the sons of God, it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." Mysticism develops his capacity of concentration to its highest power and thereby experiences the soul transformation that comes with it as its necessary result. In the process of formulating the ideal of faith the intellect functions in the same way as respects the mystic data as it does in forming the concepts of physical science from the data of sense perception. Hence it is that in the long run faith and reason must come together. Reason can neither establish nor annul faith; nor can faith go against reason. Personality is both believing and rational. In the end we simply cannot go contrary to the truth. Once we get a clear grasp of this

fact, it seems to me that we must become more tolerant and at the same time more energetic in our pursuit of spiritual truth.

The faith of religion is limited to the matters which bear on personal destiny. But here it must square with the facts of personality. That is just the reason why man simply cannot be an atheist. The practical result of this conclusion should lead us to the same kind of thorough study of the faith experience as we devote to other types of experience. It is reported that Thomas Edison has a motto hanging on the wall of his office, a quotation from Sir Joshua Reynolds, which reads as follows, "There is no expedient to which man will not resort to avoid the real labor of thinking." And Edison is quoted as saying that "this is what is the matter with us." If a man gets this impression in the field of applied science and practical invention, what parallel conclusion should come from reflection on the amount of real thinking men are doing about their religious faith?

The main thesis with which the writer is concerned is to show that the status of religion in human experience is just as factual as science; that mystic experience is just as real as sense experience; that the faith which produces mysticism requires the same ardent application of our best powers of thought and experiment as other types of experience; and that the re-

sults are just as certain and positive. He is concerned further to show that in face of the fact that ultimate destiny lies wholly within the domain of religion, it logically follows that thoroughness on the problems of faith should be man's first and most ardent interest. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God," was spoken by One who impressed His age as one who spoke "with authority, and not as the scribes." The scribes were but stenographers for whom other people did the thinking. A Church whose leadership is made up of scribes will necessarily lose the respect and interest of thoughtful people. It reflects badly on the intelligence of the people if it does not. And, lastly, the writer is concerned to show that, by its very nature, the taproot of religion achieves its promise wherever it receives the attention it deserves; and in so far as it does receive this attention it is the real master of civilization. An easy-going attitude toward the things of faith is quite as fatal as such an attitude is in other lines of human endeavor.

Having said this much about faith as an experience growing out of our personal nature and as necessarily qualified by our nature, we come next to consider its objective aspect. Faith is the expression of personality reaching out toward destiny. What further can be said of the object upon which it lays hold? What is there to indicate that God exists in any other way

than as the concept which the believer makes of Him and holds in his mind? May it not be that man has created God after his own image and that, therefore, God is but a fiction of the human imagination? This involves the old problem of how we know that we are not dreaming. By what signs do we get outside of ourselves and make sure that our noble thoughts have any guarantee other than imagination?

This introduces us to the wide problem of the ways to certitude and to the nature of reality of which we can attempt but the barest outline. In the first place we distinguish a dream or delirium experience from a normal experience by the fact that the normal experience fits into the totality of experience whereas the dream and hallucination do not. We assure ourselves that there is some kind of correspondence between an object which stimulates us and the type of conscious reaction which takes place within our minds, by the fact that when we act on it we get the results which the objectivity implies. For example, I see a post in front of me. My consciousness of the post is based on an activity in the retina. If I should dream of a post I might have the same type of consciousness of the post as I now have when I actually see one, but I need not take any account of the dream post in any of my plans of conduct. On the other hand, I cannot ignore the seen post in what I plan to

do. Not only so, but I can help others to adjust themselves to the seen post by the symbols of language, in which I have a further warrant of the objectivity of my experiences. In other words, I know objects outside myself by placing them within a system.

I experience the surface of the earth, day and night, sunrise and sunset, winter and summer. There is a remarkable regularity about these phenomena. Science tells me that these are explained by a complex system of forces and motions. The torrid zone remains torrid and the polar zones stay frozen because of the steady position of the earth with respect to the sun. This steady position is explained by a line of polarity running through the center of the earth and extending into infinite space north and south. As a matter of fact north and south are nothing more than directions on that line. I know that line of polarity is not a mere construction of my own imagination by the fact that the whole system of the planets and my relation to the experience of their motions fits this idea. I apply the same logic to my moral and æsthetic experiences. It is a fact that beauty is in the mind and that love clothes the object of its affection with lovable attributes. This is just as much a fact as that my reaction to a post is based on what happens in my retina, but no more. I do not put these clothes of affection on

the object of my dreams for the simple reason that the dream object is not there. The real object of my affections is there to bear the attributes of beauty and loveliness, and I know it, just as I do the post, by fitting my conduct in harmony with this experience regarded as objective. This experience of love imposes an obligation. The love thrives as this obligation is discharged. Moreover, this experience of love and the experience of obligation run through the social universe just as the line of polarity runs through the physical universe. The basal fact about love, as I experience it, is that there is a person at the other end. So with the universal sense of obligation that runs through the moral universe which is fostered by love, there is a person at the other end. Thus mystic vision is confirmed in its objective foundations in the same way as the vision of sense. I see God by mystic vision as I see the post by the vision of sense. God inspires the dormant spirit of man within the soul and "we love Him because He first loved us." God is the wooer. We believe in His proffer and accept Him, and by love we identify ourselves with Him.

Our spiritual ideals are the construction of the intellect made out of the data of mystic experience. An ideal is a sort of spiritual orbit in which the creature person moves. Faith functions as the governing bond between us and the

Absolute Person, who thus determines our orbit. "In him we live, and move, and have our being." Faith, then, goes beyond demonstration, but it remains within the consistent interpretation of experience.

Religious faith lays hold of the reality of spirit. Having done this, all the distinctive processes of religion fall into place and assume the form of a spiritual system which is internally coherent. This faith system crowns man's personal striving as the goal of the creative plan. Here God reveals Himself in love and mercy in a way that gives human responsibility its chance within a program guaranteed by divine justice and love.

It is not our purpose to enter upon any theological discussion, but rather to describe the working of religious faith in the scheme of things as we find it in experience. With this done, we have the principles by which to distinguish in the theological field between the essential things of the religious life and the superstitions that seem to persist. We are then on the way toward finding the universal religion by methods that find their legitimacy in the laws of the human mind, methods which rescue us from the danger of resting on dogmatic affirmation. If I am to bring a Buddhist or a Mohammedan to acknowledge Jesus Christ, and do it effectively, I must proceed in this way.

If Christianity is the true religion, as I believe it is, it must be capable of ultimately establishing the supremacy of its truth by the consistency with which it interprets the religious impulse, and the faith which issues from it. Dogmatic affirmations of its supremacy will accomplish nothing but antagonism. The way of faith is the way of life, and it is known by its fruits, fruits of consistent thinking and consistent living. The faith that ultimately wins is the faith that most completely satisfies the whole personality. This is the faith that is the master of civilization.

In brief, we have found that faith and knowledge are alike in that they are normal products of the human mind. They supplement each other in every field. Each is indispensable to the other. Neither one can stand alone. They are different from each other in that knowledge is always of parts of experience and as such finished, whereas faith is everlastingly reaching out after the unfinished whole. In this way it is faith that acts as the author and finisher of our personal nature. It is just because destiny must be achieved that religion has had to travel its weary way so haltingly. The only way destiny can be thought of without achievement is by abolishing our personal nature and making it the culmination of a mechanical process. But we are personal, and all along the tortuous path

of civilization, despite the grossness of its varied superstitions, personality gives the best expression of its genius in the presence of its gods. It is in the presence of his gods that man ultimately finds God, when he has found the truth, the truth that comprehends both nature and personality.

> The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth his handiwork.
>
> Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge.
>
> There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard.
>
> When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, The moon and the stars, which thou has ordained;
>
> What is man that thou art mindful of him? . . .
>
> For thou has made him a little lower than God.

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